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Adaptation and evolution in collective systems / Akira Namatame.

EBSCOhost Academic eBook Collection (North America) Available online

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EBSCOhost eBook Community College Collection Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Namatame, Akira, 1950-
Series:
Advances in natural computation ; v. 5.
Advances in natural computation ; v. 5
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Coevolution--Mathematical models.
Coevolution.
Collective behavior--Mathematical models.
Collective behavior.
Intelligent agents (Computer software).
Self-organizing systems--Mathematical models.
Self-organizing systems.
System theory--Mathematical models.
System theory.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (373 p.)
Place of Publication:
Hackensack, NJ : World Scientific, c2006.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
Self-contained and unified in presentation, this invaluable book provides a broad introduction to the fascinating subject of many-body collective systems with adapting and evolving agents. The coverage includes game theoretic systems, multi-agent systems, and large-scale socio-economic systems of individual optimizing agents. The diversity and scope of such systems have been steadily growing in computer science, economics, social sciences, physics, and biology.
Contents:
Preface; Contents; 1. Introduction to Collective Systems; 1.1 Collective Outcomes of Interacting Agents; 1.2 The Study of Collective Systems; 1.3 The Price of Anarchy in Collective Systems; 1.4 Review of the Literature; 1.5 Evolutionary Design of Desired Collective Systems; 1.6 Outline of the Book; 2. Introduction to Game Theory and Evolutionary Games; 2.1 Classification of Games and Nash Equilibrium; 2.2 Correlated Equilibrium; 2.3 Interaction Structures; 2.4 Learning in Games; 2.5 Evolutionary Games; 2.6 Relation between Learning and Evolution; 2.7 Design of Learning and Evolving Agents
3. Social Interactions and Social Games3.1 Social Interactions with Externalities; 3.2 Binary Decisions with Externalities; 3.3 Decomposition to Pair-wise Interactions; 3.4 Compound Social Games; 3.5 Nash Equilibrium and Collective Efficiency; 3.6 Conflict Resolution between Collective Efficiency and Equity; 4. Micro-Macro Dynamics; 4.1 A Threshold Model for Dealing with Heterogeneity in Agents; 4.2 A Micro-Macro Loop; 4.3 Two Facets of an Individual's Decision: Purposive and Contingent Decisions; 4.4 Micro-Macro Dynamics within a Collective; 4.5 Micro-Macro Loop between Two Collectives
4.6 Micro-Macro Dynamics between Two Collectives5. Knowledge Transaction Games; 5.1 Merit of Knowledge Sharing; 5.2 A Formulation of Knowledge Transaction Games; 5.3 Characteristics of Knowledge Transaction; 5.4 Repeated Knowledge Transaction; 5.5 Knowledge Transaction by Multiple Agents; 5.6 The Knowledge Accumulation Process as a Micro-Macro Loop; 6. Gains from Diversity; 6.1 Identity and Diversity; 6.2 Integration and Segregation; 6.3 Global and Local Adaptation Models; 6.4 Threshold Distributions and Locating Heterogeneous Agents; 6.5 Performance Measures
6.6 Evaluation of Collective Adaptive Dynamics7. Selective Interaction and Reinforcement of Preference; 7.1 Selective Interaction in Games; 7.2 Evolution of Preference; 7.3 Social Games with Neighbor Selection; 7.4 Preference Reinforcement through Selective Interaction; 7.5 Coexistence of Conformists and Nonconformists; 7.6 Development of Preference through Interaction; 8. Give-and-Take in Social Interaction; 8.1 Social Interaction with the Logic of the Minority; 8.2 Formalisms of Dispersion Games; 8.3 The Price of Anarchy of Uncoordinated Collective Decisions
8.4 Learning Models in Dispersion Games8.5 The Principle of Give-and-Take in Dispersion Games; 8.6 Localized Dispersion Games and Emergence of Dynamic Orders in Harmony; 8.7 Interpretation of the Principle of Give-and-Take; 9. Collective Evolution of Behavioral Rules; 9.1 Repeated Interactions on Social Networks; 9.2 Repeated Interactions with Bounded Memory; 9.3 A Strategy Choice with a Coupling Rule; 9.4 Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games on Social Networks; 9.5 Iterated Coordination Games on Social Networks; 9.6 Iterated Hawk-Dove Games on Social Networks; 9.7 Sustainable Coupling Rules
10. Collective Evolution of Synchronized Behavioral Rules
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 341-352) and index.
ISBN:
9786611924621
9781281924629
1281924628
9789812773227
9812773223

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