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The role of special and incentive pays in retaining military mental health care providers / James Hosek, Shanthi Nataraj, Michael G. Mattock, Beth J. Asch.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Hosek, James R., author.
- Nataraj, Shanthi, author.
- Mattock, Michael G., 1961- author.
- Asch, Beth J., author.
- Series:
- Research report (Rand Corporation)
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Mental health personnel--Armed Forces--United States.
- Mental health personnel.
- Employee retention--United States--Mathematical models.
- Employee retention.
- Mental health services--Armed Forces--United States--Planning.
- Mental health services.
- Health Personnel--organization & administration.
- Mental Health Services--organization & administration.
- Employee Incentive Plans.
- Military Medicine--organization & administration.
- Armed Forces--Officers--Salaries, etc.
- Employee retention--Mathematical models.
- Personnel management.
- United States--Armed Forces--Officers--Salaries, etc.
- United States.
- United States. Department of Defense--Personnel management.
- United States Department of Defense.
- United States. Department of Defense.
- Medical Subjects:
- Health Personnel--organization & administration.
- Mental Health Services--organization & administration.
- Employee Incentive Plans.
- Military Medicine--organization & administration.
- United States.
- United States Department of Defense.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (xiii, 101 pages) : illustrations
- Place of Publication:
- Santa Monica, CA : RAND Corporation, 2017.
- Summary:
- "After more than a decade of war, the military services have many returning personnel with mental health needs, and thus the United States needs to ensure that it has the capacity to address their needs. Officer special and incentive (S & I) pays are used to create incentives for officer retention to meet manning requirements. However, no capability exists to assess how alternative S & I pay adjustments affect the retention of mental health care officers, and, as a result, policymakers lack an analytical and empirical basis for determining the effect of such adjustments on retention. The authors of this report adapt RAND's dynamic retention model (DRM) to handle multiyear special pay and develop estimates of expected military and civilian pay over a career, which are needed inputs to the model. Using longitudinal data on officer retention for entry cohorts from 1990 to 2000 followed to 2010, the authors obtain DRM parameter estimates for psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses, occupational therapists, physician assistants, and social workers. Nearly all estimates are statistically significant, and the estimated models fit the data well. To demonstrate the needed capability, the authors use the estimated models to simulate the retention effects of alternative S & I pays."--Publisher's description.
- Contents:
- Introduction
- Military Financial Aid Programs for Physicians
- Conceptualizing and Modeling the Military Financial Aid Choice and Retention Decision
- Active Component Earnings of Mental Health Professionals
- Civilian Earnings of Mental Health Professionals
- Dynamic Retention Model Parameter Estimation
- Policy Simulations and Analyses
- Appendix A: Cost to the Individual of a Two-Period Commitment
- Appendix B: Possible Selectivity by Military Financial Aid Pathway
- Appendix C: Reserve Duty Earnings
- Appendix D: Comparisons of Military Pay Using the Pay Table Approach Versus Observed Pay from the Pay Files
- Appendix E: Civilian Earnings of Mental Health Care Providers
- Appendix F: Civilian Earnings of Female Physicians.
- Notes:
- "Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense."
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