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Abductive reasoning in science / Finnur Dellsén, University of Iceland.

Cambridge Open Access Books and Elements Available online

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Cambridge eBooks: Frontlist 2024 Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Dellsén, Finnur, author.
Series:
Cambridge elements. Elements in the philosophy of science 2517-7273.
Cambridge elements. Elements in the philosophy of science, 2517-7273
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Science--Methodology.
Science.
Reasoning.
Abduction (Logic).
Science--Philosophy.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (74 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).
Edition:
1st ed.
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY, USA : Cambridge University Press, 2024.
Summary:
"In abductive reasoning, scientific theories are evaluated on the basis of how well they would explain the available evidence. There are a number of subtly different accounts of this type of reasoning, most of which are inspired by the popular slogan "Inference to the Best Explanation." However, these accounts disagree about exactly how to spell out the slogan so as to avoid various problems for abductive reasoning. This Element aims, firstly, to give an opinionated overview both of the many accounts of abductive reasoning that have been proposed and the problems that have motivated them; and, secondly, to critically evaluate these accounts in a way that points toward a systematic view of the nature and purpose of abductive reasoning in science. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core"-- Provided by publisher
Contents:
Cover
Title Page
Imprints Page
Abductive Reasoning in Science
Contents
Introduction
1 A Brief History of Abductive Reasoning
1.1 The Historical Roots of Abductive Reasoning
1.2 Peirce's Notion of "Abduction"
1.3 The Hypothetico-Deductive Model
1.4 Inference to the Best Explanation
2 Contemporary Accounts of Abductive Reasoning
2.1 A Classification of Accounts
2.2 Inferential Accounts
2.3 Probabilistic Accounts
2.4 Hybrid Accounts
3 Why Prefer Explanatory Hypotheses?
3.1 Conceptions of Explanatory Goodness
3.2 Do Explanatory Virtues Track Truth?
3.3 Scope: Explaining More
3.4 Parsimony: Positing Less
4 Is Abductive Reasoning Irrational?
4.1 The Bad Lot Objection
4.2 The Dynamic Dutch Book Argument
4.3 Recent Challenges to Abductive Reasoning
4.3.1 The Screening-Off Challenge
4.3.2 The Problem of Multiple Plausible Rivals
4.3.3 Incoherence Across Explanatory Levels
Conclusion
References
Acknowledgments
Notes:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 03 Jun 2024).
ISBN:
9781009353212
1009353217
9781009353229
1009353225
9781009353199
1009353195

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