Deadlines Versus Continuous Incentives: Evidence from the Patent Office / Michael D. Frakes, Melissa F. Wasserman.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Frakes, Michael D.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Wasserman, Melissa F.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w32066.

NBER working paper series no. w32066

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2024.

Summary:

A quota system with an associated deadline may retain the possibility of worker procrastination and related deadline behaviors. A performance appraisal system based on continuous temporal incentives, on the other hand, has the potential to alleviate deadline effects but may lose some of the quality-related benefits associated with the flexibility of a quota/deadline system. We explore these tradeoffs by observing patent examiner behavior and examination quality outcomes surrounding a 2011 reform at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office that built on its bi-weekly quota system by adding a set of bonuses tied to daily examination-pendency measures. We find a substantial reduction in deadline effects and near complete temporal smoothing in examiner behavior in connection with the reform, leading to large reductions in average examination pendency while resulting in no corresponding reductions in the accuracy of examinations.

Notes:

Print version record

January 2024.