The politics of order in informal markets : how the state shapes private governance / Shelby Grossman, Stanford University, California.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Grossman, Shelby, author.

Series:

Cambridge studies in economics, choice, and society.

Cambridge studies in economics, choice, and society

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Informal sector (Economics)--Developing countries.

Informal sector (Economics).

Economic policy--Developing countries.

Economic policy.

Business and politics--Developing countries.

Business and politics.

Private companies--Developing countries.

Private companies.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xv, 149 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).

Place of Publication:

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2021.

Summary:

Property rights are important for economic exchange, but many governments don't protect them. Private market organizations can fill this gap by providing an institutional structure to enforce agreements, but with this power comes the ability to extort group members. Under what circumstances, then, will private organizations provide a stable environment for economic activity? Based on market case studies and a representative survey of traders in Lagos, Nigeria, this book argues that threats from the government can force an association to behave in ways that promote trade. The findings challenge the conventional wisdom that private good governance in developing countries thrives when the government keeps its hands off private group affairs. Instead, the author argues, leaders among traders behave in ways that promote trade primarily because of the threat of government intrusion.

Contents:

Cover

Title page

Copyright

Contents

Figures

Tables

Preface

Acknowledgments

1 Introduction

1.1 WHY THESE PRIVATE LEADERS MATTER

1.2 THE ARGUMENT: HOW THREATS OF STATE INTERFERENCE SUSTAIN PRIVATE PRO-TRADE POLICIES

1.3 BROADER IMPLICATIONS

1.4 ADDITIONAL FACTORS THAT MAY SHAPE PRIVATE GOOD GOVERNANCE

1.5 THE CONTEXT: LAGOS

1.6 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

1.7 OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

1.8 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

2 Market Associations: An Overview

2.1 MARKETS AND MARKET ASSOCIATIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

2.2 HISTORY OF POLITICS AND MARKETS IN LAGOS

2.3 CONTEMPORARY LAGOS MARKET ASSOCIATIONS

2.4 CONCLUSION

3 Conducting a Representative Survey of Informal Traders

3.1 SURVEYING INFORMAL TRADERS: SAMPLING AND RECRUITMENT

3.2 POLICING THE SAMPLING STRATEGY AND INCOMING DATA

3.3 DEFINING MARKET ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP

3.4 MEASURING FRICTIONS TO SORTING

3.5 SUMMARY STATISTICS

3.6 CONCLUSION

4 A Calm Sea Does not Make a Good Sailor: A Theory of Private Good Governance

4.1 CRITIQUES OF LITERATURE

4.2 PROVISION OF PRIVATE TRADE-PROMOTING POLICIES

4.3 COMPETITION

4.4 CORE PREDICTIONS

4.5 COLLUSION

4.6 RELATIONAL CONTRACTING

4.7 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

4.8 CONCLUSION

5 Government Threats and Group Leader Strength

5.1 A MARKET WHERE CITIZENS ARREST NORM VIOLATORS: THE CASE OF OKE ARIN

5.2 I DON'T KNOW WHAT THEY ARE USING THE MONEY FOR": THE CASE OF EBE EBE

5.3 THEY ARE NONCHALANT": THE CASE OF UNENGAGED MARKET LEADERS IN DABIRI

5.4 OUR ASSOCIATION HERE NA FOR DECORATION": THE CASE OF DESTINY ASSOCIATION

5.5 ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF MARKET GOOD GOVERNANCE

5.6 CONCLUSION

6 Business is Secret: Government Threats and Within-Group Competition

6.1 DATA

6.2 EVIDENCE

6.3 ASSESSING ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE.

6.4 CONCLUSION

7 Private Groups in Comparative Perspective

7.1 SUMMARY OF BOOK

7.2 WHEN AND WHERE WILL STATE THREATS MOTIVATE STRONG LEADERS TO PROMOTE TRADE?

7.3 BROADER IMPLICATIONS

7.4 PRIVATE GOVERNANCE AND GROUP MEMBER BUSINESS OUTCOMES

7.5 SHIFTING EQUILIBRIA

7.6 PRIVATE GOVERNANCE AND THE ECONOMY

Appendix A: Appendix to Chapter 2 - Market Associations: An Overview

Appendix B: Appendix to Chapter 3 - Conducting a Representative Survey of Informal Traders

Appendix C: Appendix to Chapter 4 - A Calm Sea Does not Make a Good Sailor: A Theory of Private Good Governance

Appendix D: Appendix to Chapter 6 - Government Threats and Within-Group Competition

Appendix E: Appendix to Chapter 7 - Private Groups in Comparative Perspective

Bibliography

Index.

Notes:

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 09 Jul 2021).

ISBN:

1-108-98810-5

1-108-98847-4

1-108-98498-3

OCLC:

1258782318