Oxford studies in ancient philosophy. Volume LXI, Winter 2021 / edited by Victor Caston.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Caston, Victor, 1963- editor.

Series:

Oxford studies in ancient philosophy, 0265-7651 ; 61

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Aristotle.

Plato.

Sextus, Empiricus.

Sextus.

Philosophy, Ancient--Periodicals.

Philosophy, Ancient.

Genre:

Periodicals.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (vi, 318 pages) : color illustrations.

Edition:

First edition.

Other Title:

Oxford studies in ancient philosophy. Volume 61

Studies in ancient philosophy

Ancient philosophy

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2022.

Summary:

Volume LXI contains: an examination of the relation between technē and epistēmē in Plato; a new reading of the final argument for immorality in the Phaedo and its connection to the affinity argument; the account of colour in the Timaeus; a renewed examination of Aristotle’s distinction between synonymy and homonymy and its consequences for questions of incommensurability; his conception of geometrical objects; his treatment of continence or enkrateia; and a close examination of Sextus Empiricus’ response to dogmatists’ charge of self-refutation in the final arguments of Against the Logicians.

Contents:

Cover

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy

Copyright

Advisory Board

Contents

Plato's Knowledge Vocabulary and John Lyons's Structural Semantics

1. The structural semantic method

2. The interchangeability of epistēmē and technē

3. Does epistasthai imply tēn technēn echein?

4. Can epistēmē substitute for technē with no change in meaning?

5. Linguistic meaning and philosophical meaning

6. A suggested interpretation

7. Conclusion

Bibliography

The Phaedo's Final Argument and the Soul's Kinship with the Divine

1. The kinship argument (78 B-80B)

2. Cebes' objection (87 A-88B)

3. The final argument's response to Cebes' objection

4. The forms in us: 102 B-103C

5. The bringers (103 C-105C)

6. The soul as bringer of life and the final argument proper (105 C-107A)

7. The soul and the divine as immortal

8. Conclusion

Timaeus on Colour Mixture

1. Colour, fire, and flame

2. Chromatic affections

3. Primary colours

4. Brilliant

5. Red

6. Proportion, divine bonds, and the chromatic unknown

7. Colour mixture

8. Interpreting Timaean colour mixture

9. The minimalist interpretation

10. Against Democritus

Aristotle on Comparison

1. Aristotle's (apparent) claim that comparison requires synonymy

1.1. The Topics on homonymy and comparability

1.2. Physics 7. 4 on synonymy and comparability

1.3. Dichotomous and non-dichotomousdivisions of homonymy and synonymy

1.4. Homonymy and non-synonymyare not the same

1.5. Developmental and other approaches

2. Comparison across ambiguity

2.1. Introducing the pros hen legomena

2.2. Comparison using the pros hen legomena

2.3. Analogical comparisons?

3. Broader implications: Aristotle's cosmological hierarchy

3.1. Species specificity and non-synonymyof goodness.

3.2. Cosmic comparison without cosmic synonymy

Aristotle's Philosophy of Geometry: A Philosophical Defence

1. Introduction

2. Inadequacy, Inherence, and the properties interpretation

3. How geometrical objects inhere in sensibles

3.1. An apparent conflict

3.2. Kooky objects

3.3. Geometrical objects as kooky objects

3.4. How sensible objects have geometrical properties (and how they do not)

4. How geometrical objects are limits and divisions of sensibles

4.1. How geometrical objects are limits

4.2. How geometrical objects are divisions

5. An incompatible alternative: The parts interpretation

6. Problems for the parts interpretation

6.1. Weakness of motivations

6.2. Irreconcilability with other Aristotelian commitments

6.2.1. The actual parts problem

6.2.2. A category error

6.2.3. The material parts confusion

7. The kooky objects solution

Aristotelian Continence Reconsidered

1. Preface

2. Continence and incontinence as behavioural tendencies

3. Reason and motivation

4. Ethical education

5. Epilogue: The continent character

Appendix 1: Virtue and vice

Appendix 2: Two recent treatments

Appendix 3: Jennifer Whiting's Locomotive Soul

Appendix 4: David Charles's 'Third Way'

Proof against Proof: A Reading of Sextus Empiricus' Against the Logicians 8. 463-81

2. The Dogmatist's anti-scepticalargument (M 8. 463-5)

2.1. The Dogmatist's aim

2.2. The Dogmatist's dilemmatic argument

3. The sceptic's response to the first horn of the dogmatist's dilemma (M 8. 470-1)

3.1. The sceptic's strategy

3.2. The unamended text

3.3. Deleting both the third and the fourth οὐκ

3.4. Retaining the third and deleting the fourth οὐκ

3.5. Deleting the third and retaining the fourth οὐκ.

3.6. One-Sidedversus Two-Sidedsuspension of judgement

4. The sceptic's response to the second horn of the dogmatist's dilemma (M 8. 472)

4.1. The sceptic's argument

4.2. Opposing an argument versus superseding an argument

5. The dogmatist's objection and the sceptic's counterargument (M 8. 479-81)

5.1. The content of the dogmatist's objection: Self-refutation or self-elimination?

5.2. The sceptic's first response to the dogmatist's objection

5.3. The sceptic's second response to the dogmatist's objection

5.4. The target of the dogmatist's objection: AAP or S2?

5.5. Two interpretations of the sceptic's counterargument

5.6. The seriousness of the dogmatist's challenge

5.7. The completeness of the sceptic's response

6. Conclusion

Index Locorum

Notes for Contributors.

Notes:

This edition also issued in print: 2022.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on October 7, 2022).

ISBN:

0-19-195539-6

0-19-268834-0