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Defining knowledge : method and metaphysics / Stephen Hetherington.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Hetherington, Stephen Cade, author.
- Series:
- Cambridge Elements. Elements in epistemology
- Cambridge elements. Elements in epistemology 2398-0567
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Knowledge, Theory of.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (64 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).
- Edition:
- 1st ed.
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2022.
- Summary:
- Post-Gettier epistemology is increasingly modalized epistemology - proposing and debating modally explicable conditionals with suitably epistemic content (an approach initially inspired by Robert Nozick's 1981 account of knowledge), as needing to be added to 'true belief' in order to define or understand knowing's nature. This Element asks whether such modalized attempts - construed as responding to what the author calls Knowing's Further Features question (bequeathed to us by the Meno and the Theaetetus) - can succeed. The answer is that they cannot. Plato's and Aristotle's views on definition reinforce that result. Still, in appreciating this, we might gain insight into knowing's essence. We might find that knowledge is, essentially, nothing more than true belief.
- Contents:
- Cover
- Title page
- Copyright page
- Defining Knowledge: Method and Metaphysics
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 A Quest
- 1.1 A Socratic Question
- 1.2 A Philosophical Quest
- 2 An Hypothesis
- 2.1 A Socratic Version
- 2.2 A Contemporary Version
- 3 Modalised Epistemology
- 3.1 Post-Gettier Epistemology
- 3.2 Nozick's Account of Knowledge
- 3.3 Further Modalised Accounts of Knowledge
- 4 Knowing's Further Features Question
- 4.1 The Question
- 4.2 No Further Features?
- 4.3 The Further Power of Knowing's Further Features Question
- 4.4 An Unwelcome Infallibilism?
- 5 Knowledge and Luck
- 6 An Aristotelian Strengthening of the Argument
- 6.1 Aristotle on Definition
- 6.2 Aristotle on Definition on Nozick
- 6.3 Defusing a Williamsonian Objection
- 6.4 An Aristotelian Complication
- 6.5 A Platonic Strengthening of the Aristotelian Strengthening
- 7 Knowledge-Minimalism
- 7.1 Might It Be True?
- 7.2 A Final Word - from Socrates?
- References
- Acknowledgements.
- Notes:
- Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 31 Oct 2022).
- ISBN:
- 1-009-09027-5
- 1-009-09047-X
- 1-009-09220-0
- OCLC:
- 1376934879
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