The Matter of Consciousness : From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism / Torin Alter.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Alter, Torin Andrew, 1963- author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Consciousness.

Monism.

Psychology.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (280 pages)

Place of Publication:

Oxford, England : Oxford University Press, [2023]

Summary:

Torin Alter makes a compelling case against the view that consciousness is a physical phenomenon. He argues that Frank Jackson's knowledge argument refutes all standard versions of physicalism, and leads to Russellian monism - the view there are intrinsic properties which both constitute consciousness and underlie properties described by physics.

Contents:

Cover

The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism

Copyright

Dedication

Contents

Acknowledgments

Sources

PART I: THE CASE FOR THE EPISTEMIC GAP

1: Introduction

1.1 Mary and the Knowledge Argument

1.2 Historical Background

1.3 What the Knowledge Argument Shows

1.4 The Three Main Steps

1.4.1 Step One: From the Mary Case to the Epistemic Gap

1.4.2 Step Two: From the Epistemic Gap to the Modal Gap

1.4.3 Step Three: From the Modal Gap to the Ontological Gap

1.5 A More Precise Formulation

1.5.1 The Physical

1.5.2 Negative Truths

1.5.3 Indexicality

1.5.4 Non-Standard Versions of Physicalism

1.5.5 Final Pass

1.6 The Chapters

1.6.1 Part I

1.6.2 Part II

1.6.3 Part III

2: The Significance of Structure

2.1 A Structural Explanation of the Learning Claim

2.2 Chalmers on Structure

2.3 Are Spatiotemporal and Nomic Concepts Structural?

2.4 Absolutely Intrinsic Properties

2.5 Conclusion

3: Structure, Physical Knowledge, and Ignorance

3.1 The Equivocation Objection

3.1.1 Physical Information: Explicit and Ontological

3.1.2 Chalmers's Way Out

3.1.3 Unknown Microphysical Truths

3.2 The Ignorance Objection

3.2.1 Ignorance and the Learning Claim

3.2.2 A Structuralist Response

3.2.3 Stoljar's Ignorance Objection

3.2.3.1 The Ignorance Hypothesis

3.2.3.2 The Slugs and the Tiles

3.3 The New-Concepts Objection

3.3.1 Would Mary Know?

3.3.2 Montero's Response

3.4 Conclusion

4: Phenomenal Knowledge without Experience

4.1 The No-Experience-Necessary Objection

4.2 RoboMary

4.2.1 Locked RoboMary

4.2.2 Dispositional Phenomenal Knowledge?

4.2.3 The Problem with RoboMary

4.2.4 An Improbable and Extravagant Distinction?

4.3 Hyperbolic Mary

4.4 Deviant Phenomenal Knowledge.

4.4.1 Earned and Deviant Phenomenal Knowledge

4.4.2 The Indirect Argument

4.5 Conclusion

5: Non-Propositional Phenomenal Knowledge

5.1 The Ability-Hypothesis Strategy

5.1.1 Mary and the Ability Hypothesis

5.1.2 Against the Ability-Hypothesis Strategy

5.1.2.1 Knowledge-How without Ability

5.1.2.2 Lewis and Nemirow's Analogies

5.1.2.3 No Information, No Revelation

5.2 The Acquaintance-Hypothesis Strategy

5.2.1 Acquaintance with Phenomenal Properties

5.2.2 Further Details

5.2.3 Against the Acquaintance-Hypothesis Strategy

5.3 The Source of the Problem

5.4 Conclusion

6: Phenomenal Representation

6.1 The Argument from Representationalism

6.1.1 The Main Steps

6.1.2 The Jackson 5

6.2 Mary's Revenge

6.2.1 The Problem

6.3 Responses

6.3.1 The Ability Hypothesis Redux

6.3.2 Varieties of Representationalism

6.4 Introspective Misrepresentation

6.4.1 Introspective Inaccuracy

6.4.2 Epistemic Possibility Is not Enough

6.5 Conclusion

PART II: THE CASE FOR THE MODAL GAP

7: Deduction and Necessity

7.1 The New Fact Thesis

7.2 The Argument from No Primitive Necessitation

7.2.1 Primitive Necessitation

7.2.2 Kripke Cases

7.2.3 Modal/Non-Modal

7.2.4 The Impossicycle

7.2.5 The Roots of Modal Concepts

7.3 The Two-Dimensional Knowledge Argument

7.3.1 Two Dimensions of Meaning

7.3.3 The Two-Dimensional Knowledge Argument

7.4 Conclusion

8: Epistemic-Modal Bridge Principles

8.1 In Defense of the Metaphysical Spin

8.1.1 Two-Dimensionalism, Metaphysical and Cognitive

8.1.2 SN, Triviality, and Anti-Realism

8.2 Radical Opacity and Revelation

8.2.1 Radical Opacity

8.2.2 Revelation, Weak and Strong

8.2.3 Revelation and Super-Justification

8.3 Conclusion

9: The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and Chalmers's Dilemma.

9.1 The Phenomenal Concept Strategy

9.2 Chalmers's Dilemma

9.2.1 The Master Argument

9.2.2 The Basis for the Premises

9.3 Balog and Circularity

9.3.1 Balog's Three Claims

9.3.2 Responses

9.4 Further Applications

9.4.1 Howell and Acquaintance

9.4.2 Prinz and Mental Maintenance

9.4.3 The New-Concepts Objection Revisited

9.5 Conclusion

10: Consequences of Social Externalism

10.1 The Ball-Tye Argument

10.2 The Concept-Mastery Strategy

10.2.1 The Concept-Mastery Thesis

10.2.2 The Strategy

10.2.3 Elaboration

10.3 Objections and Replies

10.3.1 Is the Concept-Mastery Thesis Explanatory?

10.3.2 Do Concept-Mastery Considerations Undermine the Knowledge Argument?

10.3.2.1 Rabin's Requirement

10.3.2.2 Re-Captured Mary

10.3.2.3 The Problem with Re-Captured Mary

10.3.2.4 Apriority, Introspection, and Rabin's Ahmed Case

10.4 Conclusion

11: The Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts

11.1 The Conditional-Analysis Strategy

11.2 The Oracle Argument

11.3 Explaining the Intuitions

11.4 Counterarguments

11.4.1 Haukioja's Defense of the Strategy

11.4.2 Majeed's Defense of the Strategy

11.5 Conclusion

PART III: THE CASE FOR THE ONTOLOGICAL GAP

12: The Supervenience Requirement on Physicalism

12.1 The Grounding Argument

12.2 Zhong's Objections

12.3 Montero's and Brown's Objections

12.4 Conclusion

13: Two Final Objections

13.1 A Quinean Strategy

13.2 Hybrid Strategies

13.2.1 Cath's Hybrid

13.2.2 Sainsbury and Tye's Hybrid

13.2.3 The Prospects for Hybridizing

13.3 Conclusion

14: Consciousness and Fundamentality

14.1 The Entailment Thesis

14.2 Against the Entailment Thesis

14.2.1 On the Argument from Adding Lessons

14.2.2 The Via Negativa Argument

14.3 Objections.

14.3.1 Goff 's Argument against Constitutive Russellian Monism

14.3.2 Strawson's Argument from Intrinsic Suitability

14.3.3 The Argument from Protophenomenal Laws

14.4 Conclusion

15: The Knowledge Argument, Russellian Monism, and Causal Integration

15.1 The Path to Russellian Monism

15.2 Howell's Integration-Failure Argument

15.2.1 Quiddistic Efficacy and Macrophenomenal Inheritance

15.2.2 The Contingency Thesis

15.2.3 From Contingency to Integration Failure

15.2.4 A Dilemma for the Integration-Failure Argument

15.2.5 Responses

15.3 Kind's Pessimism

15.4 Conclusion

16: Conclusion

Bibliography

Index.

Notes:

Description based on print version record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Other Format:

Print version: Alter, Torin The Matter of Consciousness

ISBN:

0-19-198787-5

0-19-257692-5

9780191987878

OCLC:

1374606229