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Web and Internet Economics : 17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14-17, 2021, Proceedings / edited by Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Inbal Talgam-Cohen.
- Format:
- Book
- Series:
- Computer Science (SpringerNature-11645)
- LNCS sublibrary. Information systems and applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI ; SL 3, 13112
- Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI ; 13112
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Algorithms.
- Artificial intelligence.
- Electronic commerce.
- Data structures (Computer science).
- Information theory.
- Application software.
- Computer science-Mathematics.
- Design and Analysis of Algorithms.
- Artificial Intelligence.
- e-Commerce and e-Business.
- Data Structures and Information Theory.
- Computer and Information Systems Applications.
- Mathematics of Computing.
- Local Subjects:
- Design and Analysis of Algorithms.
- Artificial Intelligence.
- e-Commerce and e-Business.
- Data Structures and Information Theory.
- Computer and Information Systems Applications.
- Mathematics of Computing.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (XIV, 558 pages) : 65 illustrations, 48 illustrations in color.
- Edition:
- 1st ed. 2022.
- Contained In:
- Springer Nature eBook
- Place of Publication:
- Cham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2022.
- System Details:
- text file PDF
- Summary:
- This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2021, which was held online during December 14-17, 2021. The conference was originally planned to take place in Potsdam, Germany, but changed to a virtual event due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 41 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 146 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: mechanism design and pricing; matching, markets and equilibria; learning, fairness, privacy and behavioral models; social choice and cryptocurrencies.
- Contents:
- Mechanism Design and Pricing
- Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality
- Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials
- The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing
- On Symmetries in Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design
- Welfare-Preserving $nvarepsilon$-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss
- Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances
- Contract Design for A orestation Programs
- Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching
- Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness
- On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals
- Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction
- Matching, Markets and Equilibria
- Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Model
- Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis
- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home
- Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods
- Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem
- Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy
- The Platform Design Problem
- A Consumer-Theoretic Characterization of Fisher Market Equilibria
- Learning, Fairness, Privacy and Behavioral Models A tight negative example for MMS fair allocations
- Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations
- Default Ambiguity: Finding the Best Solution to the Clearing Problem
- Planning on an Empty Stomach: On Agents with Projection Bias
- Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment
- Social Choice and Cryptocurrencies
- Decentralized Asset Custody Scheme with Security against Rational Adversary
- The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice
- Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries
- Envy-free division of multi-layered cakes
- Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies.
- Other Format:
- Printed edition:
- ISBN:
- 978-3-030-94676-0
- 9783030946760
- Access Restriction:
- Restricted for use by site license.
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