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Appointing central bankers : the politics of monetary policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union / Kelly H. Chang.

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Chang, Kelly H., author.
Series:
Political economy of institutions and decisions.
Political economy of institutions and decisions
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Economic and Monetary Union.
Federal Reserve banks.
Banks and banking, Central--United States.
Banks and banking, Central.
Banks and banking, Central--Europe.
Monetary policy--United States.
Monetary policy.
Monetary policy--Europe.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (xiv, 160 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).
Place of Publication:
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
This book examines monetary policy by focusing on how the President and the Senate influence monetary policy by appointing Federal Reserve members. It attempts to answer three questions about the appointment process and its effects. First, do politicians influence monetary policy through Federal Reserve appointments? Second, who influences the process - the President alone or both the President and the Senate? Third, what explains the structure of the Federal Reserve appointment process? The test models show that the President alone, both the President and Senate, or neither, may influence monetary policy with Federal Reserve appointments. The structure of the process reflects political battles between the Democrats and Republicans regarding the centralization of authority to set monetary policy within the Federal Reserve System. The study extends the analysis to the European Central Bank and shows that the Federal Reserve process is more representative of society than the European Central Bank process.
Contents:
A formal model of the appointment process
Estimating monetary policy preferences
Empirically testing the model's predictions
Appointments to the European Central Bank
The origins of the Federal Reserve appointment process
Conclusions.
Notes:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Includes bibliographical references (p. 147-156) and index.
ISBN:
1-107-13694-6
1-280-41532-0
0-511-18063-2
0-511-20477-9
0-511-06209-5
0-511-33102-9
0-511-51052-7
0-511-07055-1
OCLC:
57299068

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