Market Design for Surface Water / Billy A. Ferguson, Paul Milgrom.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Ferguson, Billy A.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Milgrom, Paul.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w32010.

NBER working paper series no. w32010

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2023.

Summary:

Many proposed surface water transfers undergo a series of regulatory reviews designed to mitigate hydrological and economic externalities. While these reviews help limit externalities, they impose substantial transaction costs that also limit trade. To promote a well-functioning market for surface water in California, we describe how a new kind of water right and related regulatory practices can balance the trade-off between externalities and transaction costs, and how a Water Incentive Auction can incentivize a sufficient number of current rights holders to swap their old rights for the new ones. The Water Incentive Auction adapts lessons learned from the US government's successful Broadcast Incentive Auction.

Notes:

Print version record

December 2023.