A perfectionist theory of justice / Collis Tahzib.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Tahzib, Collis, author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Justice.

Perfection.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (369 pages)

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2022]

Summary:

Many liberal political philosophers hold that the state should not impose or even promote any particular conception of the good life or human flourishing. It should not, for instance, enact laws and policies designed to elevate citizen's tastes, to refine their sensibilities, or to perfect their characters. Instead, the state should restrict itself to establishing a fair framework of rights and opportunities within which all citizens can pursue their own beliefs about what constitutes a good life. Against this backdrop, Collis Tahzib develops a theory that emanates from the perfectionist tradition of political philosophy. But whereas previous perfectionists have argued that the promotion of flourishing ways of life is permissible or legitimate, Tahzib casts perfectionism as a doctrine of justice.

Contents:

cover

titlepage

copyright

Acknowledgements

Contents

Introduction

Two Distinctive Features

Outline

I THE FOIL: ANTI-PERFECTIONIST LIBERALISM

1 Comprehensive Liberalism

1.1 Two Kinds of Liberal Theory

1.2 Kantian Liberalism

1.3 Millian Liberalism

1.4 Dworkin's Challenge Model of Ethics

2 Political Liberalism

2.1 The Fact of Reasonable Disagreement

2.2 Public Justification

2.3 A Thin Normative Rationale

2.3.1 Respect

2.3.2 Stability

2.3.3 The Reactive Attitudes

II PERFECTIONIST JUSTICE

3 A Perfectionist Conception of Society

3.1 The Rawlsian Conception of Society

3.2 Why the Rawlsian Conception of Society?

3.3 An Alternative Conception of Society

3.4 The Perfectionist Conception as Cultural Interpretation

3.5 The Perfectionist Conception in Reflective Equilibrium

4 Perfectionist Principles of Justice

4.1 Rawls's Original Position: The Set-Up

4.2 Rawls's Original Position: The Selection of Principles

4.3 A Perfectionist Original Position: The Set-Up

4.4 A Perfectionist Original Position: The Selection of Principles

4.5 Are Judgements About Human Flourishing Especially Controversial?

4.6 Is the Perfectionist Original Position Redundant?

5 A Provisional Conception of Human Flourishing

5.1 Three Conceptions Unfit for Political Purposes

5.2 The Enjoyment of Moral, Intellectual and Artistic Excellence

5.3 Are the Three Excellences Too Abstract?

5.4 Provisionality

5.5 Arbitrariness

5.6 Are Enjoyment and Excellence Strictly Necessary?

6 Perfectionist Law and Public Policy

6.1 Preliminaries

6.2 Moral Excellence

6.3 Intellectual Excellence

6.4 Artistic Excellence

6.5 Indistinguishability: Doesn't Liberal Justice Already Give Perfection Its Due?

6.6 Extensional Differences.

6.6.1 Rawls's Arguments from Unanimous Consent and Equality

6.6.2 Dworkin's Argument from Intergenerational Fairness

6.6.3 Wall's Argument from Equality and Fairness

6.6.4 Kramer's Argument from Warranted Self-Respect

6.7 Intensional Differences

III OBJECTIONS

7 Public Justification

7.1 A Road Not Taken

7.2 Perfectionist Public Reason

7.3 Is the Marriage of Perfectionism and Constructivism Well-Motivated?

7.4 Which Definition of Reasonableness Is More Plausible?

7.5 Admissible Interpretations of the Excellences

7.6 A More Sectarian Definition of Reasonableness?

7.6.1 The Anti-Sectarian Desideratum

7.6.2 The Spirit of Public Reason Liberalism

7.6.3 Stability

7.6.4 Respect

7.6.5 Redundancy

7.7 An Overly Sectarian Definition of Reasonableness?

8 Freedom

8.1 The Place of Freedom Within Perfectionist Justice

8.2 Four Freedom-Based Objections Defused

8.3 Libertarian Full Self-Ownership

8.3.1 Three Implausible Implications

8.3.2 Two Libertarian Responses

8.4 Pragmatic Concerns

9 Paternalism

9.1 Why Is Perfectionist State Action Necessary?

9.2 A Non-Paternalistic Justification for Perfectionist State Action?

9.3 Why Paternalism (in the Quongian Sense) Is Not Objectionable

10 The Village Busybody

10.1 What Is the Quidnunc Mentality?

10.2 How the Quidnunc Mentality Objection Begs the Question

10.3 A Substantive Argument Against Perfectionist Duties?

10.4 Indistinguishability Rides Again

10.5 Addendum

Conclusion

References

Index.

Notes:

Also issued in print: 2022.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on October 6, 2022).

ISBN:

0-19-266275-9

0-19-193952-8

0-19-266274-0