Oxford studies in philosophy of mind. Volume 2 / edited by Uriah Kriegel.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Kriegel, Uriah, editor.

Series:

Oxford studies in philosophy of mind ; v.2

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Philosophy of mind.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (316 pages) : illustrations.

Edition:

First edition.

Other Title:

Oxford studies in philosophy of mind. Volume II

Studies in philosophy of mind

Philosophy of mind

Place of Publication:

Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2022.

Summary:

'Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind' presents cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind, combining invited articles and articles selected from submissions. Each volume highlights two themes to bring focus to debates.

Contents:

Cover

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind: Volume 2

Copyright

Contents

Preface

List of Contributors

PART I: THE DOXASTIC REALM

1: The Puzzle of Cognitive Phenomenology

1. Introduction

2. The Puzzle of Cognitive Phenomenology

3. Challenging Uniformity?

4. Challenging Accuracy?

4.1 Blindspot

4.2 Confabulation

4.3 The Appeal to Theoretical Corruption

5. Challenging Agreement?

6. Conclusion

References

2: The Limits of the Doxastic

1. Unconscious Standing States and the Stream of Consciousness

2. Actions and Professed Beliefs

3. The Limits of the Doxastic

3: Wondering on and with Purpose

1. Introduction: Having a Question, Being Curious, and Wondering

2. A Preliminary (Incorrect) Analysis of Wonder as Desire

3. Against Wonder as Desire

4. What We Do When We Wonder Q

5. Conclusion

4: Sincerity and Philosophical Commitment

2. Philosophical Disagreement and Watered-downBelief

3. Sincerity

3.1 Assertion Sincerity

3.2 The Right Reasons Account

3.3 The Partial Sincerity Account

4. The Cross-domainAccount

5. Sincerity and Philosophical Commitment

5: Intensionalism and Propositional Attitudes

2. A Brief Statement of the Focal Puzzles

3. Higher-orderLogic as a Theory of Propositional Attitudes

3.1 The language of higher-order logic

3.2 Higher-orderlogic

3.3 Propositional attitudes in higher-order logic

4. A More Rigorous Statement of the Puzzles

5. Intensionalism

6. Varieties of Intensionalism

6.1 Transparent views

7. Opaque Views

7.1 Reformed Church intensionalism

7.2 The Kaplan Amendment

7.3 Problems with the Church Reformation and the Kaplan Amendment

7.4 The Generalized Kaplan Amendment.

7.5 The Stalnaker Translation

7.6 Attitudes and attitudes

PART II: METAPHYSICS AND/OF MIND

6: Chancy Covariance and the Mind Body Problem

1. Preliminaries

2. Generalising Supervenience

3. Chancy Covariance

4. Chancy Covariance and Pseudo Physicalism

4.1 Response 1: Deterministic Correlations

4.2. Response 2: Parsimony

4.3. Response 3: Explaining Chancy Covariance Relations

4.4. Response 4: Compatibility with Token Physicalism

5. Causal Exclusion

6. Free Will

7. Pseudo Physicalism and Naturalistic Dualism

8. Conclusion

Acknowledgements

Appendix

7: Time and the Visual Imagination From Physics to Philosophy

1. The History of Spacetime Theories

2. The Roles Visualization Plays

3. Why Visualization Helps

the Power of Images

4. The Logic of Images

5. The Problem

6. Time from the Inside

How the Mind Makes Music

7. Objections and Replies

8: Perceptual Experiences: What Use Are They?

1. The Meta-theory:Utility is Good

2. What's Good about Having Experiences, Part I

3. What's Good about Having Experiences, Part 2

4. Perceiving and Believing

5. The Debate over Unconscious Perception

6. Recasting Representationalism

9: Rethinking the Attitudes

2. Six Motivations for the Tripartite view

2.1 Motivation 1

2.2 Motivation 2

2.3 Motivation 3

2.4 Motivation 4

2.5 Motivation 5

2.6 Motivation 6

3. The Dual View for Perception

4. The Dual View for Belief, Desire, etc.

4.1 Belief

4.2 Contemplation

4.3 Wondering

4.4 Desire

4.5 Emotion

5. Addressing Tripartite Motivations

PART III: HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: SPINOZA

10: Spinoza on Mind, Body, and Numerical Identity

1. Introduction.

2. Identity across Times

3. Identity across Attributes

3.1 Commitment to 1a

3.2. Commitment to 1b

3.3. Inconsistency of 1a-1c

3.4. Commitment to 1c

4. Essences

5. To Express

6. To Constitute

7. Restricting the Indiscernibility of Identicals

8. Modes of Modes

9. Further Consequences

10. Conclusion

Primary Sources

11: Two Problems in Spinoza's Theory of Mind

1. Background

Part One

2. De Vries's Question

3. What is Separate Conceivability?

4. Descartes's Argument for the "Real Distinction" between Mind and Body

5. The Principal Attribute Thesis

6. Neutral Monism

7. Why Not Deny the Principal Attribute Thesis?

Part Two

8. Identity Puzzles

9. The Harder Problem

10. Della Rocca's Solution: Opacity to the Rescue

11. Problems with Opacity

12. Hyperintensional Alternatives

13. Hyperintensionality and Opacity

14. Conclusion

Index.

Notes:

This edition also issued in print: 2022.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

Other Format:

Print version: Kriegel, Uriah Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 2

ISBN:

0-19-267064-6

0-19-194729-6

0-19-267065-4

OCLC:

1293242972