Hamilton's paradox : the promise and peril of fiscal federalism / Jonathan A. Rodden.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Rodden, Jonathan, author.

Series:

Cambridge studies in comparative politics.

Cambridge studies in comparative politics

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Intergovernmental fiscal relations.

Central-local government relations.

Revenue sharing.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xvi, 313 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).

Place of Publication:

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. The center can commit when subnational governments retain significant tax autonomy, as in the United States. Or if the center dominates taxation, it can tightly regulate borrowing, as in many unitary systems. In a third group of countries including Brazil and Germany, the center can neither commit to a system of market-based discipline nor gain a monopoly over borrowing. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline.

Contents:

Introduction and overview

Promise and peril : intellectual history

Sovereignty and commitment

The power of the purse : intergovernmental grants and fiscal discipline

Disease or cure? : political parties and fiscal discipline

An approach to comparative case studies

Fiscal federalism and bailouts in postwar Germany

The crisis of fiscal federalism in Brazil

The challenge of reform in federations

The origins of subnational sovereignty

Conclusions.

Notes:

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Includes bibliographical references (p. 283-299) and index.

ISBN:

1-107-15162-7

1-280-43140-7

0-511-18344-5

0-511-13716-8

0-511-20138-9

0-511-31163-X

0-511-61607-4

0-511-13499-1

OCLC:

171137759