How to prevent coups d'état : counterbalancing and regime survival / Erica De Bruin.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

De Bruin, Erica, 1982- author.

Series:

Cornell scholarship online.

Cornell scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Coups d'état--Prevention.

Coups d'état.

Civil war--Prevention.

Civil war.

Political leadership.

Civil-military relations.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (1 online resource)

Place of Publication:

Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2021.

Summary:

When rulers use presidential guards, militarized police, and militia to counterbalance the regular military, efforts to oust them from power via coups d'état are less likely to succeed. Even as counterbalancing helps to prevent successful interventions, however, the resentment that it generates within the regular military can provoke new coup attempts. And because counterbalancing changes how soldiers and police perceive the costs and benefits of a successful overthrow, it can create incentives for protracted fighting that result in the escalation of a coup into full-blown civil war. Drawing on an original dataset of state security forces in 110 countries over a span of fifty years, as well as case studies of coup attempts in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, the book sheds light on how counterbalancing affects regime survival.

Contents:

Introduction: Preventing Coups d'etat

The Logic of Counterbalancing

Counterbalancing and Coup Failure

How Counterbalancing Works: Testing the Causal Mechanisms

An Effective Deterrent? Counterbalancing and Coup Attempts

Challenges to Building Coercive Institutions

How Coups d'etat Escalate to Civil War

Conclusion: Coercive Institutions and Regime Survival.

Notes:

Previously issued in print: 2020.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

9781501751929

1501751921

OCLC:

1140380459