Strategic taxation : fiscal capacity and accountability in African states / Lucy Martin.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Martin, Lucy (Lucy Elizabeth Semple), author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Taxation--Africa.

Taxation.

Finance, Public--Africa.

Finance, Public.

Government accountability--Africa.

Government accountability.

Public administration--Africa.

Public administration.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (232 pages)

Place of Publication:

New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2023]

Summary:

This book explains how and when developing countries will increase taxation to fund state development. Taxation fundamentally changes the relationship between governments and citizens, leading citizens to increase the demands they place on government. While this can lead governments to decrease corruption and increase public goods, it can also lead governments to strategically underinvest in state capacity and to lower taxation in order to reduce citizens' demands. The book shows that low-capacity democracies are particularly prone to low taxation.

Contents:

Cover

Strategic Taxation: Fiscal Capacity and Accountability in African States

Copyright

Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Acknowledgments

1: Introduction

1.1 What Makes Taxation Special?

1.2 A New Theory of Taxation and Statement Development

1.2.1 Empirical Approach

1.3 Plan of the Book

1.4 Implications

2: Understanding Fiscal Capacity

2.1 Introduction

2.2 The Old Story: Taxation and State-Building in Early Europe

2.3 The Evolution of Modern Tax Systems in Europe

2.4 Taxation in Africa

2.4.1 Pre-colonial Taxation

2.4.2 Taxation in Colonial Africa

2.4.3 Taxation in Modern African States

2.5 Comparing Europe and Africa

2.5.1 The Nature of Survival Incentives

2.5.2 Available Revenue Streams

2.5.3 The Sequencing of Democracy and Development

2.6 Conclusion

3: How Taxation Increases Accountability Demands

3.1 A Theory of Accountability

3.2 How Do Citizens Set Thresholds?

3.3 How Taxation Affects Willingness To Punish

3.3.1 Taxation's Effect on the Punishment Threshold

3.3.2 Taxation and Variation in the Propensity for Punishment

3.4 Complicating the Model

3.4.1 Tax Modality and Scope Conditions

3.4.2 Model Extensions

3.5 Alternative Mechanisms and Related Issues

3.5.1 Is Loss Aversion Real?

3.5.2 Increasing Action without Loss Aversion?

3.5.3 Alternative Paths to Accountability

3.6 Conclusion

Appendix

Appendix: A Model of Taxation and Punishment

Taxation's Effect on the Punishment Threshold

Taxation and Variation in the Propensity for Punishment

Taxation in a Repeated Game

Uncertain Punishment

Taxation and Collective Action

Pooling Equilibria

Separating Equilibria

Taxation's Effect Under Collective Action

4: A Model of Taxation and Accountability

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Why Tax?.

4.3 How to Tax?

4.4 A Note for Readers

4.5 Model without Elections

4.5.1 Possible Fiscal Institutions

No Taxation

Coercive Taxation

Tax Bargaining

4.5.2 Utility in Each Subgame

4.5.3 No Taxation and Coercive Taxation

4.5.4 Tax Bargaining

4.5.5 Equilibria

4.5.6 Discussion

4.6 Adding Elections

4.6.1 Defining the Citizen's Voting Decision

4.6.2 No Taxation and Coercive Taxation with Elections

4.6.3 Coercion vs. No Taxation

4.6.4 Bargaining under Elections

4.6.5 Equilibria of Model with Elections

4.6.6 Understanding the Equilibria

4.7 Discussion

4.7.1 When Will Governments Support Taxation?

4.7.2 Taxation's Effect on Rent-Seeking

4.7.3 Bargaining and Coercion

4.8 Extensions

4.9 Conclusion

5: Evidence that Taxation Increases Accountability Demands

5.1 Introduction

5.2 An Experimental Approach

5.2.1 Experimental Design

5.2.2 Implementation

5.3 Results: Tax and Grant Games

5.3.1 Qualitative Evidence

5.4 Testing the Mechanism

5.4.1 Treatment Heterogeneity

5.4.2 Loss Aversion or Fairness?

5.4.3 Measuring Losses and Benefits

5.4.4 Ownership and Loss Aversion: Complementary Mechanisms

5.5 Replications

5.6 The Role of Tax Modality

5.7 External Validity and Scope Conditions

5.7.1 Subgroup Analysis

5.7.2 Making Punishment More Difficult

5.7.3 Evidence from Outside the Lab

5.8 Observational Data

5.9 Conclusion

6: Taxation, Democracy, and Accountability

6.1 Democracy and Tax Revenues

6.1.1 Summary Statistics

6.1.2 Initial Regression Analysis

6.1.3 Interaction Effects

6.1.4 Democratization

6.1.5 Robustness

6.2 Democracy and the Tax Net

6.2.1 Discussion

6.3 Taxation, Accountability, and Rent-Seeking

6.3.1 Robustness and Additional Work

6.4 Conclusion

7: Understanding Taxation in Uganda.

7.1 Introduction

7.2 Why Uganda?

7.3 The Graduated Tax

7.3.1 Low Electoral Accountability

7.3.2 The Fate of the Graduated Tax under Political Competition

7.4 Market Fees

7.5 Taxing Boda-Bodas

7.6 The Social Media Tax

7.6.1 Analysis

7.7 Indirect Taxation in Uganda

7.7.1 Analysis

7.8 Discussion

8: Conclusion

8.1 Scope Conditions

8.1.1 Types of Taxes and Taxpayers

8.1.2 Types of Governments

8.2 Directions for Future Research

8.2.1 Understanding Citizen Behavior

8.2.2 Understanding Policy Outcomes

References

Index.

Notes:

Description based on print version record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Other Format:

Print version: Martin, Lucy E. S. Strategic Taxation

ISBN:

0-19-767266-3

0-19-767265-5

9780197672679

OCLC:

1377819951