Conventional Deterrence (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Mearsheimer, John J., Author.

Contributor:

Mearsheimer, John

Series:

Cornell studies in security affairs.

Cornell Studies in Security Affairs

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource (298 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, 2017

Language Note:

In English.

Summary:

Conventional Deterrence is a book about the origins of war. Why do nations faced with the prospect of large-scale conventional war opt for or against an offensive strategy? John J. Mearsheimer examines a number of crises that led to major conventional wars to explain why deterrence failed. He focuses first on Allied and German decision making in the years 1939-1940, analyzing why the Allies did not strike first against Germany after declaring war and, conversely, why the Germans did attack the West. Turning to the Middle East, he examines the differences in Israeli and Egyptian strategic doctrines prior to the start of the major conventional conflicts in that region. Mearsheimer then critically assays the relative strengths and weaknesses of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to determine the prospects for conventional deterrence in any future crisis. He is also concerned with examining such relatively technical issues as the impact of precision-guided munitions (PGM) on conventional deterrence and the debate over maneuver versus attrition warfare.Mearsheimer pays considerable attention to questions of military strategy and tactics. Challenging the claim that conventional detrrence is largely a function of the numerical balance of forces, he also takes issue with the school of thought that ascribes deterrence failures to the dominance of "offensive" weaponry. In addition to examining the military consideration underlying deterrence, he also analyzes the interaction between those military factors and the broader political considerations that move a nation to war.

Contents:

Frontmatter

Contents

Preface

1. Introduction

2. Conventional Deterrence

3. The Allied Decision Not to Attack Germany, March 1939-May 1940

4. The German Decision to Attack in the West, 1939-1940

5. Conventional Deterrence and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

6. The Prospects for Conventional Deterrence in Central Europe

7. Precision-Guided Munitions and Conventional Deterrence

8. Conclusion

Notes

Select Bibliography

Index

Notes:

Includes index.

Bibliography: p. 273-289.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 24. Sep 2018)

ISBN:

9781501713255

1501713256

9781501713262

1501713264

OCLC:

1016841502