A unified treatment of Moore's paradox : belief, knowledge, assertion, and rationality / John N. Williams.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Williams, John N. (John Nicholas), 1952- author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Paradox.

Moore, G. E. (George Edward), 1873-1958.

Moore, G. E.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (276 pages)

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2023.

Summary:

Since the early twentieth century, Moore's paradox has been a challenge to the philosophical understanding of belief, assertion, knowledge, and rationality. This book offers a compelling study of the paradox by the world's leading authority on the subject, the late John Williams.

Contents:

Cover

A Unified Treatment of Moore's Paradox: Belief, Knowledge, Assertion, and Rationality

Copyright

Contents

Acknowledgements

Foreword

1. What Moore's Paradox is

2. Why Moore's Paradox Matters

3. Contributions of this Book

4. John's Broader Contributions: Moore's Paradox and Beyond

5. Personal Reflections

References

1: Introducing Moore's Paradox

1.1 A Very Brief History

1.2 Aims

2: Moore on Moore's Paradox

2.1 Moore's Omissive and Commissive Paradox

2.2 Moore's Problem as Paradox

2.3 Moore's Knowledge Version

2.4 Moore's Two Solutions

3: Wittgenstein on Moore's Paradox

3.1 Wittgenstein's Reaction

3.2 Report of Belief as Assertion

3.3 Wittgenstein's Expressivist Approach

3.4 Moorean Utterances without Moore-Paradoxical Assertion

3.5 Distinguishing Features of Moore-Paradoxical Assertion

4: Some Salient Approaches to Omissive and Commissive Moore-Paradoxical Assertion

4.1 Non-verbal Moore-Paradoxical Assertions

4.2 Partly Non-assertoric Analogues

4.3 Hintikka's Priority Thesis

4.4 Sorensen's Contribution

4.5 Chan's Example of MSN Messenger

4.6 'Self-referential' Moore-Paradoxical Assertions

4.7 Sorensen's Commitment Approach

4.8 Rosenthal's Assertibility Approach

4.9 Shoemaker's Priority Thesis

4.10 Green's Normative Approach

4.11 Vahid's Defective Interpretation Approach

4.12 Pagin's Informativeness Approach

4.13 Crimmins's Example

4.14 Pruss's Examples: Expert, Earthquake, and Robot

4.15 Schwitzgebel's Juliet the Implicit Racist

4.16 Turri's Ellie the Eliminativist

4.17 Hájek's Dialetheist

4.18 Douven's Priority Thesis

5: Expressing Belief and Knowledge, Assertion, and the Expressivist Approach

5.1 The Need for an Analysis of Assertion

5.2 Expressing Belief, Conviction, or Knowledge.

5.3 An Analysis of Assertion

5.4 Utterance Without Assertion

5.5 Back to Pruss: Earthquake and Robot

5.6 Expressing Lack of Belief or Knowledge via Assertion

5.7 An Expressivist Account of Omissive and Commissive Absurdity

5.8 The Expressivist Account and Other Examples of Moore-Paradoxical Assertion

5.9 The Expressivist Account and the Knowledge Version in Assertion

6: An Account of Belief

6.1 Belief without Qualification, or 'Occurrent' Belief

6.2 Judgement

6.3 Dispositional Beliefs

6.4 Conscious Beliefs

6.5 Unconscious Beliefs

6.6 The Possibility of Overtly Contradictory Beliefs

6.7 Searle's Principle

6.8 Belief as Assignment of Subjective Probability and Degrees of Conviction

7: Some Salient Approaches to Moore's Paradox in Belief

7.1 Hintikka's Epistemic Logic Approach

7.2 A Digression: Pruss's Three Objections to Belief-Distribution

7.3 Back to Hintikka's Epistemic Logic Approach

7.4 Sorensen's Contribution

7.5 Sorensen's Iterated Cases

7.6 Heal's Positive Infallibility Approach

7.7 Sorensen's Commitment to Directly Opposed Belief Approach

7.8 Garvey's Omissive Alcoholic

7.9 Shoemaker's Self-intimation Approach

7.10 Baldwin's Conscious Belief Approach

7.11 Kriegel's Conscious Belief Approach

7.12 Fernández's Extrospective Justification Approach

7.13 De Almeida's Justification Approach

7. 14 Douven's Probabilistic Approach

8: The Knowledge Version in Belief

8.1 Williamson's Commitment to Knowledge as the Norm of Belief

8.2 Sutton's Knowledge Norm for Belief

8.3 Bird's Norm of Justification for Belief

8.4 Douven's Probabilistic Approach to the Knowledge Version in Belief

8.5 Huemer's Knowledge Norm for Belief

8.6 An Alternative Proposal: The Aim of Belief is Truth

8.7 Concluding Remarks

9: The Knowledge Version in Assertion.

9.1 The Aims of Assertion

9.2 Green's Argument for the Absurdity of Asserting the Knowledge Version

9.3 Williamson's Knowledge Account of Assertion

9.4 The Ordinary Practice Argument for the Knowledge Norm of Assertion, and Its Supporters

9.5 Williamson's Lottery Argument

9.6 Koethe's Lottery Argument

9.7 Problems with Koethe's General Position

9.8 Some Assertions of the Form 'p but I don't know that p' are not Absurd

9.9 Some Assertions of the Form 'p but I don't know that p' are Absurd

9.10 The Emptiness of the Knowledge Account: What's Wrong with Breaking the Rule?

9.11 The Category Mistake of the Knowledge Account

9.12 Explaining the Absurdity or Non-absurdity of Assertions

9.13 Types of Assertion and Their Norms of Success

9.14 Interlocutor Norms of Assertion

10: The Priority of Belief Thesis and the Incredibility of the Assertor

10.1 The Priority of Belief Thesis and Rational Expression of Irrational Belief

10.2 Believing the Assertor

10.3 Rational Expression of Irrational Non-Moorean Belief

10.4 Omissive Moore-Paradoxical Assertion and Believing the Assertor

10.5 Expressing Omissive Moore-Paradoxical Belief

10.6 Rational Commissive Moore-Paradoxical Assertion

10.7 The Incredibility of the Assertor and Two Deviant Types of Assertion

10.8 The Incredibility of the Assertor and Other Examples of Moore-Paradoxical Assertion

10.9 The Incredibility of the Assertor and the Knowledge Version

10.10 Other Examples of Moorean Assertion to be Dealt with

11: Conscious Belief

11.1 Fully Conscious Belief Collects as Well as Distributes over Conjunction

11.2 Fully Conscious Belief and the Incredibility of the Assertor

11.3 Fully Conscious Belief and Expressing Belief via Assertion

11.4 Fully Conscious Moore-Paradoxical Belief.

11.5 Other Examples of Fully Conscious Moore-Paradoxical Belief

11.6 Fully Conscious Belief and the Knowledge Version

11.7 Fully Conscious Belief as Part of a Diachronic Process

12: The Self-falsification Account in Belief and Assertion, Rationality, and Absurdity

12.1 The Basic Self-falsification Account of the Epistemic Irrationality of Moore-Paradoxical Belief

12.2 The Normative Self-falsification Account of the Epistemic Irrationality of Moore-Paradoxical Belief

12.3 The Normative Self-falsification Account and Other Moore-Paradoxical Beliefs

12.4 Moore-Paradoxical Beliefs and Absurdity: Extending the Normative Self-falsification Account

12.5 Chan's Objection

12.6 'I Don't Believe This Proposition' as a Problem for Philosophical Theology

13: Eliminativism, Dialetheism, and Moore's Paradox

13.1 Ellie the Eliminativist and Di the Dialetheist

13.2 Ellie's Omissive Belief and Epistemic Rationality

13.3 Ellie's Omissive Belief and Absurdity

13.4 Ellie's Omissive Assertion and Practical Rationality

13.5 Ellie's Omissive Assertion and Absurdity

13.6 Di's Commissive Belief and Epistemic Rationality

13.7 Di's Commissive Belief and Absurdity

13.8 Di's Commissive Assertion and Practical Rationality

13.9 Di's Commissive Assertion and Absurdity

13.10 Diane, a More Extreme Dialetheist

14: Moore's Paradox and Sorensen's Iterated Cases

14.1 Sorensen's Iterated Beliefs

14.2 Why the Iterated Beliefs are not Moore-Paradoxical

14.3 The Irrationality of the Iterated Beliefs

14.4 The Irrationality of the Iterated Assertions

14.5 Increasing Iteration and Absurdity in Belief

14.6 Increasing Iteration and Absurdity in Assertion

15: The Justification Approach to Moore-Paradoxical Belief

15.1 Preliminary Remarks: Being Justified in Believing

15.2 The Externalist Syllogism.

15.3 Vahid's Two Objections

15.4 Fernández's Objections

15.5 The Internalist Evidential Argument

15.6 Applying the Account to Some Other Moore-Paradoxical Beliefs

15.7 The Justification Approach and the Knowledge Version

16: Defining Moore-Paradoxicality The Preface Paradox and Rational Inconsistent Belief

16.1 Defining Moore-Paradoxicality

16.2 The Original Version of the Preface Paradox

16.3 A Less Generalized Version of the Preface Paradox: World Capitals

16.4 A More Generalized Version of the Preface Paradox: Fallibility

16.5 A Maximally Generalized Version of the Preface Paradox: Modesty

17: Moore's Paradox and Desire

17.1 Preliminary Remarks

17.2 Moore's Paradox in Desire

17.3 Desires May be Rational or Irrational

17.4 Rational and Irrational Moorean Desires

17.5 Some Future Directions of Enquiry

18: Further Work

Index.

Notes:

Also issued in print: 2023.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (viewed on May 19, 2023).

Other Format:

Print version: Williams, John N. A Unified Treatment of Moore's Paradox

ISBN:

0-19-180410-X

0-19-106533-1

0-19-887955-5

OCLC:

1375296499