The Metaphysics of Market Power : The Zero-Sum Competition and Market Manipulation Approach / George Raitt.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Raitt, George, author.

Series:

Hart studies in competition law.

Hart Studies in Competition Law Series

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Antitrust law--Australia.

Antitrust law.

Industrial concentration.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (298 pages) : illustrations

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford, England : Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, [2019]

Summary:

Australian competition law has just emerged from a significant period of reform which has seen controversial changes to the legal test to distinguish between normal competitive conduct and conduct that should be condemned. The controversy continues, arguably because the traditional legal conception of market power does not provide a useful standard in real world markets. This important new book offers a radical interpretation of market power, based on the power to manipulate. Seeing it in this way allows for positive and normative standards within which to frame a legal theory of liability for misuse of that power. The book provides suggestions to improve the forensic assessment of conduct that should be condemned as misuse of market power.

Contents:

Intro

Foreword

Preface

Acknowledgements

Contents

Abbreviations

Table of Cases

Table of Legislation

List of Figures and Tables

Introduction

I. The Problem

II. Australia's Reform Process

III. The Proposed Market Manipulation Approach

IV. Implications of the Study beyond the Present Scope

V. The Problematic Role of Efficiency

VI. Differing Views of the World

VII. Economic Models and the Paradigm of Competition

VIII. The Overseas Experience

IX. What Difference Will Market Manipulation Theory Make?

X. Application to the Digital Economy

XI. Outline of the Chapters

XII. Effective Date of Law

PART I: THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1. Market Power in Economics and Law

I. Introduction

II. Policy Objectives and Concepts of Efficiency

III. Economic Models and the Paradigm of Competition

IV. Market Manipulation Laws in Securities Markets

V. Thought Experiment: Incumbent Response to New Entry

VI. Norms in Zero-Sum Competition

VII. Zero-Sum Competition, Market Manipulation and Efficiency

VIII. Conclusion

2. The Mischief and Australia's Institutional Response

II. The Continuing Influence of the SCP Approach in Australia

III. Australia's Institutional Division of Functions between Courts and Agencies

IV. Institutional Arrangements in the EU and the US: Court-Centred or Agency-Centred?

V. Conclusion

3. Competition and Efficiency Effects in Europe, North America and Australia

II. The Current Australian Effects Test Outside Section 46

III. The Harper Review Effects Test and the Role of Efficiency Effects

IV. EU Abuse of Dominance and Defences

V. US Monopolisation and Defences

VI. Efficiency in the Law of Securities Market Manipulation

VII. Adapting Efficiency as a Legal Concept.

VIII. Zero-Sum Competition, Market Manipulation and Efficiency

IX. Conclusion

PART II: TESTING MARKET MANIPULATION AND EFFICIENCY APPROACHES

4. Refusal to Deal and Margin Squeeze

II. Queensland Wire: Factual Matrix

III. Gaps in the Factual Matrix

IV. Queensland Wire under Harper Section 46

V. Queensland Wire under Market Manipulation

VI. Melway: Factual Matrix

VII. Melway under Harper Section 46

VIII. Melway under Market Manipulation

5. Predatory Pricing

II. Boral: Factual Matrix

IV. Boral under Harper Section 46

V. Boral under Market Manipulation

VI. Conclusion

6. Meeting Competition

II. Rural Press: Factual Matrix

IV. Rural Press under Harper Section 46

V. Rural Press under Market Manipulation

7. Raising Rivals' Costs

II. Cement Australia: Factual Matrix

IV. Cement Australia under Harper Section 46

V. Cement Australia under Market Manipulation

8. Bundling

II. Baxter: Factual Matrix

IV. Baxter under Harper Section 46

V. Baxter under Market Manipulation

VI. The Implications of Pfizer

VII. Conclusion

9. Institutional and Procedural Implications

II. NT Power

III. The Burden of Proof

IV. Conclusion

PART III: CONCLUSION

10. Findings and Recommendations

II. The Concept of Market Power

III. Paradigms of Competition and Norms of Conduct

IV. Forensic Assessment of Misuse of Market Power: Conclusions from the Case Studies

V. Implications for Competition Law.

Appendix: Text of the Old and New Versions of Section 46 of the CCA

Old (or Pre-Harper) Section 46

Harper Review Recommended Version of Section 46

Version of Section 46 Adopted by Parliament

Bibliography

Index.

Notes:

Description based on print version record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9781509928088

1509928081

9781509928095

150992809X

OCLC:

1090497452