An Austro-libertarian critique of public choice / Thomas J. DiLorenzo, Walter E. Block.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

DiLorenzo, Thomas J., author.

Block, Walter, 1941- author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Social choice.

Libertarianism.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (344 pages)

Place of Publication:

New York, New York : Addleton Academic Publishers, [2016]

Summary:

We do not say that the Public Choice School has not made any positive contribution to political economy. It has. The originators of it, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, along with their many followers and collaborators, have done important work on rational voter theory, setting up a meeting agenda, game theory, etc. Nor can we object to the application of economic theory to political issues. Far from it. However, the present book seeks to uncover its many failures. For example, the fact that underneath the veneer of its supposed adherence to value-free positive analysis lies a value-laden support for statism. To wit, its emphasis and reliance on “theoretical unanimity” not the actual unanimity incorporated in every commercial act under free enterprise. We also take issue with its nomenclature “rent seeking” albeit not the concept itself. Why pick on innocuous “rent” to describe crony capitalism?

Contents:

Front Cover

Half Title

Editorial Advisory Board

Title

Copyright

Contents

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Part 1: What Is Austrian Economics?

Chapter 1 The Subjectivist Roots of James Buchanan's Economics

Chapter 2 Cultural Dynamics

Part 2: The Austrian Critique of Public Choice

Chapter 3 Competition and Political Entrepreneurship: Austrian Insights into Public-Choice Theory

Chapter 4 Is Voluntary Government Possible? A Critique of Constitutional Economics

Chapter 5 George Stigler and the Myth of Efficient Government

Part 3: The Austrian Response to The Calculus of Consent

Chapter 6 The Calculus of Consent Revisited

Chapter 7 Buchanan and Tullock's "The Calculus of Consent"

Chapter 8 Constitutional Economics and the Calculus of Consent

Part 4: Austrians and Public Choicers on Antitrust

Chapter 9 The Truth about Sherman

Chapter 10 The Myth of Natural Monopoly

Chapter 11 Monopolistic Competition and Macroeconomic Theory by Robert Solow

Chapter 12 The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest-Group Perspective

Chapter 13 Total Repeal of Antitrust Legislation: A Critique of Bork, Brozen, and Posner

Part 5: Rent Seeking

Chapter 14 Property Rights, Information Costs, and the Economics of Rent Seeking

Chapter 15 All Government is Excessive: A Rejoinder to Dwight Lee's "In Defense of Excessive Government"

Chapter 16 Watch Your Language

Part 6: Taxation

Chapter 17 Utility Profits, Fiscal Illusion, and Local Public Expenditures

Chapter 18 The Expenditure Effects of Restricting Competition in Local Public Service Industries: The Case of Special Districts

Chapter 19 The Justification for Taxation in the Public Finance Literature: An Unorthodox View

Part 7: Other Topics in Public Choice

Chapter 20 A Constitutionalist Approach to Social Security Reform.

Chapter 21 The Futility of Bureaucracy

Chapter 22 Government and Market: A Critique of Professor James Buchanan's "What Should Economists" Do?

Chapter 23 Economic Competition and Political Competition: An Empirical Note

Chapter 24 An Empirical Assessment of the Factor-Supplier Pressure Group Hypothesis

Back Cover.

Notes:

Description based on print version record.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN:

1-935494-98-8