Biological Essentialism / Michael Devitt.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Devitt, Michael, 1938- author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Biology--Philosophy.

Biology.

Biology, life sciences.

Essentialism (Philosophy).

Science.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (241 pages)

Place of Publication:

Oxford, England : Oxford University Press, [2023]

Summary:

The consensus in philosophy of biology is that biological essences, such as the essences of species, are wholly relational; Michael Devitt argues that they are at least partly intrinsic. He further argues that an individual is essentially a member of its species. He concludes by considering whether race is biologically 'real'.

Contents:

Cover

Biological Essentialism

Copyright

Dedication

Contents

Preface

1. Resurrecting Biological Essentialism

1.1 Introduction

1.2 Evidence of the Consensus

1.3 An Argument for Intrinsic Biological Essentialism

1.4 Relational Species Concepts

1.5 A Crucial Distinction

1.6 Species Concepts and the Category Problem (2)

1.7 BSC, ENC, and the Taxon Problem (1)

1.8 The Conspecificity Route to Error about the Taxon Problem (1)

1.9 P-CC and the Taxon Problem (1)

1.10 Variation and Change

Variation

Gradual Change

Indeterminacy

Arbitrariness

Worldmaking"

Monsters

Essentialism?

1.11 Conclusion

2. Defending Partly Intrinsic Taxon Essentialism

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Clarifications

2.3 Three Important Distinctions

2.4 Variation

2.4.1 The Common Cause Hypothesis

2.4.2 Genetic Variations

2.4.3 Phenotypic Variations

2.4.4 Causes of Phenotypic Properties

2.4.5 Complicated Developmental Pathways

2.4.6 Disjunctive Developmental Pathways

2.4.7 Evolving not Timeless

2.5 "The Added Metaphysical Claim"

2.6 The Irrelevance of the Species Concepts

2.7 The Conspecificity Diagnosis

2.8 The Relational View of Conspecificity (R-CON)

2.9 The Essence of Implements ("Artifacts")

2.10 Godman and Papineau against Partly Intrinsic Taxon Essentialism

2.11 The Historical Species Essentialism of Godman, Mallozzi, and Papineau

2.11.1 The "More Fundamental Objection"

2.11.2 The Positive View

2.12 Conclusion

3. Historical Biological Essentialism

3.1 Introduction

3.2 An Argument for Partly Historical Taxon Essentialism

3.3 Hypothesis (1): Descended from Certain Particular Actual Organisms

3.4 Hypothesis (2): Descended from a Certain Kind of Organism (Which Itself has a Wholly Relational Essence).

3.5 Hypothesis (3): Descended from a Certain Kind of Organism with a Partly Intrinsic Essence

3.6 Objections: Twin Earth and the Like

3.7 Conclusion

4. Individual Essentialism in Biology

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Individual Essentialism: A Kripkean View

4.3 An Argument for Partly Intrinsic Individual Essentialism

4.4 An Argument for Partly Historical Individual Essentialism

4.5 Haecceitism

4.6 Essential Membership

4.7 Objection 1: The Interbreeding and Ecological Approaches to Species

4.8 Objection 2: The Cladistic Approach to Species

4.9 Objection 3: Kitcher's "Dumbbell Allopatry"

4.10 Objection 4: Higher Taxa

4.11 Conclusion

5. Type Specimens and Reference

5.1 Introduction

5.2 The Causal Theory of Reference and Levine's Thesis

5.3 The Falsity of Levine's Thesis

The Case for C1

5.4 "But What about the Theory of Reference?"

The Case for C2

5.5 The Causal Theory of Multiple Grounding

The Case for C3

5.6 Philosophical Evaluations of Levine's Thesis

5.6.1 Haber

The Case for C4

5.6.2 Witteveen

5.6.3 Brzozowski

5.7 Objections

5.7.1 Reviewer R1 and Codes of Nomenclature

5.7.2 Reviewer R2 and the Linguistic Turn

5.8 Conclusion

6. Racial Realism and Essentialism

6.1 Introduction

6.2 A Presentation of the Racial Realism Issue

6.3 The Reality/Existence Issues about Race

6.4 Racial Taxon Realism

6.5 Racial Taxon Realism (Humans)

6.5.1 The Case for Racial Taxon Realism (Humans)

6.5.2 Objections to Racial Taxon Realism (Humans)

6.5.3 Rosenberg et al. and the Essences of Alleged Races

6.6 Racial Category Realism (Humans): The "Worthy of the Name" Issue

6.7 Racial Category Realism (Humans): The Explanatory Issue

6.7.1 The Explanatory Issue with Other Categories

6.7.2 The Explanatory Issue with the Category Race.

6.7.3 Minimal Concepts of the Higher Categories

6.7.4 A Minimal Concept of the Category Race

6.8 Too Weak to be Interesting?

6.9 Conclusion

Glossary of Named Doctrines

Taxon Essentialism

Individual Essentialism

Type Specimens

Race

References

Index.

Notes:

Description based on print version record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Other Format:

Print version: Devitt, Michael Biological Essentialism

ISBN:

0-19-257660-7

0-19-198774-3

0-19-257659-3

OCLC:

1374606331