The constitutionalization of European budgetary constraints / edited by Maurice Adams, Federico Fabbrini, and Pierre Larouche.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Adams, Maurice, 1964- editor.

Fabbrini, Federico, 1985- editor.

Larouche, Pierre, editor.

Tilburg Law School.

Series:

Modern studies in European law ; v. 47.

Modern studies in European law ; v. 47

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Budget--Law and legislation--European Union countries--Congresses.

Budget.

Budget--Law and legislation.

European Union countries.

Genre:

Conference papers and proceedings.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (446 p.)

Place of Publication:

Oxford, United Kingdom ; Portland, Oregon : Hart Publishing, 2014.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

The recently enacted Treaty on the Stability, Coordination and Governance of the Economic and Monetary Union (generally referred to as the Fiscal Compact) has introduced a 'golden rule', which is a detailed obligation that government budgets be balanced. Moreover, it required the 25 members of the EU which signed the Treaty in March 2012, to incorporate this 'golden rule' within their national Constitutions. This requirement represents a major and unprecedented development, raising formidable challenges to the nature and legitimacy of national Constitutions as well as to the future of the European integration project. This book analyses the new constitutional architecture of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), examines in a comparative perspective the constitutionalization of budgetary rules in the legal systems of the Member States, and discusses the implications of these constitutional changes for the future of democracy and integration in the EU. By combining insights from law and economics, comparative institutional analysis and legal theory, the book offers a comprehensive survey of the constitutional incorporation of new fiscal and budgetary rules across Europe and a systematic normative discussion of the legitimacy issues at play. It thus contributes to a better understanding of the Euro-crisis, of the future of the EU, and the reforms needed towards a deeper and genuine EMU

Contents:

Forward: Fiscal capacity and constitutional reform in the EMU

Miguel Poiares Maduro

Introduction: The constitutionalization of European budgetary constraints: effectiveness and legitimacy in comparative perspective

Marice Adams, Federico Fabbrini and Pierre Larouche

Part 1. The new constitutional architecture of European Economic and Monetary Union

Economic governance and the Euro crisis: constitutional architecture and constitutional implications

Paul Craig

The use of international law as a tool for enhancing governance in the Eurozone and its impact on EU institutional integrity

Angelos Dimopoulos

Differentiated economic governance and the reshaping of dominium law

Kenneth A Armstrong

EU fiscal governance and the effectiveness of its reform

Alexandre de Streel

Maastricht revisited: economic constitutionalism, the ECB and the Bundesbank

Marijn van der Sluis

The independence of the ECB after the economic crisis

Stefania Baroncelli

Part 2. The constitutionalization of European budgetary constraints: comparative experiences

(Un)balanced budget rules in Europe and America

Pieter-Augustijn Van Malleghem

A legalization of financial constitutions in the EU? Reflections on the German, Spanish, Italian and French experiences

Giacomo Delledonne

Fiscal stability rules in central European constitutions

Marek Antoš

Can constitutional rules, even if "golden," tame Greek public debt?

Lina Papadopoulou

Mandatory balanced budget in Dutch legislation following examples abroad?

Michal Diamant and Michiel van Emmerik

An analysis of the method and efficacy of Ireland's incorporation of the fiscal compact

Roderic O'Gorman

Part 3. Towards a genuine EMU: democracy, legitimacy and integration

Domestic courts, constitutional constraints and European democracy: what solution for the crisis?

Ingolf Pernice

National parliaments' say on the new EU budgetary constraints: the case of Spain and Ireland

Sonia Piedrafita

Who got to adjudicate the EU's financial crisis and why? Judicial review and the legal instuments of the Eurozone

Samo Bardutzky and Elaine Fahey

The impact of stronger economic policy co-ordination on the European social dimension: issues of legitimacy

Francesco Costamagna

Power and legitimacy in the Eurozone: can integration and democracy be reconciled?

Peter L Lindseth

From fiscal constraints to fiscal capacity: the future of EMU and its challenges

Federico Fabbrini.

Notes:

"I am pleased to write the foreword to this volume, collecting the proceedings of a Conference held at Tilburg Law School, in the Netherlands on 30-31 May 2013 and organized by Federico Fabbrini, Maurice Adams and Pierre Larouche. This book explores the challenges of effectiveness and legitimacy produced by the constitutionalization of European budgetary rules and is highly recommended to anyone interested in European constitutional law, comparative fiscal federalism and the implications of the euro crisis."--Foreword.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9781782254195

1782254196

9781509907052

150990705X

9781474201643

1474201644

9781782254188

1782254188

OCLC:

1154996503