The epistemology of desire and the problem of nihilism / Allan Hazlett.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Hazlett, Allan, author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Nihilism (Philosophy).

Desire (Philosophy).

Physical Description:

1 online resource.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2024.

Summary:

This text is about the idea that goodness is the correctness condition for desire, in the same way that truth is the correctness condition for belief. Allan Hazlett argues that, given this similarity between desire and belief, desires, like beliefs, can both amount to knowledge and be justified or unjustified.

Contents:

Cover

The Epistemology of Desire and the Problem of Nihilism

Copyright

Dedication

Contents

Acknowledgments

1: Introduction

1.1 The Thought That Nothing Matters

1.2 The Humean Solution

1.3 The Problem of Nihilism and the Nature of Desire

1.4 Desire as Non-Instrumental

1.5 The Practical Theory of Desire

1.6 Desire as Evaluation

1.7 The Evaluative Belief Theory of Desire

1.8 The Evaluative Perception Theory of Desire

1.9 The Prospective Theory of Desire

1.10 AD Is Not a Theory of Desire

1.11 Desire and the Emotions

1.12 The Epistemology of Desire

1.13 Synopsis

2: Accurate Desire

2.1 Truth as the Accuracy Condition for Belief

2.2 Goodness as the Accuracy Condition for Desire

2.3 Desire as Propositional

2.4 Propositional Goodness

2.5 Aversion

2.6 "Good" vs. "Good For"

2.7 Degrees of Goodness and Strength of Desire

2.8 Axial Gaps

2.9 Axial Gluts?

2.10 Desiring the Bad

2.11 Conclusion

3: Why Criticize Desires for the Bad?

3.1 Axial Criticism of Desires

3.2 Desires for the Bad Are Inaccurate

3.3 Desires for the Bad Depend on False Beliefs

3.4 Desires for the Bad Are Abnormal

3.5 Desires for the Bad Are Vicious

3.6 Desires for the Bad Might Have Bad Consequences

3.7 Desires for the Bad Are Bad

3.8 Desires for the Bad Are Unfitting

3.9 Desires for the Bad Are Unreasonable

3.10 Desires for the Bad Are Desires There Is a Reason Not to Have

3.11 Conclusion

4: Desire That Amounts to Knowledge

4.1 Orectic Knowledge as Knowledge of Goodness

4.2 The Ethical Importance of Orectic Knowledge

4.3 Knowledge as Apt Mental Representation

4.4 An Account of Orectic Knowledge

4.5 Sources of Orectic Knowledge

4.6 Orectic Knowledge and Epistemic Luck

4.7 Conclusion

5: Irrational Desire

5.1 Irrationality and Deliberation

5.2 Desire and Deliberation

5.3 Doxastic Deliberation

5.4 Attitude Formation through Deliberation

5.5 Orectic Deliberation Is Not Practical Deliberation

5.6 Orectic Deliberation Is Not Instrumental Doxastic Deliberation

5.7 A Case

5.8 Orectic Deliberation

5.9 Acedia

5.10 Is Acedia Irrational?

5.11 Orectic Deliberation Is Not (the Same Thing as) Evaluative Doxastic Deliberation

5.12 Why Is Desire Susceptible to Deliberation?

5.13 Conclusion

6: The Problem

6.1 Statement of the Problem

6.2 The Realist Solution

6.3 The Expressivist Solution

6.4 The Humean Solution, Again

6.5 The Egoistic Solution

6.6 The Relativistic Solution

6.7 The Perspectival Solution

6.8 The Naturalist Solution

6.9 Conclusion

7: Desiring the Neutral

7.1 Strong Incoherence

7.2 The Risk of Contradiction

7.3 Weak Incoherence

7.4 James' Two Intellectual Duties

7.5 Non-Accurate Representation

7.6 Why Weak Incoherence Is Rationally Permissible

7.7 Preference

7.8 Why It Matters That We Already Have Desires

Notes:

Also issued in print: 2024.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (viewed on January 9, 2024).

Other Format:

Print version :

ISBN:

0-19-199558-4

OCLC:

1416892225