Do we have free will? : a debate / Robert Kane and Carolina Sartorio ; with a foreword by Saul Smilansky.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kane, Robert, 1938- author.

Sartorio, Carolina, author.

Contributor:

Taylor & Francis eBooks.

Series:

Little debates about big questions

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Free will and determinism.

Physical Description:

1 online resource.

Place of Publication:

New York, NY, : Routledge, 2022.

System Details:

text file

Contents:

Opening Statements p. 1

1 The Problem of Free Will: A Libertarian Perspective p. 3 / Robert Kane

Introduction: An Ancient Problem with Modern Significance p. 4

1 Modern Debates and Views p. 5

2 The Compatibility Question: Alternative Possibilities and Ultimate Responsibility p. 9

3 Self-forming Actions p. 12

4 Freedom of Action and Freedom of Will: AP and UR p. 13

5 Plurality Conditions and Plural Voluntary Control p. 15

6 Will-Setting and Self-formation p. 18

7 The Compatibility Question Revisited: Free Will and Moral Responsibility p. 19

8 Fair Opportunity to Avoid Wrongdoing: Hart and Others p. 21

9 Reactive Attitudes, Criminal Trials and Transference of Responsibility p. 23

10 Transference of Responsibility and Compatibility Questions p. 25

11 Two Dimensions of Responsibility p. 28

12 Compatibilist Responses (I): Conditional Analyses p. 29

13 Compatibilist Responses (II): Frankfurt-Style Examples p. 32

14 The Intelligibility Question p. 35

15 Indeterminism: Empirical and Philosophical Questions p. 36

16 Initial Pieces: Self-formation, Efforts, Willpower, Volitional Streams p. 38

17 Indeterminism and Responsibility p. 43

18 Initial Questions and Objections: Indeterminism and Chance p. 46

19 Further Questions and Objections: Phenomenology and Rationality p. 48

20 Micro vs. Macro Control p. 51

21 Control and Responsibility p. 52

22 Agency, Complexity, Disappearing Agents p. 54

23 Regress Objections: Responsibility and Character Development p. 57

24 The Explanatory Luck Objection: Authors, Stories, Value Experiments and Liberum Arbitrium p. 59

25 Contrastive Explanations: Concluding Remarks on Ruck Finn and Other Literary Figures p. 63

2 Free Will and Determinism: A Compatibilism p. 68 / Carolina Sartorio

1 What Is a Theory of Free Will? p. 69

2 A Sketch of a Theory of Free Will p. 71

3 The Free Will Problem: Compatibilism and lncompatibilism p. 80

4 The Motivation for Compatibilism p. 87

5 Incompatibilist Arguments: Part I p. 94

6 Incompatibilist Arguments: Part II p. 107

First Round of Replies p. 119

3 Reply to Carolina Sartorio's Opening Statement p. 121 / Robert Kane

Introduction: On Acting Freely: Some Significant Agreements p. 121

1 Acting Freely and Free Will: Some Significant Differences p. 123

2 Critique of Incompatibilist Views (Part I): The Consequence Argument and Being Powerless over the Fast and Laws p. 125

3 Critique of Incompatibilist Views (Part II): Being Powerless and Acting Freely p. 128

4 Idle Aliens, Frankfurt-Style Examples and the Ability to Do Otherwise p. 130

5 Will-Setting, Responsibility and the Ability to Do Otherwise p. 131

6 Critique of Incompatibilist Views (Part III): Design Arguments p. 134

7 Free Will, Design Arguments and Religious Questions p. 139

Conclusion: Freedom, Determinism, Indeterminism, Causation and Control p. 143

4 Reply to Bob Kane's Opening Statement p. 148 / Carolina Sartorio

1 Incompatibilist Arguments and Incompatibilist Intuitions p. 150

2 Does Free Will Have to Be a Struggle? p. 155

3 SFAs, Indeterminism and Alternative Possibilities p. 159

Second Round of Replies p. 167

5 Reply to Carolina Sartorio's Reply to My Opening Statement p. 169 / Robert Kane

1 Determinism, Formative Circumstances and the Young Man at Trial p. 169

2 Free Will and Struggle p. 174

3 Self-forming Actions, Indeterminism and Alternative Possibilities p. 178

4 Intuitions and Aspirations p. 182

6 Reply to Bob Kane's Reply to My Opening Statement p. 186 / Carolina Sartorio

1 Indeterminism and Free Will p. 186

2 Leeway Compatibilism: The Consequence Argument and "Weak" Abilities p. 190

3 Source Compatibilism and Frankfurt-Style Cases p. 195.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Electronic reproduction. London Available via World Wide Web.

Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher.

Other Format:

Print version: Kane, Robert, 1938- Do we have free will?

ISBN:

9781003212171

1003212174

9781000449440

1000449440

Publisher Number:

40030873250

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.