The metaphysics of sensory experience / David Papineau.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Papineau, David, 1947- author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Senses and sensation--Philosophy.

Senses and sensation.

Metaphysics.

Philosophy.

Physical Description:

xi, 163 pages ; 23 cm

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford [England] ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2021.

Summary:

What are the materials of conscious perceptual experience? What is going on when we are consciously aware of a visual scene, or hear sounds, or otherwise enjoy sensory experience? In this book David Papineau exposes the flaws in contemporary answers to this central philosophical question and defends a new alternative.0Contemporary theories of perceptual experience all hold that conscious experiences reach out into the world beyond the mind. According to naive realism, experiences literally incorporate perceived facts, while representationalism holds that experiences contain ordinary properties of the kind possessed by physical objects. These ideas might seem attractive at first sight, however Papineau shows that they do not stand up to examination. Instead, he argues for a purely qualitative account of sensory experience. Conscious sensory experiences are intrinsic states with no essential connection to external circumstances or represented properties. This might run counter to initial intuition, yet Papineau develops this qualitative theory in detail and illustrates how it can accommodate the rich structure of sensory experience. 0Papineau's qualitative account has respectable antecedents in the history of philosophy. By placing the qualitative theory on a firm footing, he shows that those curious about experience need not be restricted to the options in contemporary philosophical discourse.

Contents:

Machine generated contents note: 1. Clearing the Ground

1.1. Sensation versus Perception

1.2. Sensation versus Cognition

1.3. Properties and Experiences

1.4. Naive Realism: Outline

1.5. Naive Realism and the Time-Lag Problem

1.6. Naive Realism and Phenomenal Similarities

1.7. Mental Contact with Reality

1.8. The Instability of Naive Realism

1.9. Sense-Datum Theories

1.10. Representationalism: Contingent and Essential

1.11. Representationalism: Naturalists and Phenomenal Intentionalists

1.12. Representationalism: Content and Mode

1.13. Representationalism: Broadness, Supervenience, and Identity

2. Against Representationalism

2.1. The Metaphysical Challenge

2.2. Initial Representationalist Thoughts

2.3. Naturalist Theories of Representation

2.4. The Implausibility of Naturalist Representationalism

2.5. The Distractions of Broadness

2.6. Broadness in Context

2.7. The Appeal to Transparency

2.8. Free-Floating Properties

2.9. Mysteries of Mental Contact

2.10. Here-and-Now

2.11. The Efficacy of Mental Representation

2.12. The Incommensurability of Conscious and Representational Properties

2.13. Pure Phenomenal Intentionalism

2.14. What Are the Truth Conditions?

3. The Structure of Experience

3.1. The Qualitative View

3.2. No Problems

3.3. Block, Peacocke, and Qualia

3.4. Functionalism and `Role Semantics'

3.5. The Organization of Experience

3.6. Quasi-Objects and Their Quasi-Properties

3.7. Intentional Objects

3.8. A Dangerous Confusion

3.9. Paint That Doesn't Point

3.10. Spatial Experience

4. Introspection, Adverbialism, and Rich Contents

4.1. Not Sense Data

4.2. Awareness

4.3. Transparency Revisited

4.4. The Complications of Attention

4.5. Introspection of Experience

4.6. Contentful Mental States

4.7. Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument

4.8. Talking about Experience

4.9. Red Squares and Green Circles

4.10. Rich Sensory Contents

4.11. Very Rich Sensory Contents.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 153-160) and index.

ISBN:

9780198862390

0198862393

OCLC:

1201681731