The collected papers of Leonid Hurwicz. Volume 1 / edited by Samiran Banerjee.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Hurwicz, Leonid, author.

Contributor:

Banerjee, Samiran, editor.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Standardized Title:

Works. Selections

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Economics, Mathematical.

Mathematical optimization.

Hurwicz, Leonid.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (407 pages)

Place of Publication:

[New York] : Oxford University Press, [2022]

Summary:

Leonid Hurwicz (1917-2008) was a major figure in modern theoretical economics whose contributions over 65 years spanned at least five areas: econometrics, nonlinear programming, decision theory, microeconomic theory, and mechanism design. While some of Hurwicz's work were published in journals, many remain scattered as chapters in books which are difficult to access and others were never published at all. 'The Collected Papers of Leonid Hurwicz' is the first volume in a series of four that will bring his oeuvre in one place, to bring to light the totality of his intellectual output, and to document his contribution to economics and the extent of his legacy, with the express purpose to make it easily available for future generations of researchers to build upon.

Contents:

Cover

The Collected Papersof Leonid Hurwicz

Copyright

Dedication

Preface

Contents

Part I: Biography and Reminiscences

1: Leo Hurwicz: A Biography

The Early Years

The University Years in Europe

The University Years in the US

The Faculty Years

Final Words

References

2: Leonid Hurwicz: An Appreciation

Editor's Postscript

3: A Twenty-One-Year Collaboration

4: Some Reminiscences of Leo and His Work on Informational Requirements

Leo Discovers ``Cross-Fertilization'' and Learns about Space-Filling Curves

Leo Ventures into an Unexplored Terrain: Mechanisms with Finite Message Spaces

Leo Enthusiastically Responds to a Proposal for an Unusual Workshop and Becomes its Guiding Spirit

Leo Becomes the Heart and Soul of the Decentralization Conference

5: Leonid Hurwicz: A Reminiscence

6: The Hurwicz 1940-41 Year When MIT Launched Its Graduate Degree Rocket: A Letter in Honor of Leo Hurwicz's Ninetieth Birthday

Part II: Mechanisms and Institutions

7: On the Concept and Possibility of Informational Decentralization

Optimality Properties of Competitive Equilibria

Nonclassical Environments

Formula versus Mechanism

Dispersion of Information

Transfer of Information

Communication in the Competitive Process

A Concept of Informational Decentralization

A Priori Admissible Environments

Performance Criteria

Pareto Satisfactoriness

Malinvaud's Criteria

Decentralizability of Non-Pecuniary Externalities

Whinston's Scheme

Commodity Interpretation

An Alternative Scheme

Pecuniary Externalities

8: Centralization and Decentralization in Economic Processes

Background

The Issue

Analytical Approach

A General Model of the Economic Process

On Choosing the Adjustment Process

Structure of Authority.

Structure of Information

Informational Efficiency and Decentralization

Open Issues

9: The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation

Specific Mechanisms Whose Properties Have Been Investigated

Basic Concepts

Some Results

Incentive Compatibility

Conclusion

Part I: Competitive equilibrium

Part II: Pareto optimality

Part III: Monopoly

Part IV: `Cheating' by farmer

Part V: Incentive-compatibility under sharecropping

10: On the Interaction between Information and Incentives in Organizations

Control Theory versus Structural Change Framework

Structural Change in an Economic Adjustment Model

Informational Properties of Adjustment Models

Incentive Properties of Adjustment Models

`Synthetic' Mechanisms for Non-manipulative Behavior

Incentive Structures for Unilateral Maximization

Information Cost and Performance of Systems

11: Mechanism Design without Games

Upper Bounds for Informational Efficiency

Different Message Space Situations Depending on Convexity Properties of the Economic Environments

Convex economic environments, indirect mechanisms (Walrasian, Lindahl)

Non-classical (non-convex) economic environments

Idealized Mechanism Construction

12: On Modeling Institutions

Mechanisms

Message Model or Adjustment Process

Game Model

Institutions as Classes of Mechanisms

Enforcement

Artificial (Juristic) Persons

Formation through Prior (Human) Action or Behavior

13: Toward a Framework for Analyzing Institutions and Institutional Change

Introduction

Mechanisms and Adjustment Processes

Normative aspects

Formulating a Generalized Concept

Formalization

Performance, Realization, and Implementation

Institutions

References.

14: Economic Design, Adjustment Processes, Mechanisms, and Institutions

Adjustment Processes

15 Institutional Change and the Theory of Mechanism Design

Institutions: The Concept

How to Model Game-Forms

Appendix

16: Institutions as Families of Game-Forms

1 Introduction

2 Institutions and Game-Forms

2.1 Meanings A and B of the term `institution'

2.2 Notation for games in normal form

2.3 Game-forms vs. games

2.4 `Rules of the game' are represented by game-forms, not by games

2.5 Representation of institutions by game-forms involves more than restrictions on strategy domains

2.6 An institution is a class of game-forms, not just a single game-form

2.7 Conditional game-forms (`humanly devised' aspects of game-forms)

2.7.1 Institutions as correspondences from environments to game-forms

2.7.2 An alternative formalization of dependence on the environment

3 The Defining Attributes of Institutions

3.1 The genesis of institutions: human actions (behavior)

3.1.1 Conscious design vs. `organic' (endogenous) origin

3.2 Ensuring the effectiveness of institutions

3.3 The domain of applicability of institutional rules (`categoricity')

4 A Game Sequence Model

4.1 Three-game sequence model

4.2 Main features of the model

4.3 Definition of an institution

5 Contents of Institutions

5.1 Institutions assigning initial endowments

5.2 Institutions assigning certain residuals

5.3 Institutions governing particular aspects of behavior

6 The Characteristic Function, the Support Set, and the Support Function

17: Issues in the Design of Mechanisms and Institutions

Micro- and Welfare Economic Foundations

A Coase economy: Institutions without transaction costs.

Market mechanisms for achieving optimality

First-order conditions for Pareto optimality

Artificial markets for externalities

Pigou taxes and bounties as a remedy

The sad dilemma

Other microeconomic limitations

Institutional Arrangements as Game Rules

Distinguishing games from mechanisms (`game-forms')

Example: Auctioning a common resource

Institutions as game-forms and families of game-forms

Implementation via Nash equilibria

Informational Aspects of Economics

Informational efficiency of the Walrasian process

Informational aspects of externalities

Non-convexities

Infinite time horizons

Incomplete information and the interpretation of Nash equilibria

Concluding Remarks

18: But Who Will Guard the Guardians?

Message Exchange (Non-Game-Theoretic) Processes

Game-Theoretic Framework

Are Nash Equilibria Self-Enforcing?

Formalizing Rules of a Game as Game-Forms (Mechanisms)

Successful Enforcement and Implementation

Back to Juvenal

19 Fundamental Theory of Institutions: A Lecture in Honor of Leo Hurwicz

Recognizing the Need for a Fundamental Theory of Institutions

An Old Debate and a New Theoretical Framework

Advantages of Socialism in a Simple Adverse-Selection Model

Disadvantages of Socialism in a Simple Moral-Hazard Model

Comparing Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

General Theory of Institutions Enforced in Larger Games

Moral Hazard and Privilege in Sovereign Political Institutions

Leadership and Moral Hazard at the Center

Part III: Other Essays

20: Environmental Issues: Economic Perspectives

21: The Theory of Economic Behavior

22: Book Review: The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior

23: What Has Happened to the Theory of Games.

Individual Behavior under Uncertainty

Many-Person Situations

Games wiithout Communication

Games with Communication

24: Game Theory and Decisions

25: Book Review: The Theory of Value

26: A Voting System Reform Proposal to Provide for Minority Representation

27: Publications of Leonid Hurwicz

Books

Articles

1940s

1950s

1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s

Index.

Notes:

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (viewed on April 11, 2022).

Also issued in print: 2022.

"Funded in part by The Heller-Hurwicz Economics Institute, University of Minnesota."

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

0-19-765817-2

0-19-023631-0

0-19-023632-9