Enterprise Level Security 1 And 2.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Foltz, Kevin.

Contributor:

Simpson, W. R. (William R.)

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Computer networks--Security measures.

Computer networks.

Industries--Security measures.

Industries.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (752 pages)

Edition:

1st.

Place of Publication:

Milton : Taylor & Francis Group, 2020.

Summary:

This is a set, comprising of Enterprise Level Security and Enterprise Level Security 2.Enterprise Level Security: Securing Information Systems in an Uncertain World provides a modern alternative to the fortress approach to security. The new approach is more distributed and has no need for passwords or accounts. Global attacks become much more difficult, and losses are localized, should they occur. The security approach is derived from a set of tenets that form the basic security model requirements. Many of the changes in authorization within the enterprise model happen automatically. Identities and claims for access occur during each step of the computing process.Many of the techniques in this book have been piloted. These techniques have been proven to be resilient, secure, extensible, and scalable. The operational model of a distributed computer environment defense is currently being implemented on a broad scale for a particular enterprise.The first section of the book comprises seven chapters that cover basics and philosophy, including discussions on identity, attributes, access and privilege, cryptography, the cloud, and the network. These chapters contain an evolved set of principles and philosophies that were not apparent at the beginning of the project.The second section, consisting of chapters eight through twenty-two, contains technical information and details obtained by making painful mistakes and reworking processes until a workable formulation was derived. Topics covered in this section include claims-based authentication, credentials for access claims, claims creation, invoking an application, cascading authorization, federation, and content access control. This section also covers delegation, the enterprise attribute ecosystem, database access, building enterprise software, vulnerability analyses, the enterprise support desk, and network defense.Enterprise Level Security 2: Advanced Topics in an Uncertain World follows on from the authors' first book on Enterprise Level Security (ELS), which covered the basic concepts of ELS and the discoveries made during the first eight years of its development. This book follows on from this to give a discussion of advanced topics and solutions, derived from 16 years of research, pilots, and operational trials in putting an enterprise system together. The chapters cover specific advanced topics derived from painful mistakes and numerous revisions of processes. This book covers many of the topics omitted from the first book including multi-factor authentication, cloud key management, enterprise change management, entity veracity, homomorphic computing, device management, mobile ad hoc, big data, mediation, and several other topics. The ELS model of enterprise security is endorsed by the Secretary of the Air Force for Air Force computing systems and is a candidate for DoD systems under the Joint Information Environment Program. The book is intended for enterprise IT architecture developers, application developers, and IT security professionals. This is a unique approach to end-to-end security and fills a niche in the market. Dr. Kevin E. Foltz, Institute for Defense Analyses, has over a decade of experience working to improve security in information systems. He has presented and published research on different aspects of enterprise security, security modeling, and high assurance systems. He also has degrees in Mathematics, Computer Science, Electrical Engineering, and Strategic Security Studies. Dr. William R. Simpson, Institute for Defense Analyses, has over two decades of experience working to improve systems security. He has degrees in Aeronautical Engineering and Business Administration, as well as undergoing military and government training. He spent many years as an expert in aeronautics before delving into the field of electronic and system testing, and he has spent the last 20 years on IT-rel

Contents:

Cover

Volume 01

Cover

Half Title

Title Page

Copyright Page

Dedication

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Foreword

Preface

Acknowledgments

Author

1 Introduction

1.1 Problem Description

1.1.1 Success beyond Anticipation

1.1.2 But, It Started Long before That

1.1.2.1 A Brief History of the Development of the WWW

1.1.3 Fast-Forward to Today

1.2 What Is Enterprise Level Security?

1.3 Distributed versus Centralized Security

1.3.1 Case Study: Boat Design

1.3.2 Case Study Enterprise Information Technology Environment

1.3.3 Security Aspects

1.3.3.1 Confidentiality

1.3.3.2 Integrity

1.3.3.3 Availability

1.3.3.4 Authenticity

1.3.3.5 Nonrepudiation

1.4 Crafting a Security Model

1.4.1 The Assumptions

1.4.2 Tenets: Digging beneath the Security Aspects

1.5 Entities and Claims

1.5.1 Credentialing

1.6 Robust Assured Information Sharing

1.6.1 Security Requirements

1.6.2 Security Mechanisms

1.6.3 Goals and Assumptions of IA Architecture

1.6.4 Assumptions

1.6.5 A Framework for Entities in Distributed Systems

1.7 Key Concepts

1.7.1 ELS-Specific Concepts

1.7.2 Mapping between Tenets and Key Concepts

1.7.3 Enterprise-Level Derived Requirements

1.7.4 Mapping between Key Concepts and Derived Requirements

1.8 Two Steps Forward and One Step Back

1.9 The Approximate Time-Based Crafting

1.10 Summary

Section I Basics and Philosophy

2 Identity

2.1 Who Are You?

2.2 Naming

2.3 Identity and Naming: Case Study

2.4 Implications for Information Security

2.5 Personas

2.6 Identity Summary

3 Attributes

3.1 Facts and Descriptors

3.2 An Attribute Ecosystem

3.3 Data Sanitization

3.3.1 Guarded and Filtered Inputs

3.3.2 Guard Administrator Web Interface

3.3.3 Integrity in Attribute Stores.

3.3.4 Secure Data Acquisition

3.3.5 Integrity at the Source

3.4 Temporal Data

3.5 Credential Data

3.6 Distributed Stores

4 Access and Privilege

4.1 Access Control

4.2 Authorization and Access in General

4.3 Access Control List

4.3.1 Group Requirements

4.3.2 Role Requirements

4.3.3 ACRs and ACLs

4.3.4 Discretionary Access Control and Mandatory Access Control

4.4 Complex Access Control Schemas

4.5 Privilege

4.6 Concept of Least Privilege

4.6.1 Least Privilege Case Study

5 Cryptography

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Cryptographic Keys and Key Management

5.2.1 Asymmetric Key Pairs

5.2.1.1 RSA Key Generation

5.3 Symmetric Keys

5.3.1 TLS Mutual Authentication Key Production

5.3.2 Other Key Production

5.4 Store Keys

5.5 Delete Keys

5.6 Encryption

5.7 Symmetric versus Asymmetric Encryption Algorithms

5.7.1 Asymmetric Encryption

5.7.2 RSA Asymmetric Encryption

5.7.3 Combination of Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryption

5.7.4 Symmetric Encryption

5.7.4.1 Stream Ciphers

5.7.4.2 Block Ciphers

5.7.5 AES/Rijndael Encryption

5.7.5.1 Description of the AES Cipher

5.7.6 Data Encryption Standard

5.7.6.1 Triple DES

5.7.6.2 Description of the Triple DES Cipher

5.8 Decryption

5.8.1 Asymmetric Decryption

5.8.2 Symmetric Decryption

5.9 Hash Function

5.9.1 Hash Function Algorithms

5.9.2 Hashing with Cryptographic Hash Function

5.9.2.1 MD-5

5.9.2.2 SHA-3-Defined SHA-512

5.10 Signatures

5.10.1 XML Signature

5.10.2 S/MIME Signature

5.10.3 E-Content Signature

5.11 A Note on Cryptographic Key Lengths

5.11.1 Encryption Key Discovery

5.11.2 The High-Performance Dilemma

5.11.3 Parallel Decomposition of Key Discovery

5.12 Internet Protocol Security

5.13 Other Cryptographic Services

5.14 The Java Cryptography Extension.

5.15 Data at Rest

5.16 Data in Motion

6 The Cloud

6.1 The Promise of Cloud Computing

6.2 Benefits of the Cloud

6.3 Drawbacks of Cloud Usage

6.3.1 Differences from Traditional Data Centers

6.3.2 Some Changes in the Threat Scenario

6.4 Challenges for the Cloud and High Assurance

6.5 Cloud Accountability, Monitoring, and Forensics

6.5.1 Accountability

6.5.2 Monitoring

6.5.3 Knowledge Repository

6.5.4 Forensic Tools

6.6 Standard Requirements for Cloud Forensics

7 The Network

7.1 The Network Entities

7.1.1 Most Passive Elements

7.1.2 Issues of the Most Passive Devices

7.1.3 The Convenience Functions

7.1.4 Issues for the Convenience Functions

7.1.5 Content Analyzers

7.1.6 Issues for Content Analyzers

Section II Technical Details

8 Claims-Based Authentication

8.1 Authentication and Identity

8.2 Credentials in the Enterprise

8.3 Authentication in the Enterprise

8.3.1 Certificate Credentials

8.3.2 Registration

8.3.3 Authentication

8.4 Infrastructure Security Component Interactions

8.4.1 Interactions Triggered by a User Request for Service

8.4.2 Interaction Triggered by a Service Request

8.5 Compliance Testing

8.6 Federated Authentication

8.6.1 Naming and Identity

8.6.2 Translation of Claims or Identities

8.6.3 Data Requirements

8.6.4 Other Issues

9 Credentials for Access Claims

9.1 Security Assertion Markup Language

9.2 Access Control Implemented in the Web Service

9.3 Establishing Least Privilege

9.4 Default Values

9.5 Creating an SAML Token

9.6 Scaling of the STS for High Assurance Architectures

9.7 Rules for Maintaining High Assurance during Scale-Up

10 Claims Creation

10.1 Access Control Requirements at the Services

10.1.1 Discretionary Access Control List

10.1.2 Mandatory Access Control.

10.1.3 Access Control Logic

10.2 Access Control Requirement

10.3 Enterprise Service Registry

10.4 Claims Engine

10.5 Computed Claims Record

11 Invoking an Application

11.1 Active Entities

11.2 Claims-Based Access Control

11.2.1 Authorization in the Enterprise Context

11.3 Establishing Least Privilege

11.4 Authorizing the User to the Web Application

11.5 Authorizing a Web Service to a Web Service

11.6 Interaction between Security Components

11.6.1 Access from within the Enterprise

11.6.2 Disconnected, Intermittent, or Limited Environments

11.6.2.1 Prioritization of Communications

11.6.2.2 Reduction of the Need for Capacity

11.6.2.3 Asset Requirements

12 Cascading Authorization

12.1 Basic Use Case

12.2 Standard Communication

12.3 Pruning Attributes, Groups, and Roles

12.4 Required Escalation of Privilege

12.5 Data Requirements for the Pruning of Elements

12.6 Saving of the SAML Assertion

12.7 SAML Token Modifications for Further Calls

12.8 An Annotated Notional Example

12.9 Additional Requirements

12.10 Service Use Case Summary

13 Federation

13.1 Federation

13.2 Elements of Federated Communication

13.2.1 Naming and Identity

13.2.2 Credentials

13.2.3 PKI-X.509 Certificates

13.2.4 Certificate Services

13.2.5 Bilateral Authentication

13.2.6 Authorization Using SAML Packages

13.2.7 Registration of the STS

13.2.8 Recognizing STS Signatures

13.2.9 Translation of Properties, Roles, and Groups

13.2.10 Other Issues

13.3 Example Federation Agreement

13.4 Access from Outside the Enterprise

13.5 Trusted STS Store

13.6 Trusted STS Governance

14 Content Access Control

14.1 Authoritative and Nonauthoritative Content

14.2 Content Delivery Digital Rights Management

14.3 Mandatory Access Control.

14.4 Access Control Content Management System

14.5 Enforcing Access Control

14.6 Labeling of Content and Information Assets

14.7 Conveying Restrictions to the Requester

14.8 Enforcing/Obtaining Acknowledgment of Rest

14.9 Metadata

14.10 Content Management Function

14.11 Components of a Stored Information Asset

14.11.1 Information Asset, Section A: ACL, MAC, and Data

14.11.2 Information Asset, Section B: Information Asset as Labeled

14.11.3 Information Asset, Section C: Information Asset Signature(s)

14.11.4 Information Asset, Section D: MDE Metacard

14.12 Additional Elements for Stored Information Assets

14.12.1 Key Words

14.12.2 Storage Location(s) of Key Word Metadata

14.12.3 Reference Identity and Information Asset Description

14.12.4 Information Asset Name

14.12.5 Information Asset Description

14.13 Key Management Simplification

14.13.1 Information Asset

14.14 Import or Export of Information Assets

15 Delegation

15.1 Delegation Service

15.2 Service Description for Delegation

15.3 Form of Extended Claims Record

15.4 Special Delegation Service

16 The Enterprise Attribute Ecosystem

16.1 User and Data Owner Convenience Functions

16.1.1 Self-Registration (Partial)

16.1.2 User Attribute Service

16.1.3 Service Discovery

16.1.4 User Claim Query Service

16.1.5 Direct Service/Application Invocation

16.1.6 Trusted Delegation Service

16.1.7 Special Delegation Service

16.2 Attribute Ecosystems Use Cases

16.2.1 Process Flows Related to Security for Each Service

16.2.2 Updating Claims

16.2.3 Adding a New Identity

16.2.4 Adding a Service

16.2.5 Accessing Services

16.2.6 Providing Delegation

16.2.7 Providing Special Delegation

16.3 Attribute Ecosystem Services

16.3.1 Authoritative Content Import Service(s).

16.3.2 Manage Import and Aggregation Web Application.

Notes:

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

<p></p><p><strong>Enterprise Level Security (1)</strong></p><p><strong></strong></p><p><strong>1 Introduction</strong></p><p><strong> </strong></p><p>1.1 Problem Description</p><p>1.1.1 Success beyond Anticipation</p><p>1.1.2 But, It Started Long before ­at</p><p>1.1.2.1 A Brief History of the Development of the WWW</p><p>1 1.1.3 Fast-Forward to Today</p><p>1.2 What Is Enterprise Level Security?</p><p>1.3 Distributed versus Centralized Security</p><p>1.3.1 Case Study: Boat Design</p><p>1.3.2 Case Study Enterprise Information Technology Environment</p><p>1.3.3 Security Aspects</p><p>1.3.3.1 Confidentiality</p><p>1.3.3.2 Integrity</p><p>1.3.3.3 Availability</p><p>1.3.3.4 Authenticity</p><p>1.3.3.5 Nonrepudiation</p><p>1.4 Crafting a Security Model</p><p>1.4.1 ­e Assumptions</p><p>1.4.2 Tenets: Digging beneath the Security Aspects</p><p>1.5 Entities and Claims</p><p>1.5.1 Credentialing</p><p>1.6 Robust Assured Information Sharing</p><p>1.6.1 Security Requirements</p><p>1.6.2 Security Mechanisms</p><p>1.6.3 Goals and Assumptions of IA Architecture</p><p>1.6.4 Assumptions</p><p>1.6.5 A Framework for Entities in Distributed Systems</p><p>1.7 Key Concepts</p><p>1.7.1 ELS-Specific Concepts</p><p>1.7.2 Mapping between Tenets and Key Concepts</p><p>1.7.3 Enterprise-Level Derived Requirements</p><p>1.7.4 Mapping between Key Concepts and Derived Requirements</p><p>1.8 Two Steps Forward and One Step Back</p><p>1.9 ­e Approximate Time-Based Crafting</p><p>1.10 Summary</p><p> </p><p><strong>SECTION I BASICS AND PHILOSOPHY</strong></p><p><strong> </strong></p><p><strong>2 Identity</strong></p><p><strong> </strong></p><p>2.1 Who Are You?</p><p>2.2 Naming</p><p>2.3 Identity and Naming: Case Study</p><p>2.4 Implications for Information Security</p><p>2.5 Personas</p><p>2.6 Identity Summary</p><p> </p><p><strong>3 Attributes</strong></p><p><strong> </strong></p><p>3.1 Facts and Descriptors</p><p>3.2 An Attribute Ecosystem</p><p>3.3 Data Sanitization</p><p>3.3.1 Guarded and Filtered Inputs</p><p>3.3.2 Guard Administrator Web Interface</p><p>3.3.3 Integrity in Attribute Stores</p><p>3.3.4 Secure Data Acquisition</p><p>3.3.5 Integrity at the Source</p><p>3.4 Temporal Data</p><p>3.5 Credential Data</p><p>3.6 Distributed Stores</p><p> </p><p><strong>4 Access and Privilege </strong></p><p><strong> </strong></p><p>4.1 Access Control</p><p>4.2 Authorization and Access in General</p><p>4.3 Access Control List</p><p>4.3.1 Group Requirements</p><p>4.3.2 Role Requirements</p><p>4.3.3 ACRs and ACLs</p><p>4.3.4 Discretionary Access Control and Mandatory Access Control</p><p>4.4 Complex Access Control Schemas</p><p>4.5 Privilege</p><p>4.6 Concept of Least Privilege</p><p>4.6.1 Least Privilege Case Study</p><p> </p><p><strong>5 Cryptography </strong></p><p><strong> </strong></p><p>5.1 Introduction</p><p>5.2 Cryptographic Keys and Key Management</p><p>5.2.1 Asymmetric Key Pairs</p><p>5.2.1.1 RSA Key Generation</p><p>5.3 Symmetric Keys</p><p>5.3.1 TLS Mutual Authentication Key Production</p><p>5.3.2 Other Key Production</p><p>5.4 Store Keys</p><p>5.5 Delete Keys</p><p>5.6 Encryption</p><p>5.7 Symmetric versus Asymmetric Encryption Algorithms</p><p>5.7.1 Asymmetric Encryption</p><p>5.7.2 RSA Asymmetric Encryption</p><p>5.7.3 Combination of Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryption</p><p>5.7.4 Symmetric Encryption</p><p>5.7.4.1 Stream Ciphers</p><p>5.7.4.2 Block Ciphers</p><p>5.7.5 AES/Rijndael Encryption</p><p>5.7.5.1 Description of the AES Cipher</p><p>5.7.6 Data Encryption Standard</p><p>5.7.6.1 Triple DES</p><p>5.7.6.2 Description of the Triple DES Cipher</p><p>5.8 Decryption</p><p>5.8.1 Asymmetric Decryption</p><p>5.8.2 Symmetric Decryption</p><p>5.9 Hash Function</p><p>5.9.1 Hash Function Algorithms</p><p>5.9.2 Hashing with Cryptographic Hash Function</p><p>5.9.2.1 MD-5</p><p>5.9.2.2 SHA-3-Defined SHA-512</p><p>5.10 Signatures</p><p>5.10.1 XML Signature</p><p>5.10.2 S/MIME Signature</p><p>5.10.3 E-Content Signature</p><p>5.11 A Note on Cryptographic Key Lengths</p><p>5.11.1 Encryption Key Discovery</p><p>5.11.2 ­e High-Performance Dilemma</p><p>5.11.3 Parallel Decomposition of Key Discovery</p><p>5.12 Internet Protocol Security</p><p>5.13 Other Cryptographic Services</p><p>5.14 ­e Java Cryptography Extension</p><p>5.15 Data at Rest</p><p>5.16 Data in Motion</p><p> </p><p><strong>6 The Cloud </strong></p><p><strong> </strong></p><p>6.1 ­e Promise of Cloud Computing</p><p>6.2 Benefits of the Cloud</p><p>6.3 Drawbacks of Cloud Usage</p><p>6.3.1 Differences from Traditional Data Centers</p><p>6.3.2 Some Changes in the ­reat Scenario</p><p>6.4 Challenges for the Cloud and High Assurance</p><p>6.5 Cloud Accountability, Monitoring, and Forensics</p><p>6.5.1 Accountability</p><p>6.5.2 Monitoring</p><p>6.5.3 Knowledge Repository</p><p>6.5.4 Forensic Tools</p><p>6.6 Standard Requirements for Cloud Forensics</p><p> </p><p><strong>7 The Network</strong></p><p><strong> </strong></p><p>7.1 ­e Network Entities</p><p>7.1.1 Most Passive Elements</p><p>7.1.2 Issues of the Most Passive Devices</p><p>7.1.3 ­e Convenience Functions</p><p>7.1.4 Issues for the Convenience Functions</p><p>7.1.5 Content Analyzers</p><p>7.1.6 Issues for Content Analyzers</p><p> </p><p><strong>SECTION II TECHNICAL DETAILS</strong></p><p><strong> </strong></p><p><strong>8 Claims-Based Authentication</strong></p><p><strong> </strong></p><p>8.1 Authentication and Identity</p><p>8.2 Credentials in the Enterprise</p><p>8.3 Authentication in the Enterprise</p><p>8.3.1 Certificate Credentials</p><p>8.3.2 Registration</p><p>8.3.3 Authentication</p><p>8.4 Infrastructure Security Component Interactions</p><p>8.4.1 Interactions Triggered by a User Request for Service</p><p>8.4.2 Interaction Triggered by a Service Request</p><p>8.5 Compliance Testing</p><p>8.6 Federated Authentication</p><p>8.6.1 Naming and Identity</p><p>8.6.2 Translation of Claims or Identities</p><p>8.6.3 Data Requirements</p><p>8.6.4 Other Issues</p><p> </p><p><strong>9 Credentials for Access Claims </strong></p><p><strong> </strong></p><p>9.1 Security Assertion Markup Language</p><p>9.2 Access Control Implemented in the Web Service</p><p>9.3 Establishing Least Privilege</p><p>9.4 Default Values</p><p>9.5 Creating an SAML Token</p><p>9.6 Scaling of the STS for High Assurance Architectures</p><p>9.7 Rules for Maintaining High Assurance during Scale-Up</p><p> </p><p><strong>10 Claims Creation </strong></p><p><strong> </strong></p><p>10.1 Access Control Requirements at the Services</p><p>10.1.1 Discretionary Access Control List</p><p>10.1.2 Mandatory Access Control</p><p>10.1.3 Access Control Logic</p><p>10.2 Access Control Requirement</p><p>10.3 Enterprise Service Registry</p><p>10.4 Claims Engine</p><p>10.5 Computed Claims Record</p><p> </p><p><strong>11 Invoking an Application</strong></p><p><strong> </strong></p><p>11.1 Active Entities</p><p>11.2 Claims-Based Access Control</p><p>11.2.1 Authorization in the Enterprise Context</p><p>11.3 Establishing Least Privileg

ISBN:

9781000165173

1000165175

OCLC:

1338678808