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Overreach : Delusions of Regime Change in Iraq /

De Gruyter Harvard University Press Complete eBook-Package 2014-2015 Available online

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EBSCOhost Academic eBook Collection (North America) Available online

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EBSCOhost eBook History Collection - North America Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
MacDonald, Michael, Author.
Contributor:
Macdonald, Michael
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
United States--Politics and government--1989-.
United States.
United States--Foreign relations--21st century.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (336 p.)
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 2014
Language Note:
English
Summary:
In the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a fair number of Americans thought the idea was crazy. Now everyone, except a few die-hards, thinks it was. So what was going through the minds of the talented and experienced men and women who planned and initiated the war? What were their assumptions? Overreach aims to recover those presuppositions. Michael MacDonald examines the standard hypotheses for the decision to attack, showing them to be either wrong or of secondary importance: the personality of President George W. Bush, including his relationship with his father; Republican electoral considerations; the oil lobby; the Israeli lobby. He also undermines the argument that the war failed because of the Bush administration's incompetence. The more fundamental reasons for the Iraq War and its failure, MacDonald argues, are located in basic axioms of American foreign policy, which equate America's ideals with its interests (distorting both in the process) and project those ideals as universally applicable. Believing that democratic principles would bring order to Iraq naturally and spontaneously, regardless of the region's history and culture or what Iraqis themselves wanted, neoconservative thinkers, with support from many on the left, advocated breaking the back of state power under Saddam Hussein. They maintained that by bringing about radical regime change, the United States was promoting liberalism, capitalism, and democracy in Iraq. But what it did instead was unleash chaos.
Contents:
Frontmatter
Contents
Introduction
ONE Why Elect a Self- Defeating War?
TWO. Bring 'Em On: Making the World Safe for Democracy
THREE. What Went Wrong: The Decapitationist Consensus of Washington Elites
FOUR. What Were Neoconservatives Thinking?
FIVE. Demo cratic Hawks
SIX. American Exceptionalism Meets Iraqi History
SEVEN. The Semi- Sovereign Shi'i State
Conclusion
Notes
Acknowledgments
Index
Notes:
Includes index.
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 08. Jul 2019)
ISBN:
9780674745261
0674745264
9780674735927
0674735927
OCLC:
891589886

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