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The cognitive science of belief : a multidisciplinary approach / edited by Julien Musolino, Rutgers University, New Jersey, Joseph Sommer, Rutgers University, New Jersey, Pernille Hemmer, Rutgers University, New Jersey.
- Format:
- Book
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Belief and doubt.
- Belief and doubt--Social aspects.
- Cognition.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (xi, 614 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).
- Edition:
- First edition.
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2023.
- Summary:
- Beliefs play a central role in our lives. They lie at the heart of what makes us human, they shape the organization and functioning of our minds, they define the boundaries of our culture, and they guide our motivation and behavior. Given their central importance, researchers across a number of disciplines have studied beliefs, leading to results and literatures that do not always interact. The Cognitive Science of Belief aims to integrate these disconnected lines of research to start a broader dialogue on the nature, role, and consequences of beliefs. It tackles timeless questions, as well as applications of beliefs that speak to current social issues. This multidisciplinary approach to beliefs will benefit graduate students and researchers in cognitive science, psychology, philosophy, political science, economics, and religious studies.
- Contents:
- Cover
- Half-title
- Title page
- Copyright information
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- List of Contributors
- Chapter 1 Introduction: Toward a Cognitive Science of Belief
- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 What Are Beliefs?
- 1.3 A Cognitive Perspective on Beliefs
- 1.4 The Mechanics and Functions of Beliefs
- 1.4.1 The Mechanics of Beliefs
- 1.4.2 The Functions of Beliefs
- 1.5 The Practical Difficulty of Belief
- 1.5.1 Epistemic Trade-offs
- 1.5.2 Computational Constraints
- 1.5.3 Effects Of Prior Knowledge
- 1.5.4 A Final Note on Irrationality
- 1.6 The Cognitive Science of Belief
- References
- Part I Understanding Belief
- Philosophical and Linguistic Approaches to Beliefs
- Chapter 2 The Cognitive Science of 'Belief' (The Word)
- 2.1 What This Is About
- 2.2 First Approximation
- 2.3 The Character of the Proposition
- 2.3.1 Three Puzzles
- 2.3.2 Grammatical Parallel with Depictions
- 2.3.3 Analysis of Depictions
- 2.3.4 Solution to the Puzzles for Depictions
- 2.3.5 Solution to the puzzles for 'Beliefs'
- 2.4 Alternatives to Commitment
- 2.5 Commitment to Actions
- 2.6 Commitment to Norms
- 2.7 Conclusions
- Chapter 3 The Science of Belief: A Progress Report
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Philosophical Models of Belief
- 3.3 Belief in Cognitive Science: An Overview
- 3.3.1 Placebo Effects and Reward Prediction Error Learning
- 3.3.2 Attribution Theory
- 3.3.3 Theory of Mind
- 3.3.4 Belief in Comparative Cognition
- 3.3.5 Belief in Cognitive Science: A Midterm Report
- 3.4 The Science of Belief: Belief Acquisition, Storage, Change
- 3.4.1 Belief Acquisition
- 3.4.2 Belief Storage
- 3.4.3 Belief Change
- 3.4.4 Beliefs and the Structure of Thought: Bayesianism and Implicit Attitudes
- 3.5 Future Directions for the Empirical Study of Belief
- 3.6 Conclusion
- References.
- Chapter 4 The Role of Context in Belief Evaluation: Costs and Benefits of Irrational Beliefs
- 4.1 Human Agency and Irrationality
- 4.2 Irrationality and Mental Health
- 4.3 The Optimistic COVID-19 Victim
- 4.4 The Domestic Violence Victim and the Role of Context
- 4.5 Irrational Beliefs: Something to Fight Against or Something to Embrace?
- Models of Optimal Beliefs
- Chapter 5 How and Why Does Schematic Knowledge Affect Memory?
- 5.1 Schematic Knowledge and Its Role in Episodic Memory
- 5.2 Understanding Why Schematic Knowledge Affects Episodic Memory Retrieval
- 5.2.1 Rational Analysis
- 5.2.2 A Bayesian Model of Reconstructive Memory
- 5.3 Connecting Rational Analysis with Recent Empirical Findings on Schematic Knowledge
- 5.3.1 Temporal Dynamics of Schematic Influence on Episodic Memory
- 5.3.2 The Effect of Schematic Knowledge on Atypical Items
- 5.3.3 When Schematic Knowledge Hampers Episodic Memory
- Chapter 6 Probability, Belief, and the Richness of Cognition
- Implicit vs Explicit Beliefs
- Chapter 7 Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs
- 7.1 Intuitive Beliefs
- 7.2 Reflective Attitudes
- 7.3 Reflective Beliefs
- 7.4 Disquotational Incontinence
- 7.5 Representational Capacity
- 7.6 Intuitive and Reflective Concepts
- 7.7 Believing the Same Thing Twice
- 7.8 Summary
- Chapter 8 Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs in a Modern World
- 8.1 Psychological Underpinnings of Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs
- 8.2 On The (Almost) Overlooked Beneficial Effect of Intuitive Beliefs
- 8.3 Primary and Secondary Beliefs in Reasoning and Learning
- 8.4 Conclusion
- Evolutionary Psychology of Beliefs
- Chapter 9 Do Cultural Misbeliefs Cause Costly Behavior?
- 9.1 Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs.
- 9.2 How to Tell Whether Cultural Misbeliefs Are Intuitive or Reflective
- 9.3 Diverse Misbeliefs, Common Costly Behaviors
- 9.4 Consequences of Holding Intuitive vs Reflective Beliefs
- 9.4.1 Rumors
- 9.4.2 Conspiracy Theories
- 9.5 Conclusion
- Chapter 10 Cultural Evolutionary Psychology of Belief
- 10.1 Introduction
- 10.2 (Cultural) Evolutionary Psychology
- 10.2.1 Standard Evolutionary Psychology
- 10.2.2 Toward a Cultural Evolutionary Psychology of Belief
- 10.2.3 Cultural Evolutionary Forces
- 10.3 Case Studies
- 10.3.1 Religious Belief Systems
- 10.3.2 Conspiracy Theory Beliefs
- 10.3.3 Summary
- 10.4 Merits of a Cultural Evolutionary Psychology
- 10.4.1 Competing and Interacting Forces of Cultural Evolution
- Part II Domains of Beliefs
- Religion and Morality
- Chapter 11 Religious Beliefs
- 11.1 Introduction: Religion Is Nothing Special
- 11.2 Supernatural Imagination
- 11.3 The Cognitive Status of Religious Beliefs
- 11.4 Varieties of Religions (I): Non-Doctrinal Traditions
- 11.4.1 What Are Non-Doctrinal Religions About?
- 11.5 Varieties of Religions (II): Doctrinal Religions
- 11.6 Belief Statements as Signals
- 11.7 Conclusion
- Chapter 12 Essentialist Views of Criminal Behavior Predict Increased Punitiveness
- 12.1 Introduction
- 12.2 Study 1
- 12.2.1 Method
- 12.2.2 Results
- 12.2.3 Discussion
- 12.3 Study 2
- 12.3.1 Method
- 12.3.2 Results
- 12.3.3 Discussion
- 12.4 Study 3
- 12.4.1 Methods
- 12.4.2 Results
- 12.4.3 Discussion
- 12.5 General Discussion
- 12.6 Conclusions
- Appendix
- A.1 Essentialism of Criminality Scale
- Economics and Politics
- Chapter 13 Political Belief Formation: Individual Differences and Situational Factors
- 13.1 Introduction
- 13.2 Motivated Reasoning
- 13.2.1 Directionally Motivated Reasoning.
- 13.2.2 Accuracy Motivation and Reflection
- 13.3 Individual Differences in Reflective Reasoning
- 13.4 Situational Factors
- 13.5 Questions for Future Research
- Chapter 14 Americans' Lack of Political Beliefs and the Consequences for Democracy
- 14.1 Introduction
- 14.2 The Formation of Political Beliefs
- 14.3 Updating Beliefs in Response to Information
- 14.3.1 The Role of Elite Influence
- 14.3.2 Susceptibility to Bias and Elite Influence
- 14.3.3 A Place for Emotions
- 14.4 Group-Based Influences on Political Beliefs
- 14.4.1 Race and Ethnicity
- 14.4.2 Party Polarization
- 14.5 The Consequences for Democracy
- 14.6 Conclusion
- Chapter 15 Thoughts and Players: An Introduction to Old and New Economic Perspectives on Beliefs
- 15.1 Introduction
- 15.2 The Economic Account of Beliefs
- 15.2.1 A Historical Diversion
- 15.3 Belief-Based Utility
- 15.3.1 The Evolutionary Origins of Caring about Beliefs and a Fundamental Problem
- 15.3.2 A Brief History of Belief-Based Utility
- 15.4 Sources of Belief-Based Utility
- 15.4.1 Beliefs about Future Outcomes and Anticipatory Emotions
- 15.4.2 Beliefs about the Self and Ego-Utility
- 15.4.3 The Value of Intra-Personal Consistency of Beliefs
- 15.5 Utility From Other People's Beliefs
- 15.5.1 The Role of Others' Beliefs in Economic Models
- 15.5.2 ''Direct'' Concerns about Others' Beliefs
- 15.5.3 The Evolutionary Origins of Caring about Others' Beliefs
- 15.6 Consequences of Belief-Based Utility
- 15.6.1 Information Avoidance
- 15.6.2 Biased Information Processing
- 15.6.3 Intertemporal Choice: Choosing between the Present and the Future
- 15.6.4 Decision Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- 15.6.5 Overconfidence and Overoptimism
- 15.6.6 Social Consequences: Ideological Conformity and Segregation by Beliefs
- 15.7 Applications.
- 15.7.1 Politics: News Consumption, Misinformation, and Polarization
- 15.7.2 Finance: Portfolio Choice and Investor Behavior
- 15.7.3 Healthcare: Medical Testing, Health Insurance, and Vaccination
- 15.7.4 Organizational Behavior: Employee Effort and Managerial Decisions
- 15.8 Concluding Remarks
- 15.8.1 Final Comments
- Science and Race
- Chapter 16 How Intuitive Beliefs Inoculate Us against Scientific Ones
- 16.1 Introduction
- 16.2 Interfering Intuitions
- 16.2.1 Origins of Intuitive Theories
- 16.2.2 Hallmarks of Intuitive Theories
- 16.3 The Case of Projectile Motion
- 16.3.1 Historical Precedence
- 16.3.2 Widespread Prevalence
- 16.3.3 Resistance to Counterevidence
- 16.3.4 Maladaptive Consequences
- 16.3.5 Enduring Resilience
- 16.4 The Case of Evolutionary Adaptation
- 16.4.1 Historical Precedence
- 16.4.2 Widespread Prevalence
- 16.4.3 Resistance to Counterevidence
- 16.4.4 Maladaptive Consequences
- 16.4.5 Enduring Resilience
- 16.5 Why Intuitive Theories Matter
- 16.5.1 Theoretical Implications
- 16.5.2 Pedagogical Implications
- 16.5.3 Social Implications
- 16.6 Conclusion
- Chapter 17 COVID-19: Conspiracies and Collateral Damage vs Constructive Critique
- 17.1 Climate Change and COVID-19
- 17.2 COVID-19, Civil Liberties, and Lived Experiences
- 17.3 Collective vs Individual Optimality
- 17.4 Science vs Denial
- 17.5 Recommendations
- 17.6 Conclusions and Outlook
- Chapter 18 Believing in Race vs Knowing Ourselves
- 18.1 Introduction
- 18.2 Seeing Race in Every Face
- 18.2.1 Race and Intelligence
- 18.2.2 Race and Medicine
- 18.2.3 Race and Sports
- 18.3 Reason For Hope
- Part III Variation in Beliefs
- Pathological Beliefs
- Chapter 19 Delusions
- 19.1 Introduction
- 19.2 Explaining Delusion Formation
- 19.3 What Shape Is the Mind?.
- 19.3.1 Modularity versus Penetrability.
- Notes:
- Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 03 Nov 2022).
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- ISBN:
- 9781009007474
- 1009007475
- 9781009008242
- 1009008242
- 9781009001021
- 1009001027
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