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Deterrence and Escalation in Competition with Russia : The Role of Ground Forces in Preventing Hostile Measures below Armed Conflict in Europe.

RAND Reports Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Watts, Stephen.
Contributor:
Rooney, Bryan.
Germanovich, Gene.
McClintock, Bruce.
Pezard, Stephanie.
Reach, Clint.
Shostak, Melissa.
Series:
[Research Report]; Series
[Research Report]; Series ; v.RR-A720-1
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Deterrence (Strategy).
Escalation (Military science).
Armed Forces.
Military policy.
Military relations.
National security.
Strategic aspects of individual places.
United States--Military relations--Russia (Federation).
United States.
Russia (Federation)--Military relations--United States.
Russia (Federation).
Europe.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (296 pages)
Edition:
1st ed.
Other Title:
Deterrence and Escalation in Competition with Russia
Place of Publication:
Santa Monica : RAND Corporation, The, 2022.
Summary:
The deterrence of armed conflict has been studied intensively for decades, as have escalation dynamics along the path to such conflicts. The deterrence of forms of aggression below the level of armed conflict — such hostile measures as economic coercion, political subversion, and military intimidation — has received much less attention. In this report, the authors investigate how the United States might use its military posture in Europe (specifically, ground forces) as part of a strategy to deter these Russian malign activities. The authors identify how forward posture could deter hostile measures through signaling the United States' commitment to its allies and partners, providing irregular capabilities for those partners and allies threatened with political subversion, providing conventional capabilities to neutralize hostile powers' coercion attempts, and providing support for other instruments of U.S. power, such as sanctions. However, forward posture can also lead to an escalation in competitor activities, increasing their sense of threat, incentivizing partners to undertake aggression at levels below armed conflict, and incentivizing third parties to act in ways that increase the likelihood of confrontation. The authors propose ways to calibrate U.S. forward posture to minimize such risks while enhancing deterrence. An Executive Summary of this report is also available.
Contents:
Contending Perspectives on Competition
A Framework for Understanding Deterrence in Competition
Quantitative Historical Analysis
Case Studies
Scenario-Based Analysis.
Notes:
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
OCLC:
1470855405

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