Army aviation special and incentive pay policies to promote performance, manage talent, and sustain retention / AVERY CALKINS, MICHAEL G. MATTOCK, BETH J. ASCH, RYAN A. SCHWANKHART, TARA L. TERRY.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Calkins, Avery, author.

Mattock, Michael G., 1961- author.

Asch, Beth J., author.

Schwankhart, Ryan, author.

Terry, Tara L., author.

Contributor:

United States. Army.

Arroyo Center.

Rand Corporation.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Employee retention--United States.

Employee retention.

United States. Army--Pay, allowances, etc.

United States.

United States. Army--Officers.

United States. Army--Recruiting and enlistment, etc.

Place of Publication:

RAND Corporation 2023

Summary:

The U.S. Army is looking to modernize its special and incentive (S&I) pays to increase their efficiency in improving retention and incentivizing greater performance. Specifically for aviator S&I pays, the Army is considering proposals that would make S&I pays contingent on achieving specific career milestones. Such a policy change could increase incentives for the development of valuable human capital and improve retention among aviators who achieve defined milestones. Ideally, the proposed policy change would aim to not only sustain retention but also target compensation to individual qualifications and talent. RAND Arroyo Center researchers extended RAND's dynamic retention model (DRM) to Army aviators, including the option for prior enlisted service and multi-year contracts tied to aviation bonuses for warrant officer aviators. The model includes commissioned and warrant officers who entered aviation service between 2002 and 2009 and follows them over their careers until 2021. The new DRM was then used to assess alternative proposals for setting S&I pays based on achieving specific career milestones, how this change might affect retention, the possibility of increasing aviation-specific S&I pays to keep up with inflation, and how S&I pays might be varied to respond to changes in civilian labor market pay. The researchers also used the DRM to determine how the change to the Army's Blended Retirement System and the change from a six- to ten-year initial service obligation affected aviator retention.

Contents:

Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter Two: Overview of Army Aviation Careers and Special and Incentive Pays

Chapter Three: Civilian Opportunities for Army Aviators

Chapter Four: DRM Approach and Model Estimates

Chapter Five: Simulated Retention Effects of Alternative Special and Incentive Pays

Chapter Six: Simulated Retention Effects of Alternative Values of AvB

Chapter Seven

Simulated Retention Effects of Increasing Service Obligation Length and of the BRS

Chapter Eight: Findings and Conclusions

Appendix A: Aviation Careers

Appendix B: Army Aviation Special and Incentive Pays

Appendix C: Civilian Earnings Analysis

Appendix D: Simulation Results with a Six-Year ADSO

Appendix E: Estimates Including Major Airline Hiring

Appendix F: Sensitivity Checks: Heterogeneity in Timing and Probability of Milestone Achievement

Notes:

Description based on electronic resource