Delegation and agency in international organizations / edited by Darren G. Hawkins [and others].

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Hawkins, Darren G., 1966- editor.

Series:

Political economy of institutions and decisions.

Political economy of institutions and decisions

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

International organization.

International agencies.

International relations.

Delegation of authority.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xvi, 406 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).

Edition:

1st ed.

Other Title:

Delegation & Agency in International Organizations

Place of Publication:

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters.

Contents:

Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal agent theory / Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney

Variation in principal preferences, structure, decision rules, and private benefits

Who delegates? : alternative models of principals in development aid / Mona Lyne, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney

US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy / J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes

Why multilateralism? : foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems / Helen V. Milner

Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations : the case of IMF conditionality / Lisa L. Martin

Delegation and discretion in the European Union / Mark A. Pollack

Variation in agent preferences, legitimacy, tasks, and permeability

How agents matter / Darren G. Hawkins and Wade Jacoby

Screening power : international organizations as informative agents / Alexander Thompson

Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? : staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO / Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson

Delegating IMF conditionality : understanding variations in control and conformity / Erica R. Gould

Delegation to international courts and the limits of re-contracting political power / Karen J. Alter

Directions for future research

The logic of delegation to international organizations / David A. Lake and Mathew D. McCubbins.

Notes:

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Includes bibliographical references (p. 369-393) and index.

ISBN:

1-107-16854-6

0-511-32295-X

0-511-26103-9

0-511-25981-6

1-280-70270-2

0-511-25011-8

0-511-49136-0

0-511-24905-5

0-511-25062-2

0-511-31881-2

0-511-24960-8

OCLC:

252529091