Contests : Theory and Applications / Carmen Beviá and Luis Corchón.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Beviá, Carmen, author.

Corchón, Luis, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Game theory--Economic aspects.

Game theory.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xvi, 219 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, [2024]

Summary:

Contest theory is an important part of game theory used to analyse different types of contests and conflicts. Traditional microeconomic models focus on situations where property rights are well defined, and agents voluntarily trade rights over goods or produce rights for new goods. However, much less focus has been given to other situations where agents do not trade property rights, but rather fight over them. Contests: Theory and Applications presents a state-of-the art discussion of the economics of contests from the perspective of both core theory and applications. It provides a new approach to standard topics in labour, education, welfare and development and introduces areas like voting, industrial organisation, mechanism design, sport, and military conflict. Using elementary mathematics, this book provides a versatile framework for navigating this growing area of study and serves as an essential resource for its wide variety of applications in economics and political science

Contents:

Cover

Half-title

Title page

Imprints page

Contents

List of Illustrations

List of Tables

Preface

Book Outline

How to Use This Book

Part I Foundations

1 An Introduction to Contests

1.1 Contests in the Early Economic Literature

1.2 Examples

1.3 The Main Concept

1.4 Contest as a Normal Form Game

1.5 Extensions

2 Contest Success Functions

2.1 All Pay Auction (Hillman and Riley, 1989)

2.2 Difference CSF (Hirshleifer, 1989)

2.3 Ratio Form CSF (Tullock, 1980)

2.4 Extensions of Ratio: Logit CSF (Dixit, 1987)

2.5 Extensions of Ratio: Ratio Plus Luck and Relative Difference CSFs

2.6 Additive Separable CSF

2.7 Advanced Material: The Existence of a Symmetric Equilibrium with General CSF

2.8 Exercises

3 Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Agents

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Two Contestants

3.3 Equilibrium with Heterogeneous Agents and Ratio Form CSF

3.4 Effects of Rent-Seeking

3.5 All Pay Auction with More Than Two Contestants

3.6 Empirical Estimation of CSF

3.7 Appendix: Existence of a Nash Equilibrium for Two-Person Games

3.8 Exercises

4 Foundations for Contest Success Functions

4.1 Noisy Performance

4.2 Axiomatics

4.3 Contests Organized by a Planner

4.4 Bargaining and Claims

4.5 Exercises

Part II Extensions

5 Contests between Groups

5.1 A Model of Contests between Groups

5.2 Free Riding

5.3 The Size of Groups and the Success of Conspiracies

5.4 Endogenous Sharing Rules

5.5 Exercises

6 Sabotage

6.1 An Example

6.2 The Basic Model of Sabotage in Contest

6.3 Equilibrium with and without Sabotage

6.4 Consequences of Sabotage

6.5 Exercises

7 Dynamic Contests

7.1 Endogenous Timing Contests

7.2 Elimination Contests

7.3 Races

7.4 Effort as an Investment for the Future

7.5 Repeated Contests

7.6 Exercises

8 Asymmetric Information

8.1 One-Sided Asymmetric Information

8.2 Characteristics of Equilibrium in One-Sided Asymmetric Information

8.3 Two-Sided Asymmetric Information

8.4 Characteristics of Equilibrium in Two-Sided Asymmetric Information

8.5 Exercises

Part III Applications

9 Contests in Other Environments: Draws, Large Contests, and Entry

9.1 Contest with Draws

9.2 Large Contests

9.3 Several Alternative Contests

9.4 Exercises

10 Contests in Classical Problems: Divisionalization, Monopoly Welfare Losses, Coase Theorem, Voting

10.1 Divisionalized Firms

10.2 The Fight for Monopoly Rents

10.3 The Coase Theorem with a Previous Contest

10.4 Contests and Voting

10.5 Derivation of the Winning Probabilities

10.6 Exercises

11 Contests, Institutions, Wars, and Economic Success

11.1 Rent-Seeking and Economic Performance: The Basic Trade-off

11.2 Why Some Countries Succeed While Others Do not

11.3 War

11.4 Exercises

Notes:

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 30 May 2024).

Description based on print version record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9781009504416

100950441X

9781009504430

1009504436

9781009504409

1009504401