Staying the Unfavorable Course National Security Council Decisionmaking and the Inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016 / MATTHEW SARGENT, JASON H. CAMPBELL, ALEXANDRA T. EVANS, CAITLIN MCCULLOCH, JORDAN R. REIMER, RICHARD S. GIRVEN.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Sargent, Matthew

Contributor:

Campbell, Jason H.

Evans, Alexandra T.

McCulloch, Caitlin

Reimer, Jordan R.

Girven, Richard

International Security and Defense Policy Center

Rand Corporation

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Afghan War, 2001-2021--United States.

Afghan War, 2001-2021.

National security--United States.

National security.

Terrorism--United States--Prevention.

Terrorism.

Civil-military relations--United States.

Civil-military relations.

Military policy--Decision making.

Military policy.

United States--Military policy--Decision making.

United States.

Terrorism--Prevention.

Physical Description:

xvii, 160 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm

Other Title:

National Security Council Decisionmaking and the Inertia of U.S. Afghanistan Policy, 2001-2016

Place of Publication:

Santa Monica, CA : RAND, 2023

Summary:

From 2001 to 2021, the United States pursued an unchanging policy objective in Afghanistan: to prevent a terrorist group from using the country as a safe haven in which to plan or launch an attack on the United States. However, despite deteriorating conditions and no apparent hope of military victory, the U.S. goal remained constant even as successive leaders experimented with different strategies to achieve it. The authors examined the reasons behind this policy inertia through interviews with the senior leaders involved in the policy deliberations between 2001 and 2016. They interviewed the decisionmakers involved in high-level discussions and policy formulation to establish the institutional, informational, and interpersonal dynamics that informed major decisions; capture common interpretations and assumptions; and reconstruct how the deliberative process functioned in practice. As this analysis details, decisions for how to navigate de-escalation from a conflict under conditions short of victory are tremendously difficult, both practically and politically. With no clear definition of success, bureaucratic inertia took hold, extending the conflict and enabling focus on mechanical details of its execution rather than its ultimate intent. The dynamics of the policy process further prevented dramatic policy change. Psychological factors promoted risk aversion and a continued escalation of commitment, even when the mission itself became poorly aligned with national priorities. Additionally, frictions between civilian and military leaders and with the Intelligence Community further prevented fundamental reassessments of the mission.

Contents:

Chapter One: Introduction

Chapter Two: The U.S. War in Afghanistan, 2001-2016: A Brief Overview

Chapter Three: The Memory of 9/11 and the Psychology of Decisionmaking in Afghanistan

Chapter Four: Bureaucratic Dynamics and the Structure of the Policy Process

Chapter Five: Civil-Military Relations

Chapter Six: The Role of the Intelligence Community in the Policy Process

Chapter Seven: Conclusions.

Notes:

Title from PDF document (viewed February 22, 2023)

Includes bibliographical references (pages 143-160)

Description based on electronic resource

ISBN:

1977410448

9781977410443

OCLC:

1372368718