Patronage at work : public jobs and political services in Argentina / Virginia Oliveros.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Oliveros, Virginia, 1976- author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Patronage, Political--Argentina.

Patronage, Political.

Political culture--Argentina.

Political culture.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xv, 249 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).

Place of Publication:

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2021.

Summary:

In countries around the world, politicians distribute patronage jobs to supporters in exchange for a wide range of political services - such as helping with campaigns and electoral mobilization. Patronage employees (clients) engage in these political activities that support politicians (patrons) because their fates are tied to the political fate of their patrons. Although conventional wisdom holds that control of patronage significantly increases an incumbent's chance of staying in power, we actually know very little about how patronage works. Drawing on in-depth interviews, survey data, and survey experiments in Argentina, Virginia Oliveros details the specific mechanisms that explain the effect of patronage on political competition. This fascinating study is the first to provide a systematic analysis of the political activities of mid and low-level public employees in Latin America. It provides a novel explanation of the enforcement of patronage contracts that has wider implications for understanding the functioning of clientelist exchanges.

Contents:

Cover

Half-title page

Title page

Copyright page

Dedication

Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Acknowledgments

1 Introduction

1.1 Patronage, Electoral Competition, and the Quality of Democracy

1.2 Defining Clientelism and Patronage

1.2.1 Patronage

1.3 Why Study Patronage?

1.4 Challenges to the Study of Patronage

1.5 Why Argentina?

1.6 The Argument in Brief

1.7 Plan of the Book

2 A Theory of Self-Enforcing Patronage

2.1 Patronage Jobs and Political Competition

2.2 Political Services

2.3 The Commitment Problem

2.4 Making Patronage Work: A Theory of Self-Enforcing Patronage

2.5 Alternative Explanations

2.6 A Note on the Collective Action Problem

2.7 Empirical Implications, Assumptions, and Scope Conditions

2.8 Summary

3 Getting the Job

3.1 Research Design

3.1.1 The Survey

3.1.2 Testing the Strategy

3.1.3 The Interviews

3.1.4 Selecting Municipalities within Argentina

3.2 Getting the Job

3.3 Who Gets Hired?

3.4 Chapter Appendix: Additional Tables

4 Patronage Contracts and Political Services: Evidence from List Experiments

4.1 Empirical Strategy: List Experiments

4.2 Political Services during Elections

Helping with Electoral Campaigns

Attending Political Rallies

Monitoring Elections

4.3 Political Services and Support for the Mayor

4.4 Summary

4.5 Chapter Appendix: Additional Tables

5 Patronage, Favors, and the Personalization of Public Administration

5.1 Granting Favors

5.2 Making It Personal

5.3 How Widespread Is the Provision of Favors?

5.4 Favors and Support for the Mayor

5.5 Getting Asked for Favors

5.6 The Personal Connection

5.7 Are Incumbents' Supporters More Helpful?

5.8 Summary

5.9 Chapter Appendix: Additional Tables

6 Self-Enforcing Patronage Contracts.

6.1 Empirical Strategy: Survey Experiments

6.2 Self-Enforcing Patronage: Survey Experiment Evidence

6.2.1 Perceptions of Job Stability

6.2.2 Perceptions of Potential Job Changes

6.3 Regression Analysis

6.4 Putting the Pieces Together

6.5 Alternative Explanations

6.5.1 Punishment

6.5.2 Reciprocity

6.6 Robustness Test

6.7 Summary

6.8 Chapter Appendix: Additional Tables

7 Beyond the Argentine Case

7.1 Patronage in Latin America

7.1.1 Weak Civil Service Systems

7.1.2 Political Bias in Hiring and Firing

7.1.3 Political Services

7.2 A Closer Look at Three Cases

7.2.1 Argentina

7.2.2 Bolivia

7.2.3 Chile

7.3 Summary

7.4 Chapter Appendix

LAPOP Data: Question Wording and Coding

Public Employee

Protests

Campaigns

Meetings

Party ID

Turnout

8 Conclusions and Broader Implications

8.1 Revisiting the Argument

8.2 Taking Clients Seriously

8.3 Implications for Curbing Clientelism

8.4 What's So Wrong with Patronage?

Appendix

A.1 Interviews

A.2 Survey Methodology

A.3 Wording, Operationalization, and Descriptive Statistics

A.3.1 Descriptive Statistics (Table A7)

A.3.2 Direct Questions Wording

A.3.3 List Experiments (Chapters 4 and 5)

A.3.4 Survey Experiments (Chapter 6)

References

Index.

Notes:

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 24 Nov 2021).

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Other Format:

Print version: Oliveros, Virginia Patronage at Work

ISBN:

1-009-08478-X

1-009-08252-3

1-009-08498-4

OCLC:

1264723362