Oxford studies in experimental philosophy. Volume 4 / Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe, and Shaun Nichols, editors.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Lombrozo, Tania, editor.

Knobe, Joshua, editor.

Nichols, Shaun, editor.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Philosophy--Research.

Philosophy, Modern.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (309 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press, [2022]

Summary:

The new field of experimental philosophy has emerged as the methods of psychological science have been brought to bear on traditional philosophical issues. 'Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy' is the place to go to see outstanding new work in the field. It features papers by philosophers, papers by psychologists, and papers co-authored by people in both disciplines. The series heralds the emergence of a truly interdisciplinary field in which people from different disciplines are working together to address a shared set of questions.

Contents:

Cover

Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy: Volume 4

Copyright

Contents

Introduction

Epistemology: Judgments of Knowledge and Justification

Moral Psychology: Ignorance and Relativism

Mind and Metaphysics

Methodology

1: Folk Knowledge Attributions and the Protagonist Projection Hypothesis

1. Introduction

2. Troublesome Experimental Findings

3. The Protagonist Projection Hypothesis

4. The Experiment

4.1 Research objectives

4.2 Methods

4.3 Participants

4.4 Results

5. Discussion and Conclusions

5.1 Taking data at face value

5.2 Methodological reservations: do we have a good measure of protagonist projection?

6. Appendix A: Survey Questions

7. Appendix B: Results of Logistic Regression for K2 Judgments

Acknowledgments

References

2: Experimental Evidence that Knowledge Entails Justification

1. Experiment 1

1.1 General methods

1.2 Method

1.3 Participants

1.4 Materials and procedure

1.5 Data analysis

1.6 Results

1.7 Discussion

2. Experiment 2

2.1 Method

2.2 Participants

2.3 Materials and procedure

2.4 Data analysis

2.5 Results

2.6 Discussion

3. Experiment 3

3.1 Method

3.2 Participants

3.3 Materials and procedure

3.4 Data analysis

3.5 Results

3.6 Discussion

4. Experiment 4

4.1 Method

4.2 Participants

4.3 Materials and procedure

4.4 Data analysis

4.5 Results

4.6 Discussion

5. Conclusion

6. Appendix

3: Making the Veil of Ignorance Work: Evidence from Survey Experiments

1. Background

1.1 Theoretical background of impartial reasoning

1.2 Experimental studies on impartial reasoning

1.3 Research questions for the experimental study

2. Experimental Design

2.1 Participants

2.2 Procedure

2.3 Vignette

2.3.1 First experiment.

2.3.2 Second experiment

2.4 Experimental stimuli

2.4.1 Treatment group 1: Treatmentuniform

2.4.2 Treatment group 2: Treatmentrandom

2.5 Manipulation check

3. Results

3.1 Results of first and second experiments

3.2 Robustness checks

4. Discussion

4: The Empirical Case for Folk Indexical Moral Relativism

I.

II.

III.

IV.

5: Empiricism is Natural: It Arises from the Collision of Dualism and Essentialism

1.1 Dualism and Essentialism

1.2 Dualism, Essentialism, and innateness

2. Are Ideas Immaterial?

2.1 Experiment 1. Body replication: adult traits

2.1.1 Methods

2.1.2 Results and discussion

2.2 Experiment 2. Body replication: infant traits

2.2.1 Methods

2.2.2 Results and discussion

2.3 Experiment 3. Brain localization: infant traits

2.3.1 Methods

2.3.2 Results and discussion

2.4 Experiment 4. Adult traits in the afterlife

2.4.1 Methods

2.4.2 Results and discussion

3. Must Innate Traits Be Material?

3.1 Body replication of human traits

3.1.1 Experiment 5. Body replication: adult traits

3.1.1.1 Methods Participants. A new group of participants (N=80) took part in this

3.1.1.2 Results and discussion

3.1.2 Experiment 6. Body replication: infant traits

3.1.2.1 Methods

3.1.2.2 Results and discussion

3.1.3 Body replication of human traits: combined analysis

3.2 Body replication of nonhuman creatures

3.2.1 Experiment 7. Body replication: bird traits

3.2.1.1 Methods Participants. A new group of participants (N=40) took part in this

3.2.1.2 Results and discussion

3.2.2 Experiment 8. Body replication: alien traits

3.2.2.1 Methods

3.2.2.2 Results and discussion

3.2.3 Nonhuman traits: combined analysis

4. Do Dualism and Essentialism Shape Reasoning about Innateness?.

cause of our

4.1 Experiment 9. The effect of Dualism

4.1.1 Methods

Participants. Two new groups of participants (N=20 each) took part in the

Methods and procedure. The experiment consisted of three steps. First,

Design and sample size. In Experiment 9, Dualism was manipulated

4.1.2 Results and discussion

Correlation analysis. We first examined whether the perception of innateness

The effectiveness of the priming manipulation. Participants in the Dualist

The effect of priming on innateness rating. Figure 5.7A plots the effect of

4.2 Experiment 10. The effect of Essentialism

individual psychological traits on a

same trait is presented as immaterial.

same trait is presented as immaterial (i.e., as devoid of any known material

4.2.1 Methods

Participants. A new group of eighty participants took part in Experiment 10. Materials and procedures. The materials were the li

Design and sample size. As in Experiments 5 and 6, each participant was

4.2.2 Results and discussion

5. General Discussion

contrary to

positively biased to presume that emotions are

natural, inasmuch as it arises spontaneously and generally

6: Dehumanization and Perceptions of Immoral Intergroup Behavior

1.1 What is dehumanization?

1.2 Dehumanization against members of groups that face disadvantage

1.3 Dehumanization of prejudiced people and its link to perceptions of bias

1.4 Overview of current research

2. Study 1

2.1.1 Participants

2.1.2 Procedure

2.2. Results and discussion

2.2.1 Extent of dehumanization

2.2.2 Perceptions of bias

3. Study 2

3.1.1 Participants

3.1.2 Procedure

3.2 Results and discussion

3.2.1 Extent of dehumanization

3.2.2 Perceptions of bias

4. General Discussion.

5. Conclusions

6. Appendix: Descriptive Statistics for Blatant Dehumanization Scale

7: Mentalizing Objects

1. Folk Teleology: Findings and Explanations

1.1 The findings

1.2 Creative intentions

1.3 Normative view

1.4 Mentalizing objects

2. Folk Psychology and Folk Physics: Interdependent

2.1 The standard view

2.2 Evidence of interdependence

3. Teleological Commingling and the Agentive Worldview

3.1 The intentionality bias

3.2 The agency-non-randomness link

3.3 The Agentive Worldview

4. Debunking the Folk View of Objects

8: Insufficient Effort Responding in Experimental Philosophy

1. Insufficient Effort Responding in Self-Report Surveys

1.1 Prevalence

1.2 Effects

2. Insufficient Effort Responding in Experimental Philosophy

2.1 The relevant differences objection

2.2 The statistical objection

2.3 Anecdotal evidence

3. Preventing Insufficient Effort Responding (in Experimental Philosophy)

3.1 Sample

3.2 Compensation

3.3 Proctors

3.4 Survey length

3.5 Complicatedness

3.6 CAPTCHAs

3.7 Instructions

4. Detecting Insufficient Effort Responding (in Experimental Philosophy)

4.1 Attention checks

4.1.1 Instructional manipulation checks

4.1.2 Instructed-response items

4.1.3 Bogus/infrequency items

4.1.4 Stand-alone checks

4.1.5 General discussion

4.2 Response time

4.3 Comprehension checks

4.4 Self-reports

4.5 Response patterns

4.5.1 LongString Analysis

4.5.2 Scale Straightlining Analysis

4.5.3 General Discussion

4.6 Response consistency

4.6.1 Identical responses

4.6.2 Odd-even consistency

4.6.3 Psychometric consistency

4.6.4 Semantic consistency

4.6.5 General Discussion

4.7 Atypical responses

4.8 Open-ended questions.

5. Dealing with Insufficient Effort Responding (in Experimental Philosophy)

5.1 Removing data

5.2 Reporting results

5.3 Compensating subjects

6. Conclusion

7. Appendix: A Survey of Experimental Philosophers

7.1 Participants

7.2 Methods

7.2.1 Preventing insufficient effort responding

7.2.2 Detecting insufficient effort responding

7.2.3 Dealing with insufficient effort responding

7.2.4 General questions

7.3 Results

7.3.1 Experience in conducting (experimental philosophy) studies

7.3.2 Knowledge of IER

7.3.3 Effects of IER

7.3.4 Correlations

7.4 Discussion

9: On Second Thought: Reflections on the Reflection Defense

1. The Restrictionist Challenge

2. The Reflection Defense

3. Addressing the Reflection Defense

4. Experiment 1: The Clock Case

4.1 Participants and materials

4.2 Results and discussion

4.2.1 Main results

4.2.2 Response time

4.2.3 Analytic thinking

5. Experiment 2: Follow-Up to Experiment 1

5.1 Participants and materials

5.2 Results and discussion

5.2.1 Main results

5.2.2 Response time

5.2.3 Analytic thinking

6. Experiment 3: Knowledge and Belief

6.1 Participants and materials

6.2 Results and discussion

6.2.1 Main results

6.2.2 Response time

6.2.3 Analytic thinking

7. Experiment 4: Epistemic Side-Effect Effect

7.1 Participants and materials

7.2 Results and discussion

7.2.1 Main results

7.2.2 Response time

7.2.3 Analytic thinking

8. Experiment 5: The Gödel Case

8.1 Participants and materials

8.2 Results and discussion

8.2.1 Main results

8.2.2 Response time

8.2.3 Analytic thinking

9. Discussion

9.1 Meta-philosophical implications of the experimental studies

9.2 Why doesn't reflection influence judgment about cases?

10. Conclusion

Acknowledgments.

References.

Notes:

This edition also issued in print: 2021.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

Other Format:

Print version: Lombrozo, Tania Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy Volume 4

ISBN:

0-19-267103-0

0-19-194767-9

0-19-267102-2

OCLC:

1290022584