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Essentials of biological security : a global perspective / edited by Lijun Shang, Weiwen Zhang, Malcolm Dando.
- Format:
- Book
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Biosecurity.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (xxxii, 288 pages) : illustrations (some color)
- Place of Publication:
- Hoboken, NJ : John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2024.
- Contents:
- 12.5 The Strengths of IOs in Biosecurity and Prevention of Biological Warfare
- 12.6 The Limits of IOs in Biosecurity and Prevention of Biological Warfare
- 12.7 Conclusions
- Author Biography
- References
- 13 Laboratory Biorisk Management as a Key Tool for Scientists to Understand Future Biological Threats and Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention 161 Mayra Ameneiros
- 13.1 History, Context and Current International Guidance
- 13.2 Biosafety and Biosecurity Awareness
- 13.3 The Role of Scientists: Tailored Biorisk Management Practices
- 13.4 Case Scenarios: Practical Examples
- 13.5 An Ongoing Cycle to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention
- 14 Examples of Biorisk Management National Regulatory Frameworks 173 Dana Perkins and Lela Bakanidze
- 14.1 Introduction
- 14.2 Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity in the US
- 14.3 Import-Export and Transportation of Infectious Substances in the US
- 14.4 Genetic Engineering and Dual-Use Oversight in the US
- 14.5 The Culture of Biosafety, Biosecurity and Responsible Conduct in the US
- 14.6 The Biorisk Management National Regulatory Framework of Georgia
- 14.7 Conclusion
- 15 Lessons from ePPP Research and the COVID-19 Pandemic 189 Nariyoshi Shinomiya
- 15.1 Advances in Life Science and Technology and the Emergence of 'So-Called GOF Studies' to Create ePPPs
- 15.2 Controversy Surrounding GOF Studies on H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus
- 15.3 COVID-19 and GOF Studies on SARS-like Viruses
- 15.4 Ongoing Discussions at the NSABB and Governance by HHS
- 15.5 Future Governance of GOF Research and Prospects
- 16 The Hague Ethical Guidelines and the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines 201 Yang Xue
- 16.1 Relations Between the Hague Ethical Guidelines and the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines
- 16.1.1 Commonality in International Soft Law
- 16.1.2 Commonality in Global Public Goods
- 16.1.3 Effective Multilateralism
- 16.2 BTWC Advances the Formulation of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Responsible Scientific Research
- 16.2.1 Institutional Basis of BTWC for Responsible Scientific Research
- 16.2.2 BTWC Advances the Development of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Scientific Research
- 16.3 Constitution of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines: Ideas, Principles, Elements and Path Formation
- 16.3.1 Ideas
- 16.3.2 Principles
- 16.3.3 Path Formation
- 16.4 Future Discussion
- 17 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management 213 Yuhan Bao and Alonso Flores
- 17.1 Introduction: Scientists Engagement and Biorisk Management
- 17.2 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management at International Level: Case from IWG Assessment Framework
- 17.2.1 Building the Culture of Responsibility: The Key Elements and Approaches of Engaging Scientist in Biorisk Management
- 17.2.2 Improving the Culture of Responsibility: Engaging Scientist in the Assessment of Biorisk Management Systems
- 17.3 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management in National Institutional Oversight: Case from the Netherlands
- 17.4 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management in Community: Case from iGEM
- 17.4.1 Engaging Scientists Through iGEM Safety Rules Checklist and Safety Screening System
- 17.4.2 Engaging Scientists Through iGEM Human Practices Programme
- 17.5 Conclusion: How to Engage Scientists in Management of Biorisk and Other Emerging Fields
- 18 The Role of Ethics in Dealing with Dual Use 225 Leifan Wang
- 18.1 The Dual-Use Concept and Concerns
- 18.2 Ethics as an Instrument on Dual-Use Governance
- 18.2.1 Ethics Promote Responsible Practices on Dual Use
- 18.2.2 Limitation of Ethics in Dealing with Dual Use
- 18.3 Existing and Complementary Ethical Guidelines on Dual Use
- 18.4 Recent Dual-Use Scenarios
- 18.4.1 Synthetic Biology
- 18.4.2 Gene Editing
- 18.4.3 Neuroscience
- 18.4.4 Digital Biological Data
- 18.5 Ethical Education for Future Dual Use
- 19 Where Is the Governance of Dual-Use Science Going? 237 Nancy Connell and Gigi Gronvall
- 19.1 Background: Genetic Technologies and Their Applications
- 19.2 Dual-Use Science: Evolving Story of a Dualistic Term
- 19.3 Begin with the Experts: Models of Self-regulation
- 19.3.1 From Asilomar to Napa
- 19.3.2 Tools for Self-regulation: Risk and Benefit Analyses: Useful Frameworks
- 19.3.3 A Patchwork of Layered Oversight, from Global to Local
- 19.3.4 Self-regulation: The Basis of Scientific Enterprise
- 19.3.5 Oversight Along the Life Cycle of Research: Universities Are Sites of Layered Governance
- 19.3.6 Toward an International Model: International Collaboration in Science and Technology (ICST)
- 19.3.7 International Standards for Biosafety and Biosecurity
- 19.4 Alternative Governance Structures
- 19.4.1 Hybrid Governance Models
- 19.4.2 Network-Based Governance
- 19.4.3 Transnational Governance
- 19.5 Conclusion
- 20 Towards an International Biosecurity Education Network (IBSEN) 251 Kathryn Millett and Lijun Shang
- 20.1 Introduction
- 20.2 The Need for Biosecurity Education, Awareness-Raising and a Culture of Responsibility in the Life Sciences
- 20.3 Past Efforts in Educating Life Scientists and Establishing a Culture of Responsibility
- 20.4 Challenges Faced by Biosecurity Education and Awareness-Raising
- 20.5 Comparable Approaches Implemented in Analogous Frameworks in the Nuclear and Chemistry Fields
- 20.5.1 IAEA Nuclear Security Culture and the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN)
- 20.5.2 Chemical Weapons Convention and the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO)
- 20.5.3 Key Lessons from the INSEN and ABEO for an International Biosecurity Educational Network (IBSEN)
- 20.5.3.1 Comprehensive Understanding Learned from Related Initiatives
- 20.5.3.2 A Biosecurity Education Network Must Be Underpinned by Firm and Sustained Commitment from States and the Future Network's Host Body (Such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention)
- 20.5.3.3 Sustained Financial Support Observed and Maintained
- 20.5.3.4 Strategic Vision and Clear Pathways Are Required for Communication and Collaboration Between a Network and Treaty Bodies/States
- 20.5.3.5 Diversity of Memberships and Engagement with a Wide Range of Stakeholders
- 20.6 Conclusion
- Appendix A: The Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists
- Index.
- Notes:
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- Electronic reproduction. Hoboken, N.J. Available via World Wide Web.
- Description based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on March 06, 2024).
- Local Notes:
- Acquired for the Penn Libraries with assistance from the Rosengarten Family Fund.
- Other Format:
- Print version: Essentials of biological security
- ISBN:
- 9781394189038
- 1394189036
- 1394189028
- 9781394189045
- 1394189044
- 9781394189021
- Publisher Number:
- 40032292887
- Access Restriction:
- Restricted for use by site license.
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