Foundationalism / Richard Fumerton.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Fumerton, Richard A., 1949- author.

Series:

Cambridge elements.Elements in epistemology 2398-0567

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Foundationalism (Theory of knowledge).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (51 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2022.

Summary:

Foundationalism is a view about the structure of knowledge and justification. The heart of the thesis is the claim that if there is any knowledge or justified belief at all, then there is a kind of knowledge and justified belief that does not require inference from something else known or justifiably believed. This Element begins by exploring abstract arguments for foundationalism and against proposed alternatives. It then explores disagreements among foundationalists about how to understand foundational knowledge and justified belief, what is plausibly included in the foundations, and what is required for legitimate inference from foundations to the rest of what we believe. The author argues for the conclusion that one can combine insights captured by different versions of foundationalism by making a distinction between ideal justification and justification that falls short of that ideal.

Contents:

Cover

Title page

Copyright page

Foundationalism

Contents

1 The Structure of Knowledge and Justified Belief

1.1 Knowledge

1.2 Justified (Rational) Belief

1.2.1 Epistemic versus Propositional Justification

1.3 Knowledge or Justification - Which, if Either, Is MoreFundamental?

1.4 The Distinction between Inferential and NoninferentialJustification

Inferential and Noninferential Knowledge

1.5 Regress Arguments for Foundationalism

1.5.1 The Epistemic Regress Argument for Foundationalism

1.5.2 The Conceptual Regress Argument

1.6 A Foundationalist "Argument" for Foundationalism

1.7 Alternatives to Foundationalism and the Foundationalist'sResponses

1.7.1 The Coherence Theory of Justification

1.7.2 Foundherentism

1.7.3 Infinitism

2 What Could Make a Belief Noninferentially Justified?

2.1 Nonstarters: "Explanations" that Don't Explain

2.2 The Internalism/Externalism Controversy

2.3 Internalist Versions of Foundationalism

2.3.1 Direct Acquaintance

2.3.1.1 Clarifications

2.3.2 Other Forms of Internal-State Foundationalism

2.4 Externalist Foundationalism

2.4.1 A Causal Account of Foundational Knowledge

2.4.2 Reliabilism

3 What Belongs in the Foundations?

3.1 Descartes's Search for Secure Foundationalism

3.2 Fallible Justification and Foundational Justification

3.3 A "Disjunctivist" Response

3.4 Meager Foundations on which to Build?

4 Traditional Foundationalism and the Challenge of Skepticism

4.1 Should We Reject Skepticism from the Start?

4.2 Inferential Justification and Principles of Reasoning

4.3 Internalist Constraints on Discovering the Truth of EpistemicPrinciples

4.4 Does Traditional Foundationalism "Over-Intellectualize"Requirements for Justified Belief?

4.4.1 Ideal Justification

4.4.2 Derivative Concepts of Justification.

References.

Notes:

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 30 Jun 2022).

ISBN:

1-009-03341-7

1-009-03361-1

1-009-02886-3

OCLC:

1334604480