Dispute settlement reports 2019. Volume I, Pages 1-342 / World Trade Organization.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

World Trade Organization, copyright holder.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Foreign trade regulation--Cases.

Foreign trade regulation.

Tariff--Law and legislation--Cases.

Tariff.

Competition, Unfair--Cases.

Competition, Unfair.

Dispute resolution (Law)--Cases.

Dispute resolution (Law).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (341 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2021.

Summary:

These are the WTO's authorized and paginated reports in English. They are an essential addition to the library of all practising trade lawyers and a useful tool for students and academics worldwide working in the field of international economic or trade law. DSR 2019: Volume I contains the Appellate Body reports on 'Brazil - Certain Measures Concerning Taxation and Charges' (WT/DS472, WT/DS497).

Contents:

Cover

Title page

Half-title

Copyright information

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BRAZIL - CERTAIN MEASURES CONCERNING TAXATION AND CHARGES

Reports of the Appellate Body

LIST OF ANNEXES

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THESE REPORTS

PANEL EXHIBITS CITED IN THESE REPORTS

CASES CITED IN THESE REPORTS

1. INTRODUCTION

2. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTICIPANTS

3. ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTICIPANTS

4. ISSUES RAISED IN THIS APPEAL

5. ANALYSIS OF THE APPELLATE BODY

5.1 Articles III:2 and III:4 of the GATT 1994

5.1.1 Whether the Panel erred in finding that imported finished and intermediate ICT products were taxed in excess of like domestic finished and intermediate ICT products inconsistently with Article III:2, first sentence, of the GATT 1994

5.1.1.1 Whether the Panel erred in finding that imported finished ICT products were taxed in excess of like domestic finished ICT products

5.1.1.2 Whether the Panel erred in finding that imported intermediate ICT products were taxed in excess of like domestic intermediate ICT products

5.1.2 Whether the Panel erred in finding that the ICT programmes are inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994

5.1.2.1 Whether the Panel erred in finding that the accreditation requirements under the ICT programmes accord treatment less favourable to imported products than that accorded to like domestic products inconsistently with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994

5.1.2.2 Whether the Panel erred in finding that the ICT programmes are inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 by virtue of the lower administrative burden on companies purchasing incentivized domestic intermediate products

5.1.3 Whether the Panel erred in finding that the ICT programmes are inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement.

5.1.4 Whether the Panel erred in finding that the accreditation requirements under the INOVAR-AUTO programme are inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 because they are more burdensome for companies seeking accreditation as importers/distributors as opposed to domestic manufacturers

5.1.5 Whether the Panel erred in finding that the INOVARAUTO programme is inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement

5.2 Article III:8(b) of the GATT 1994

5.2.1 Introduction

5.2.2 The legal standard under Article III:8(b) of the GATT 1994

5.2.3 Whether the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of Article III:8(b) of the GATT 1994

5.2.4 Conclusion with respect to Article III:8(b)

5.2.5 Separate opinion of one Appellate Body Member on Article III:8(b) of the GATT 1994

5.3 Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement

5.3.1 Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement: PEC andRECAP programmes

5.3.1.1 Introduction

5.3.1.2 PEC and RECAP programmes

5.3.1.3 Whether the Panel erred in the application o fArticle 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement in determining the benchmark treatment

5.4 Article 3.1(b) the SCM Agreement

5.4.1 Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement: ICT programmes

5.4.1.1 Introduction

5.4.1.2 Panel's findings

5.4.1.3 The Panel's benchmark determination

5.4.1.4 Whether the Panel erred in its comparison of the benchmark treatment with the challenged treatment

5.4.1.5 Whether the Panel erred in finding that cash availability and implicit interest constitute revenue "otherwise due

5.4.2 Article 3.1(b) the SCM Agreement - import substitution

5.4.2.1 Introduction

5.4.2.2 Panel's findings

5.4.2.3 Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.

5.4.2.4 Whether the Panel erred in finding that the PPBs and other production-step requirements under the ICT programmes are inconsistent with Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994

5.4.2.4.1 Informatics programme

5.4.2.4.2 PADIS, PATVD, and Digital Inclusion programmes

5.4.2.4.3 INOVAR-AUTO programme

5.4.3 The European Union's and Japan's appeal concerning the in-house scenario

5.4.3.1 Introduction

5.4.3.2 Panel's findings

5.4.3.3 Analysis

5.5 Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause

5.5.1 Whether the Panel erred in finding that the claims raised by the European Union and Japan under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 were within its terms of reference

5.5.1.1 Whether the Panel erred in its interpretation of paragraph 4(a) of the Enabling Clause

5.5.1.2 Whether the Panel erred in finding that the differential tax treatment under the INOVARAUTOprogramme was not notified pursuant to paragraph 4(a) as having been adopted under paragraph 2(b) of the Enabling Clause

5.5.1.3 Whether the Panel erred in finding that the differential tax treatment under the INOVARAUTO programme was not notified pursuant to paragraph 4(a) as having been adopted under paragraph 2(c) of the Enabling Clause

5.5.2 Whether the Panel erred in its interpretation of paragraph 2(b) of the Enabling Clause and in finding that the differential tax treatment under the INOVAR-AUTO programme was not justified under that provision

5.5.3 Whether the Panel erred in its interpretation of paragraph 2(c) of the Enabling Clause and in finding that the differential tax treatment under the INOVAR-AUTO programme was not justified under that provision

5.5.4 Conclusion with respect to the Enabling Clause

5.6 Articles 11 and 12.7 of the DSU and Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement

5.6.1 Introduction.

5.6.2 Relevant legal standards under Articles 11 and 12.7 of the DSU and Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement

5.6.3 Whether the Panel acted inconsistently with Articles 11 and 12.7 of the DSU in recommending that Brazil withdraw the prohibited subsidies within 90 days

6. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Articles III:2 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement

6.1.1 Whether the Panel erred in finding that imported finishedICT products were taxed in excess of like domestic finishedICT products inconsistently with Article III:2, firstsentence, of the GATT 1994

6.1.2 Whether the Panel erred in finding that imported intermediate ICT products were taxed in excess of like domestic intermediate ICT products inconsistently with Article III:2, first sentence, of the GATT 1994

6.1.3 Whether the Panel erred in finding that the accreditation requirements under the ICT programmes accord treatment less favourable to imported products than that accorded to like domestic products inconsistently with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994

6.1.4 Whether the Panel erred in finding that theICT programmes are inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 by virtue of the lower administrative burden on companies purchasing incentivized domestic intermediate products

6.1.5 Whether the Panel erred in finding that the PPBs and other production-step requirements under the ICT programmes are contingent upon the use of domestic goods, inconsistently with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994

6.1.6 Whether the Panel erred in finding that the ICT programmes are inconsistent with Article 2.1 of theTRIMs Agreement.

6.1.7 Whether the Panel erred in finding that the accreditation requirements under the INOVAR-AUTO programme are inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 because they are more burdensome for companies seeking accreditation as importers/distributors as opposed to domestic manufacturers

6.1.8 Whether the Panel erred in finding that the INOVARAUTO programme is inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement

6.2 Article III:8(b) of the GATT 1994

6.3 Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement

6.4 Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement

6.5 Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 and the Enabling Clause

6.5.1 Whether the Panel erred in finding that the claims raised by the European Union and Japan under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 were within its terms of reference

6.5.2 Whether the Panel erred in its interpretation of paragraph 2(b) of the Enabling Clause and in finding that the differential tax treatment under the INOVAR-AUTO programme was not justified under that provision

6.5.3 Whether the Panel erred in its interpretation of paragraph 2(c) of the Enabling Clause and in finding that the differential tax treatment under the INOVAR-AUTO programme was not justified under that provision

6.6 Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement

6.7 Recommendation

ANNEX A

ANNEX A-1 BRAZIL'S NOTICE OF APPEAL

ANNEX A-2 THE EUROPEAN UNION'S NOTICE OF OTHER APPEAL

ANNEX A-3 JAPAN'S NOTICE OF OTHER APPEAL

ANNEX B

ANNEX B-1EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF BRAZIL'S APPELLANT'S SUBMISSION

ANNEX B-2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S OTHER APPELLANT'S SUBMISSION

ANNEX B-3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF JAPAN'S OTHER APPELLANT'S SUBMISSION

ANNEX B-4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF JAPAN'S APPELLEE'S SUBMISSION

ANNEX B-5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S APPELLEE'S SUBMISSION

ANNEX B-6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF BRAZIL'S APPELLEE'S SUBMISSION

ANNEX C.

ANNEX C-1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF ARGENTINA'S THIRD PARTICIPANT'S SUBMISSION.

Notes:

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 09 Apr 2021).

ISBN:

1-108-99803-8

1-108-99098-3

OCLC:

1293249817