Happiness and well-being / Chris Heathwood.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Heathwood, Chris, author.

Series:

Cambridge elements. Elements in ethics, 2516-4031.

Cambridge elements. Elements in ethics, 2516-4031

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Ethics.

Happiness.

Well-being.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (77 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2021.

Summary:

This Element provides an opinionated introduction to the debate in moral philosophy over identifying the basic elements of well-being and to the related debate over the nature of happiness. The question of the nature of happiness is simply the question of what happiness is (as opposed to what causes it or how to get it), and the central philosophical question about well-being is the question of what things are in themselves of ultimate benefit or harm to a person, or directly make them better or worse off.

Contents:

Cover

Title page

Copyright page

Happiness and Well-Being

Contents

1 The Topics of Well-Being and Happiness

1.1 Ways a Life Can Be Good

1.1.1 Moral Goodness

1.1.2 Other Scales of Evaluation

1.2 More on the Philosophical Question of Well-Being

1.2.1 Why Philosophers of Well-Being Focus on Basic Prudential Value

1.3 The Question of the Nature of Happiness

1.3.1 Happiness and Well-Being

2 Objectivism and Subjectivism about Well-Being

2.1 A Preliminary List

2.2 A Test for Basic Goodness

2.2.1 Not Everything Fails the Test

2.3 The Euthyphro Question about Well-Being and Another Test

2.3.1 Not Everything Fails This Test Either

2.3.2 The Resonance Constraint on Well-Being

2.4 Subjectivism vs. Objectivism about Well-Being

2.4.1 Subjectivism about Well-Being

2.4.2 Objectivism about Well-Being

2.4.3 The Debate Between Subjectivists and Objectivists

Challenges to Subjectivist Views

Challenges to Objectivist Views

2.5 The Hybrid Theory

2.5.1 Evaluating the Hybrid Theory

The Hybrid Theory and the Resonance Constraint

The Hybrid Theory and Matters of Mere Taste

Hybrid Theories and Defective Interests

Hybrid Theories and Adaptive Preferences

2.6 Concluding Remarks

3 The Nature of Happiness

3.1 Phenomena that Travel Under the Label "Happiness"

3.2 Hedonism about Happiness

3.2.1 Objections to Hedonism about Happiness

3.3 The Whole-Life-Satisfaction Theory of Happiness

3.3.1 Evaluating Whole-Life Satisfactionism

Changing Assessments

Absent Assessments

Mismatched Assessments

Problems of Bias and Lability

3.4 The Emotional-State Theory of Happiness

3.5 Desire-Satisfaction Theories of Happiness

3.6 Eudaimonism about Happiness

4 Varieties of Subjectivism about Well-Being

4.1 Hedonism about Well-Being.

4.1.1 The Nature of Pleasure

The Distinctive-Feeling Theory of Pleasure

The Hedonic-Tone Theory of Pleasure

Attitude-Based Theories of Sensory Pleasure

Attitude-Based Theories of Attitudinal Pleasure

4.1.2 How the Nature of Pleasure Affects Its Value

4.1.3 Arguments for Hedonism about Well-Being

From Psychological Hedonism

From the Experience Requirement

From Erroneous Intuitions

4.1.4 Objections to Hedonism about Well-Being

Malicious Pleasure

Base Pleasure

The Experience Requirement Again

Plato's Oysterman

4.2 Happiness Theories of Well-Being

4.3 Desire-Based Theories of Well-Being

4.3.1 Two Advantages and An Initial Problem

The Orthodox Solution: Idealization

Against Idealization

4.3.2 Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up Revisited

In Defense of Bottom-Up Aggregation I: McTaggart's Oysterman

In Defense of Bottom-Up Aggregation II: Kraut's Baby

4.3.3 Remote Desires

A Restricting Solution

Enriching Solutions

An Awareness Constraint

Subjective Desire Satisfactionism about Well-Being, Pleasure, and Happiness

References.

Notes:

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 26 Oct 2021).

ISBN:

9781108586429

1108586422

9781108600378

1108600379

9781108580830

1108580831

OCLC:

1492983224