The first great financial crisis of the 21st century : a retrospective / [edited by] James R. Barth (Auburn University, USA & Milken Institute, USA), George G. Kaufman (Loyola University Chicago, USA).

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Barth, James R., editor.

Kaufman, George G., editor.

Series:

World Scientific--Now Publishers series in business ; vol. 9.

World Scientific-Now Publishers series in business ; volume 9

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Financial crises.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (518 p.)

Place of Publication:

New Jersey : World Scientific, [2016]

Language Note:

English

Summary:

"Although there have been numerous studies of the causes and consequences of the Great Financial Crisis of 2007–2010 in the US and abroad, many of these were undertaken only for a small number of countries and before the financial and economic effects were fully realized and before various governmental policy responses were decided upon and actually implemented. This book aims to fill these voids by providing a more thorough assessment now that the worst events and the regulatory reforms are sufficiently behind us and much more information about these developments is available. It reviews and analyzes the causes and consequences of and the regulatory responses to the Great Financial Crisis, particularly from a public policy viewpoint. In the process, it explores such intriguing questions as: What caused the crisis? How did the crisis differ across countries? What is the outlook for another crisis, and when? This is a must read for those who are trying to find answers to these questions."-- Provided by publisher.

Contents:

Contents; Preface; About the Authors; Chapter 1 The Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2010: The Sinners and their Sins; 1 Introduction; 2 US Sinners; 2.1 Central bankers (Monetary policy); 2.2 Commercial and investment bankers (Initial and ultimate lenders; 2.3 Credit rating agencies; 2.4 Financial engineers; 2.5 Government (Congress and the administration); 2.6 Investors (Ultimate lenders); 2.7 Mortgage borrowers; 2.8 Mortgage brokers (Salesmen); 2.9 Prudential bank regulators; 3 Conclusion; Appendix; References; Chapter 2 The Costs of the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis; 1 Introduction

2 A Weak and Stumbling Recovery3 Measuring the Costs of the Financial Crisis; 4 Additional Perspectives on the Costs of the Crisis; 5 Summing Up the Costs; 6 Concluding Comments: Hopefully Never Again; References; Chapter 3 The US Financial Crisis and the Great Recession: Counting the Costs; 1 Introduction; 2 Lost GDP; 3 Depleted Wealth; 4 The Costs of Government Support; 4.1 Data and methodology; 4.2 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; 4.3 The National Credit Union Administration; 4.4 The Federal Reserve's programs; 4.5 Treasury programs; 5 Social Costs

5.1 Unemployment and labor force losses5.2 Bankruptcies and foreclosures; 5.3 Income and wealth inequality; 5.4 Increased poverty; 5.5 Reduced access to health care; 5.6 Lower fertility; 5.7 More education but more student debt; 6 Conclusions; References; Chapter 4 US Housing Policy and the Financial Crisis; 1 Introduction; 2 The Development of Underwriting Standards; 3 The Affordable-Housing Goals and the Decline in Underwriting Standards; 4 The GSEs' Failure to Disclose their Risk-Taking; 5 The Great Housing Bubble, 1997-2007; 6 The Effect of Bank Capital and Accounting Rules

7 Fair Value (Mark-to-Market) Accounting8 The Arrival of Moral Hazard; 9 2008: Growing Weakness Among the Largest Banks; 10 Chaos; References; Chapter 5 Playing for Time: The Fed's Attempt to Manage the Crisis as a Liquidity Problem; 1 Introduction; 2 Causes of the Crisis; 2.1 Innovations in real estate lending, the ABCP market, and their roles in the crisis; 3 The Unfolding of the Crisis; 3.1 Liquidity v. solvency?; 3.2 The liquidity phase; 4 The Fed's Policy Responses; 4.1 Discount window lending (DWL); 4.2 The Term Auction Facility (TAF); 4.3 Central Bank Liquidity Swaps Program (CBLS)

4.4 Single-Tranche Open Market Operations (ST OMO)4.5 Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF); 4.6 Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF); 5 Assessing the Effects of Institutional Liquidity Facilities; 6 Market Liquidity: The Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF); 7 Which Institutions Received the Largest Amount of Liquidity Assistance?; 7.1 Special benefi ts for special institutions; 8 Policy Concerns Shift From Illiquidity to Insolvency; 8.1 Why the long delay in recognition of solvency problems?; 9 Concluding Comments; References

Chapter 6 Japan's Financial Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Description based on print version record.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN:

981-4651-25-7