Game theory and mechanism design / Y. Narahari.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Narahari, Y., author.

Series:

IISc lecture notes series ; Volume 4.

IISc Lecture Notes Series, 2010-2402 ; Volume 4

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Game theory.

Economics, Mathematical.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (533 p.)

Place of Publication:

Singapore : IISc Press : World Scientific, 2014.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the "science" behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society. The importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sci

Contents:

Dedication; Foreword; Opinions on the Book; About the Author; Preface; Acronyms; Symbols and Notations; Contents; 1. Introduction and Overview; 1.1 Game Theory: The Science of Strategic Interactions; Value of Game Theory and Mechanism Design; Game Theory: A Rich History; 1.2 Current Trends and Modern Applications; Current Trends; Some Modern Applications; 1.3 Outline of this Book; References; NON-COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY; 2. Key Notions in Game Theory; 2.1 Strategic Form Games; 2.2 Preferences; 2.3 Utilities; 2.4 Rationality; 2.5 Intelligence; Common Knowledge; 2.6 Classification of Games

2.7 Summary and ReferencesReferences; 3. Extensive Form Games; 3.1 Illustrative Examples; 3.2 Extensive Form Games: Definitions; 3.3 Transforming Extensive Form to Strategic Form; 3.4 Summary and References; References; 3.5 Exercises; 4. Strategic Form Games; 4.1 Preliminaries; 4.2 Matching Pennies with Simultaneous Moves; 4.3 Rock-Paper-Scissors Game; 4.4 BOS (Bach or Stravinsky) Game; 4.5 A Coordination Game; 4.6 Prisoner's Dilemma Game; 4.7 Company's Dilemma Game; 4.8 A Non-Symmetric Company's Dilemma Game; 4.9 A Duopoly Pricing Game; 4.10 Tragedy of the Commons

4.11 Bandwidth Sharing Game4.12 A Sealed Bid Auction; 4.13 Pigou's Network Game; 4.14 Braess Paradox Game; 4.15 Summary and References; References; 4.16 Exercises; 5. Dominant Strategy Equilibria; 5.1 Strong Dominance; 5.2 Weak Dominance; 5.3 Very Weak Dominance; 5.4 Illustrations of Dominant Strategy Equilibria; 5.5 Summary and References; References; 5.6 Exercises; 6. Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria; 6.1 The Notion of Nash Equilibrium; 6.2 Illustrative Examples of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 6.3 Games without a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 6.4 Interpretations of Nash Equilibrium

6.5 Existence of Multiple Nash Equilibria6.6 Maxmin Values and Minmax Values; Maxmin Value and Maxmin Strategy; Minmax Value; 6.7 Equilibria in Extensive Form Games; Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Nash Equilibrium and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; 6.8 Summary and References; References; 6.9 Exercises; 7. Mixed Strategies and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 7.1 Mixed Strategies; 7.2 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 7.3 Properties of Mixed Strategies

7.4 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Profile to be a Mixed Strategy Nash EquilibriumImplications of the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions; Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria of the BOS Game; Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria of the Coordination Game; 7.5 Maxmin Values and Minmax Values in Mixed Strategies; Maxmin Value in Mixed Strategies; Minmax Value in Mixed Strategies; 7.6 Domination in Mixed Strategies; Dominating Strategies and Dominated Strategies; Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies; 7.7 Summary and References; References; 7.8 Exercises; 8. Utility Theory

8.1 Need for Utility Theory

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters and index.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (ebrary, viewed April 8, 2014).

ISBN:

981-4525-05-7