Limiting Risk in America's Wars : Airpower, Asymmetrics, and a New Strategic Paradigm / Phillip S. Meilinger.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Meilinger, Phillip S., 1948- author.

Series:

Transforming war.

Transforming War Series

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Air power--United States.

Air power.

Asymmetric warfare--Case studies.

Asymmetric warfare.

Asymmetric warfare--United States.

Risk management--United States--Case studies.

Risk management.

United States--Military policy--Case studies.

United States.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (277 p.)

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Annapolis, MD : Naval Institute Press, [2017]

Summary:

"The United States has the most expensive and seemingly unstoppable military in the world. Yet, since World War II the nation's military success rate has been meager. The Korean War was a draw, while Vietnam, Mogadishu, Afghanistan, and Iraq were clear losses. Successes include Iraq in 1991, the Balkans (Croatia and Kosovo), Panama, the initial takedowns of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and Libya. What differentiates the failures from the successes? Failures have been marked by the introduction of large numbers of conventional American ground troops, while successes have been characterized by the use of airpower, special operations forces, robust intelligence and sensor platforms, and the use of indigenous ground troops. Phillip S. Meilinger's new book advocates strategies that limit risks in war as well as achieve measurable goals. Instead of large numbers of conventional ground troops, the author argues in favor of a focus on asymmetric capabilities--a combination of airpower, special operation forces, intelligence, and indigenous ground troops--to achieve the desired political outcomes."--Provided by publisher.

Contents:

Liddell Hart and limiting risk

Winners: Britain, Wellington, the Arab Revolt, and Operation Torch

Losers and a tie: the Sicilian Expedition, the Imjin War, Bonaparte, Gallipoli, and the Norwegian Campaign

The rationale for a second front and indirectness

Reasons for success or failure

Limited wars with limited aims and means

Descent into disaster

An idea whose time has gone

A new paradigm for success.

Notes:

Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher; resource not viewed.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Description based on print version record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9781682472514

1682472515