Perceptual experience / Christopher S. Hill.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Hill, Christopher S., author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Perception (Philosophy).

Appearance (Philosophy).

Phenomenology.

Experience.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xiv, 270 pages) : illustrations.

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2022.

Summary:

Christopher S. Hill offers an original philosophical account of perceptual experience: its intrinsic nature, its engagement with the world, its relations to mental states of other kinds, and its role in epistemic norms. He argues that it constitutively involves representations of worldly items, which can be explained in broadly biological terms.

Contents:

Cover

Perceptual Experience

Copyright

Dedication

Contents

Preface

Acknowledgments

List of Figures

Epigraph

1: Representationalism

I. Introduction

II. Goals

III. Fixing Ideas about Perception and Experience

IV. Teleosemantics Plus Representational Pluralism

V. Selectionist Teleosemantics, Learning, and Cummins Teleosemantics

VI. Two Objections to the Foregoing Picture

VII. Conclusion

2: Appearance and Reality I

II. Introspective Grounds for Perceptual Relativity

III. Experimental Grounds for Relativity

IV. Appearance Properties

V. Thouless Sizes

VI. More on Thouless Properties

VII. Objective Properties

VIII. Conclusion

3: Appearance and Reality II

II. Alternative Accounts of Visual Appearances

III. Aspects of Perceptual Relativity Due to Peripheral Sense Organs

IV. Aspects of Perceptual Relativity Due to Attention

V. Thouless Properties and Causal Theories of Representation

VI. Generalizing from Vision to Other Perceptual Modalities

VII. Appearance and Reality in Audition

VIII. Appearance and Reality in Touch

IX. Appearance and Reality in Olfaction

X. Conclusion

4: Perceptual Awareness of Particulars

II. Particularism vs Existentialism

III. An Argument for Existentialism

IV. Arguments for Particularism

V. Awareness of Particulars

VI. The Nature of Objects of Perceptual Awareness

VII. A Dual Systems Account of Object Awareness

VIII. A Unified Account of Object Awareness

IX. Awareness of Objects Qua Members of Kinds

5: Perceptual Phenomenology

II. Dualism

III. Phenomenal Representationalism

IV. Reasons for Representationalist Accounts of Awareness

V. An Objection to Phenomenal Representationalism

VI. Conclusion.

APPENDIX I: The Phenomenology of Conscious Thought

APPENDIX II: The Phenomenology of Moods and Emotions

6: A Quasi-Perceptualist Account of Pain Experience

II. Fixing Ideas

III. The Damage Detection System and Its Relation to Pain

IV. Six Concerns about This Theory of Pain

V. Hurting

VI. Awareness of Pain and Perceptual Awareness

7: Perceptual Consciousness

II. The Autonomy Thesis

III. A Metaphysical Argument for the Autonomy Thesis

IV. A Fourth Argument for Autonomy

V. The Categorical Base Hypothesis

VI. Phenomenal Consciousness

VII. Proposals about P-Consciousness

VIII. The Second-OrderTheory of P-Consciousness

IX. The Adverbial Theory of P-Consciousness

X. The Categorical Base Theory of P-Consciousness

XI. Conclusion

8: Percepts and Concepts

II. A Theory of Propositional Attitudes

III. Percepts are Metaphysically Independent of Concepts

IV. More Differences Separating Percepts from Concepts and Propositional Attitudes

V. Classes of Worlds as the Semantic Values of Perceptual States

VI. Conclusion

9: The Epistemic Role of Perception

II. Experiential Judgments and Experiential Of-ness

III. A Brief for Process Reliabilism

IV. Skepticism

V. Answers to Objections

VI. Reliabilism and the Epistemic Role of Perceptual Experience

VII. Internalist Accounts of Justification and Rationality

VIII. A Puzzle and Its Solution

IX. Conclusion

References

Index.

Notes:

This edition originally published: 2022.

"This is an open access publication, available online and distributed under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution - Non Commercial - No Derivatives 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)"--Title page verso.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode

Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on October 8, 2022).

ISBN:

0-19-269363-8

0-19-195986-3

0-19-269362-X