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Web and Internet Economics : 9th International Conference, WINE 2013, Cambridge, MA, USA, December 1-14, 2013, Proceedings / edited by Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica.

SpringerLink Books Computer Science (2011-2024) Available online

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Format:
Book
Contributor:
Chen, Yiling, Editor.
Immorlica, Nicole, Editor.
SpringerLink (Online service)
Series:
Computer Science (SpringerNature-11645)
LNCS sublibrary. Information systems and applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI ; SL 3, 8289
Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI ; 8289
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Information storage and retrieval systems.
Electronic commerce.
Computer networks.
Algorithms.
Computer science-Mathematics.
Information Storage and Retrieval.
e-Commerce and e-Business.
Computer Communication Networks.
Mathematics of Computing.
Local Subjects:
Information Storage and Retrieval.
e-Commerce and e-Business.
Computer Communication Networks.
Algorithms.
Mathematics of Computing.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (XIV, 440 pages) : 25 illustrations
Edition:
1st ed. 2013.
Contained In:
Springer Nature eBook
Place of Publication:
Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 2013.
System Details:
text file PDF
Summary:
This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed conference proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2013, held in Cambridge, MA, USA, in December 2013. The 36 revised full papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 150 submissions and cover research in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics.
Contents:
The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem
Polylogarithmic Supports are required for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria
The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship
Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments
Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods
On Lookahead Equilibria in Congestion Games
Trading Agent Kills Market Information: Evidence from Online Social Lending
Designing Markets for Daily Deals
The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
The Price of Anarchy of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism Revisited
Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions
Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions
Competition in the Presence of Social Networks: How Many Service Providers Maximize Welfare?
Resolving Braess's Paradox in Random Networks
A protocol for cutting matroids like cakes
Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox
Price of Anarchy for the N-player Competitive Cascade Game with Submodular Activation Functions.
Other Format:
Printed edition:
ISBN:
978-3-642-45046-4
9783642450464
Access Restriction:
Restricted for use by site license.

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