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The cognitive science of belief : a multidisciplinary approach / edited by Julien Musolino, Rutgers University, New Jersey, Joseph Sommer, Rutgers University, New Jersey, Pernille Hemmer, Rutgers University, New Jersey.

Cambridge eBooks: Frontlist 2022 Available online

View online
Format:
Book
Contributor:
Musolino, Julien, editor.
Sommer, Joseph (Psychologist), editor.
Hemmer, Pernille, editor.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Belief and doubt.
Belief and doubt--Social aspects.
Cognition.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (xi, 614 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).
Edition:
First edition.
Place of Publication:
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2023.
Summary:
Beliefs play a central role in our lives. They lie at the heart of what makes us human, they shape the organization and functioning of our minds, they define the boundaries of our culture, and they guide our motivation and behavior. Given their central importance, researchers across a number of disciplines have studied beliefs, leading to results and literatures that do not always interact. The Cognitive Science of Belief aims to integrate these disconnected lines of research to start a broader dialogue on the nature, role, and consequences of beliefs. It tackles timeless questions, as well as applications of beliefs that speak to current social issues. This multidisciplinary approach to beliefs will benefit graduate students and researchers in cognitive science, psychology, philosophy, political science, economics, and religious studies.
Contents:
Cover
Half-title
Title page
Copyright information
Contents
List of Figures and Tables
List of Contributors
Chapter 1 Introduction: Toward a Cognitive Science of Belief
1.1 Introduction
1.2 What Are Beliefs?
1.3 A Cognitive Perspective on Beliefs
1.4 The Mechanics and Functions of Beliefs
1.4.1 The Mechanics of Beliefs
1.4.2 The Functions of Beliefs
1.5 The Practical Difficulty of Belief
1.5.1 Epistemic Trade-offs
1.5.2 Computational Constraints
1.5.3 Effects Of Prior Knowledge
1.5.4 A Final Note on Irrationality
1.6 The Cognitive Science of Belief
References
Part I Understanding Belief
Philosophical and Linguistic Approaches to Beliefs
Chapter 2 The Cognitive Science of 'Belief' (The Word)
2.1 What This Is About
2.2 First Approximation
2.3 The Character of the Proposition
2.3.1 Three Puzzles
2.3.2 Grammatical Parallel with Depictions
2.3.3 Analysis of Depictions
2.3.4 Solution to the Puzzles for Depictions
2.3.5 Solution to the puzzles for 'Beliefs'
2.4 Alternatives to Commitment
2.5 Commitment to Actions
2.6 Commitment to Norms
2.7 Conclusions
Chapter 3 The Science of Belief: A Progress Report
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Philosophical Models of Belief
3.3 Belief in Cognitive Science: An Overview
3.3.1 Placebo Effects and Reward Prediction Error Learning
3.3.2 Attribution Theory
3.3.3 Theory of Mind
3.3.4 Belief in Comparative Cognition
3.3.5 Belief in Cognitive Science: A Midterm Report
3.4 The Science of Belief: Belief Acquisition, Storage, Change
3.4.1 Belief Acquisition
3.4.2 Belief Storage
3.4.3 Belief Change
3.4.4 Beliefs and the Structure of Thought: Bayesianism and Implicit Attitudes
3.5 Future Directions for the Empirical Study of Belief
3.6 Conclusion
References.
Chapter 4 The Role of Context in Belief Evaluation: Costs and Benefits of Irrational Beliefs
4.1 Human Agency and Irrationality
4.2 Irrationality and Mental Health
4.3 The Optimistic COVID-19 Victim
4.4 The Domestic Violence Victim and the Role of Context
4.5 Irrational Beliefs: Something to Fight Against or Something to Embrace?
Models of Optimal Beliefs
Chapter 5 How and Why Does Schematic Knowledge Affect Memory?
5.1 Schematic Knowledge and Its Role in Episodic Memory
5.2 Understanding Why Schematic Knowledge Affects Episodic Memory Retrieval
5.2.1 Rational Analysis
5.2.2 A Bayesian Model of Reconstructive Memory
5.3 Connecting Rational Analysis with Recent Empirical Findings on Schematic Knowledge
5.3.1 Temporal Dynamics of Schematic Influence on Episodic Memory
5.3.2 The Effect of Schematic Knowledge on Atypical Items
5.3.3 When Schematic Knowledge Hampers Episodic Memory
Chapter 6 Probability, Belief, and the Richness of Cognition
Implicit vs Explicit Beliefs
Chapter 7 Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs
7.1 Intuitive Beliefs
7.2 Reflective Attitudes
7.3 Reflective Beliefs
7.4 Disquotational Incontinence
7.5 Representational Capacity
7.6 Intuitive and Reflective Concepts
7.7 Believing the Same Thing Twice
7.8 Summary
Chapter 8 Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs in a Modern World
8.1 Psychological Underpinnings of Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs
8.2 On The (Almost) Overlooked Beneficial Effect of Intuitive Beliefs
8.3 Primary and Secondary Beliefs in Reasoning and Learning
8.4 Conclusion
Evolutionary Psychology of Beliefs
Chapter 9 Do Cultural Misbeliefs Cause Costly Behavior?
9.1 Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs.
9.2 How to Tell Whether Cultural Misbeliefs Are Intuitive or Reflective
9.3 Diverse Misbeliefs, Common Costly Behaviors
9.4 Consequences of Holding Intuitive vs Reflective Beliefs
9.4.1 Rumors
9.4.2 Conspiracy Theories
9.5 Conclusion
Chapter 10 Cultural Evolutionary Psychology of Belief
10.1 Introduction
10.2 (Cultural) Evolutionary Psychology
10.2.1 Standard Evolutionary Psychology
10.2.2 Toward a Cultural Evolutionary Psychology of Belief
10.2.3 Cultural Evolutionary Forces
10.3 Case Studies
10.3.1 Religious Belief Systems
10.3.2 Conspiracy Theory Beliefs
10.3.3 Summary
10.4 Merits of a Cultural Evolutionary Psychology
10.4.1 Competing and Interacting Forces of Cultural Evolution
Part II Domains of Beliefs
Religion and Morality
Chapter 11 Religious Beliefs
11.1 Introduction: Religion Is Nothing Special
11.2 Supernatural Imagination
11.3 The Cognitive Status of Religious Beliefs
11.4 Varieties of Religions (I): Non-Doctrinal Traditions
11.4.1 What Are Non-Doctrinal Religions About?
11.5 Varieties of Religions (II): Doctrinal Religions
11.6 Belief Statements as Signals
11.7 Conclusion
Chapter 12 Essentialist Views of Criminal Behavior Predict Increased Punitiveness
12.1 Introduction
12.2 Study 1
12.2.1 Method
12.2.2 Results
12.2.3 Discussion
12.3 Study 2
12.3.1 Method
12.3.2 Results
12.3.3 Discussion
12.4 Study 3
12.4.1 Methods
12.4.2 Results
12.4.3 Discussion
12.5 General Discussion
12.6 Conclusions
Appendix
A.1 Essentialism of Criminality Scale
Economics and Politics
Chapter 13 Political Belief Formation: Individual Differences and Situational Factors
13.1 Introduction
13.2 Motivated Reasoning
13.2.1 Directionally Motivated Reasoning.
13.2.2 Accuracy Motivation and Reflection
13.3 Individual Differences in Reflective Reasoning
13.4 Situational Factors
13.5 Questions for Future Research
Chapter 14 Americans' Lack of Political Beliefs and the Consequences for Democracy
14.1 Introduction
14.2 The Formation of Political Beliefs
14.3 Updating Beliefs in Response to Information
14.3.1 The Role of Elite Influence
14.3.2 Susceptibility to Bias and Elite Influence
14.3.3 A Place for Emotions
14.4 Group-Based Influences on Political Beliefs
14.4.1 Race and Ethnicity
14.4.2 Party Polarization
14.5 The Consequences for Democracy
14.6 Conclusion
Chapter 15 Thoughts and Players: An Introduction to Old and New Economic Perspectives on Beliefs
15.1 Introduction
15.2 The Economic Account of Beliefs
15.2.1 A Historical Diversion
15.3 Belief-Based Utility
15.3.1 The Evolutionary Origins of Caring about Beliefs and a Fundamental Problem
15.3.2 A Brief History of Belief-Based Utility
15.4 Sources of Belief-Based Utility
15.4.1 Beliefs about Future Outcomes and Anticipatory Emotions
15.4.2 Beliefs about the Self and Ego-Utility
15.4.3 The Value of Intra-Personal Consistency of Beliefs
15.5 Utility From Other People's Beliefs
15.5.1 The Role of Others' Beliefs in Economic Models
15.5.2 ''Direct'' Concerns about Others' Beliefs
15.5.3 The Evolutionary Origins of Caring about Others' Beliefs
15.6 Consequences of Belief-Based Utility
15.6.1 Information Avoidance
15.6.2 Biased Information Processing
15.6.3 Intertemporal Choice: Choosing between the Present and the Future
15.6.4 Decision Making under Risk and Uncertainty
15.6.5 Overconfidence and Overoptimism
15.6.6 Social Consequences: Ideological Conformity and Segregation by Beliefs
15.7 Applications.
15.7.1 Politics: News Consumption, Misinformation, and Polarization
15.7.2 Finance: Portfolio Choice and Investor Behavior
15.7.3 Healthcare: Medical Testing, Health Insurance, and Vaccination
15.7.4 Organizational Behavior: Employee Effort and Managerial Decisions
15.8 Concluding Remarks
15.8.1 Final Comments
Science and Race
Chapter 16 How Intuitive Beliefs Inoculate Us against Scientific Ones
16.1 Introduction
16.2 Interfering Intuitions
16.2.1 Origins of Intuitive Theories
16.2.2 Hallmarks of Intuitive Theories
16.3 The Case of Projectile Motion
16.3.1 Historical Precedence
16.3.2 Widespread Prevalence
16.3.3 Resistance to Counterevidence
16.3.4 Maladaptive Consequences
16.3.5 Enduring Resilience
16.4 The Case of Evolutionary Adaptation
16.4.1 Historical Precedence
16.4.2 Widespread Prevalence
16.4.3 Resistance to Counterevidence
16.4.4 Maladaptive Consequences
16.4.5 Enduring Resilience
16.5 Why Intuitive Theories Matter
16.5.1 Theoretical Implications
16.5.2 Pedagogical Implications
16.5.3 Social Implications
16.6 Conclusion
Chapter 17 COVID-19: Conspiracies and Collateral Damage vs Constructive Critique
17.1 Climate Change and COVID-19
17.2 COVID-19, Civil Liberties, and Lived Experiences
17.3 Collective vs Individual Optimality
17.4 Science vs Denial
17.5 Recommendations
17.6 Conclusions and Outlook
Chapter 18 Believing in Race vs Knowing Ourselves
18.1 Introduction
18.2 Seeing Race in Every Face
18.2.1 Race and Intelligence
18.2.2 Race and Medicine
18.2.3 Race and Sports
18.3 Reason For Hope
Part III Variation in Beliefs
Pathological Beliefs
Chapter 19 Delusions
19.1 Introduction
19.2 Explaining Delusion Formation
19.3 What Shape Is the Mind?.
19.3.1 Modularity versus Penetrability.
Notes:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 03 Nov 2022).
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:
9781009007474
1009007475
9781009008242
1009008242
9781009001021
1009001027

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