Ignorance and moral responsibility / Michael J. Zimmerman.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Zimmerman, Michael J., 1951- author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Responsibility.

Ignorance (Theory of knowledge)--Moral and ethical aspects.

Ignorance (Theory of knowledge).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xvi, 375 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2022.

Summary:

Michael J. Zimmerman investigates the relation between ignorance and moral responsibility. He begins with the presentation of a case in which a tragedy occurs, one to which many people have unwittingly contributed, and addresses the question of whether their ignorance absolves them of blame for what happened. Inspection of the case issues in the Argument from Ignorance, whose conclusion is that, to be blameworthy for one's behaviour and its consequences, one must at some time in the history of that behaviour have known that one was engaged in wrongdoing - a thesis that threatens to undermine many everyday ascriptions of responsibility.

Contents:

Cover

Ignorance and Moral Responsibility

Copyright

Preface

Contents

List of Charts and Figures

Acknowledgments

PART I: INTRODUCTION OF THE ARGUMENT FROM IGNORANCE

1. The Argument from Ignorance

PART II: EXAMINATION AND REFINEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT FROM IGNORANCE

2. Moral Responsibility

2.1 Varieties of responsibility

2.1.1 Some key distinctions

2.1.2 The relation between blameworthiness and wrongdoing

2.1.3 Agent-evaluation and act-evaluation

2.1.4 Three kinds of moral judgments

2.2 Blameworthiness

2.2.1 The basis of blameworthiness

2.2.2 Diverse mental qualities

2.2.3 Control

2.2.4 The relation between the object and the basis of blameworthiness

2.3 The blame in blameworthiness

2.3.1 Thin blame (and praise)

2.3.2 Thick blame (and praise)

2.3.3 Thick blame (and praise) and the reactive attitudes

2.3.4 Thick blame as essentially emotional

2.3.5 Thick blame as essentially involving certain dispositions

2.3.6 Thick blame as essentially calling for an answer

2.3.7 Thick blame as essentially conversational

2.3.8 Thick blame as essentially involving a moral community

2.3.9 A conceptual circle

2.3.10 Breaking the circle

2.4 The worthiness in blameworthiness

2.4.1 From fittingness to worthiness

2.4.2 The ethics of blame

2.4.3 Between blameworthiness and blamelessness

2.5 Degrees of blameworthiness

2.5.1 Maximal blameworthiness

2.5.2 The two dimensions of blameworthiness

2.5.3 Comparing and aggregating degrees of blameworthiness

2.5.4 The basis of blameworthiness

2.5.5 Full blameworthiness

3. Ignorance

3.1 Knowledge and ignorance

3.2 Believing and failing to believeNeither believing nor failing to believe is a simple matter. A proper

3.2.1 Knowledge and belief

3.2.2 Beliefs and dispositions

3.2.3 Occurrent beliefs.

3.2.4 Degrees of belief

3.2.5 Conflicting beliefs

3.2.6 Failing to believe

3.3 Acting from ignorance

3.4 Blameworthiness without wrongdoing

3.4.1 Accuses

3.4.2 Moral realism

3.4.3 Suberogation

4. Control

4.1 Volitional control

4.1.1 Doing something at will

4.1.2 The bilateral nature of volitional control

4.1.3 Direct vs. indirect control and immediate vs. remote control

4.1.4 Complete vs. partial control

4.1.5 Basic vs. enhanced control

4.1.6 Simple vs. intentional control

4.1.7 AB-conditionals and indirect control

4.1.8 AB-conditionals and direct control

4.1.9 Control vs. freedom

4.1.10 Possessing vs. exercising control

4.2 Simple vs. intentional control

4.2.1 Control and awareness

4.2.2 Reasons-responsiveness

4.3 Direct vs. indirect control

4.4 Control over omissions

4.4.1 Acts of omission

4.4.2 Can control be purely passive?

4.4.3 The locus of direct control

4.5 Degrees of control

4.5.1 The extent of control

4.5.2 Whole control

4.5.3 Awareness of circumstances

4.5.4 Reasons-responsiveness

4.5.5 Difficulty

4.5.6 Freedom

4.5.7 The relation between degree of blameworthiness and degree of control

4.6 Control over beliefs

4.6.1 Doxastic voluntarism

4.6.2 Indirect control over beliefs

4.6.3 Direct control over beliefs

4.6.4 Believing at will

4.6.5 The Argument against Believing at Will

4.6.6 The Argument against Considering at Will

5. Culpable Ignorance

5.1 Tracing blameworthiness

5.1.1 Tracing and tracking

5.1.2 Does tracing require tracking?

5.1.3 Foreseeability

5.1.4 Moral luck

5.1.5 Tracing culpability for ignorant wrongdoing

5.2 Exculpatory culpable ignorance

5.2.1 Does ignorance of wrongdoing ever provide an excuse for wrongdoing?

5.2.2 The shadow cast by the benighting act.

5.2.3 Inculpatory ignorance

6. Negligence

6.1 Inadvertent wrongdoing

6.2 Morally substandard inadvertence

6.2.1 Substandard inattention to what one already knows

6.2.2 Substandard ignorance

7. Recklessness

7.1 Conscious wrongdoing

7.1.1 Conscious negligence and inadvertent recklessness

7.1.2 Acting recklessly vs. acting knowingly

7.1.3 Conscious risk-taking vs. conscious wrongdoing

7.1.4 Risking harm vs. risking wrong

7.1.5 Purposely doing wrong

7.2 Motivated ignorance

7.2.1 Varieties of motivated ignorance

7.2.2 The law on willful ignorance

7.2.3 The duty to inquire

7.2.4 Motivated non-moral ignorance

7.2.5 Motivated moral ignorance

8. Fundamental Moral Ignorance

8.1 Psychopathy

8.2 Evil

8.3 Amoralism

PART III: CHALLENGES TO THE ARGUMENTFROM IGNORANCE

9. Varieties of Blameworthiness

9.1 Negligence

9.1.1 Inadvertence and blameworthiness

9.1.2 Agent-regret and remorse

9.1.3 Morally substandard inadvertence

9.2 Blameworthiness and quality of will

9.2.1 Caring for morality de re vs. caring for morality de dicto

9.2.2 Conscientiousness and doing something for the right reason

9.2.3 Moral fetishism

9.2.4 Ill will

9.3 The unique moral significance of voluntary wrongdoing

9.4 Blameworthiness without responsibility

Postscript

Bibliography

Index of Names

Index of Subjects.

Notes:

This edition also issued in print: 2022.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on October 7, 2022).

ISBN:

0-19-194993-0

0-19-267567-2

0-19-267566-4