1 option
Does Compensation by Stock Options Induce Excessive Risk Appetite in Executives?.
- Format:
- Video
- Series:
- Academic Video Online
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Stock options.
- Risk management.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (11 minutes)
- Place of Publication:
- [Place of publication not identified] : Latest Thinking, [date of publication not identified]
- System Details:
- video file
- Summary:
- In the laboratory experiment presented in this video experimental CEOs were compensated either through stock options or restricted company stock. It shows that stock options induce excessive risk taking in some cases and that company performance is generally better under compensation through restricted company stock. As FERDINAND M. VIEIDER points out, the main determinant of risk taking under compensation through stock options was found to be the personal asset position of the experimental CEO.
- Notes:
- Title from resource description page (viewed August 24, 2020).
- Part of the metadata in this record was created by AI.
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