The ledger : accounting for failure in Afghanistan / David Kilcullen, Greg Mills ; foreword by Rory Stewart.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kilcullen, David, author.

Mills, Greg (Jazz musician), author.

Contributor:

Stewart, Rory, writer of foreword.

Anne and Joseph Trachtman Memorial Book Fund.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Intervention (International law).

Afghanistan--History--2001-2021.

Afghanistan.

History.

Afghanistan--Foreign relations--2001-2021.

International relations.

Afghanistan--Politics and government--2001-2021.

Politics and government.

Afghan War, 2001-2021.

Diplomatic relations.

Genre:

History.

Physical Description:

xxxi, 352 pages : illustrations, map ; 19 cm

Distribution:

New York, NY : Oxford University Press.

Place of Publication:

London : Hurst & Company, 2021.

Summary:

'These things happened. They were glorious and they changed the world,' said Charlie Wilson of America's role in supporting the mujahideen against the Soviet Union. 'And then we fucked up the endgame.' The scandal-prone US Congressman lamented the absence of support for Afghanistan after that war, a vacuum which the Taliban and Osama bin Laden would fill. The Ledger identifies and assesses the failures of the West's approach to Afghanistan after 9/11 - military, diplomatic, political and developmental. For Afghans, the war is not over because the West has declared it so, and neither will its geo-political effects simply disappear along with the last of NATO forces. Afghanistan remains connected to the world through communications and the networks of the last twenty years. The Ledger also considers these lessons for the benefit of future, similar peacebuilding missions in Africa and elsewhere. Dr David Kilcullen and Dr Greg Mills are uniquely placed to reflect backwards and forwards on the Afghan conflict, having worked with the international mission as advisers and within the Arg. Both have considerable experience of counter-insurgency and stability operations elsewhere, in Latin America, Asia and across Africa. There is plenty of blame to go around, as this book shows, in the attempts to bring peace to Afghanistan after 9/11. The signs of the collapse had been there for a long-time, mostly conveniently ignored as they were ill-suited to the political narrative of 'we're making progress' and then, as the deadline drew closer, 'mission accomplished'. In understanding why and where the failure took place, The Ledger warns against the eternal human curse in believing that we can be an exception to all that precedes us. Whatever the desire to avoid future military and diplomatic 'quagmires', the reality is that politicians will not always follow that advice, nor can these crises always be avoided.

Contents:

Machine generated contents note: 1. An Evolving Campaign

Confusion, Compression and Echoes of the Past

A Question of Politics

2. Echoes of Campaigns Past

Deja vu All Over Again?

Trying Everything

Similarities

Differences

Five Common Lessons

3. Assessing Four Failures

The Failure of Politics

Failure of Policy on Pakistan

The Corruption of Recovery

The Failure of Economic Development

4. Endgame

Slow Disintegration after 2015

The Selection-Destruction Cycle

The Collapse of 2021

Why the Afghan Military Collapsed

Why the Civil Government Collapsed

What Could Have Been Done Differently?

5. The Ball Keeps Bouncing

Assessing the Wider Cost and Implications

From Afghanistan to Africa?

Reinforcing Success, Rewarding Failure?

Changing Outside Strategy

All Peace Missions are Local?

Conclusion: The Ledger

-Lessons from Failure in Afghanistan

All for Nothing?.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Local Notes:

Acquired for the Penn Libraries with assistance from the Anne and Joseph Trachtman Memorial Book Fund.

ISBN:

1787386953

9781787386952

OCLC:

1268114535

Publisher Number:

99990591813