Game theory and applications. Volume 17, Game-theoretic models in mathematical ecology / Vladimir Mazalov [and three others], editors ; contributors Vladimir V. Beer [and thirty others].

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Mazalov, Vladimir, editor.

Beer, Vladimir V., contributor.

Series:

Game theory and applications series.

Game Theory and Applications, 1535-4792

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Game theory.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (251 p.)

Place of Publication:

New York : Nova Publishers, 2015.

Summary:

The idea of this book is to demonstrate the tendency of modern research in mathematical ecology using the optimal control theory and game-theoretic methods. The book introduces the modelling of environmental systems through conceptual game-theoretic models, showing the importance of the equilibrium behavior under resource extraction. Using discrete and continuous models of biological and physical processes, the behavior of ecological-economic systems is represented by models with analytic or numerical solutions. A range of mathematical methods including analytic and approximate methods for equilibrium definition, cooperative and collective behavior determination are used to explore such models. The main feature of the presented investigations is characterized by time consistent, stabilized, collective and cooperative concepts in ecological-economic systems. This book is recommended for researchers and post-graduate students of management, economic and in the applied mathematics departments.

Contents:

GAME THEORY AND APPLICATIONS VOLUME 17 GAME-THEORETIC MODELS IN MATHEMATICAL ECOLOGY ; GAME THEORY AND APPLICATIONS VOLUME 17 GAME-THEORETIC MODELS IN MATHEMATICAL ECOLOGY ; Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data; Contents; Preface; Chapter 1 Models of Collective Threshold Behavior in Control Problems of Ecological-Economic Systems; Abstract; Introduction; Models of Collective "Multi-Threshold" Behavior Participants; Model of Individual Penalties; Model of Individual and Collective Penalties; Incentive Model of Environmental Protection; Conclusion; References

Chapter 2 The Principle of Coordinated Planning in Control of Social and Ecological-Economic SystemsAbstract; Introduction; The Principle of Coordinated Planning in Distributed Projects (Programs); Problem Statement; Special Case. Single-Purpose Projects; General Case. Multi-purpose projects; Network Programming Method; Joint Financing Mechanisms; References; Chapter 3 A Differential Game Model of Preventing Fish Kills in Shallow Waterbodies; Abstract; Introduction; Problem Statement; Equilibria Design Algorithms; The Solution Method of theBiological Kinetics Equation

Implementation of the MCM on a Supercomputer with Distributed MemoryResults of Numerical Experiments; Conclusion; Acknowledgments; References; Chapter 4 Correction of Cooperative Games as a Stabilization Mechanism of Ecological-Economic Systems; Abstract; Introduction; The Core and the Problem of Its Emptiness; The Problem of the Game Correction; Using a Balanced Collection in the Correction Problem; Proportional Correction; Conclusion; References; Chapter 5 Hierarchical Regional Models of Environment Protection; Abstract; Introduction

Reconciliation of Interests in a Hierarchical System and Conditions for Optimal Center ControlThe Regional Model with Differentiated Environmental Payments; The Regional Model with Unified Environmental Payments, Quotas and Fines; Conclusion; References; Chapter 6 Strongly Time-Consistent Cooperative Solution for a Differential Game of Pollution Control; Abstract; Problem Statement; Strongly Time Consistent Core in a 2-Player Cooperative Differential Game with Prescribed Duration; Existence of Strongly Time Consistent Core; Yeung's Condition; Differential Game of Pollution Control

The ModelCooperative Game; The Construction of Strongly Time Consistent Optimality Principle; Conclusion; Acknowledgment; References; Chapter 7 Equilibrium and Control in Biocommunity Species Composition Preserving Problem; Abstract; Introduction; Equilibrium in Two Species Model with Migration; Model with Varying Food Attractivity; Description of Model; Discriminant Plane; Control, Permitting to Preserve Biocommunity Species Composition; Conclusion; References; Chapter 8 Assymetry in a Cooperative Bioresource Management Problem; Abstract; Introduction; The Model and Nash Equilibrium

Multi-Step Game and Recursive Nash Bargaining Solution

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters and index.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (ebrary, viewed May 2, 2016).

ISBN:

1-63483-502-6