1 option
Reciprocity, evolution, and decision games in network and data science / Yan Chen, University of Science and Technology of China, Chih-Yu Wang, Academia Sinica, Chunxiao Jiang, Tsinghua University, K.J. Ray Liu, University of Maryland, College Park.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Chen, Yan (Authority on networks), author.
- Wang, Chih-Yu, 1984- author.
- Liu, K. J. Ray, 1961- author.
- Jiang, Chunxiao, 1987- author.
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Game theory.
- System analysis.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (xv, 457 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).
- Edition:
- 1st ed.
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2021.
- Summary:
- Learn how to analyse and manage evolutionary and sequential user behaviours in modern networks, and how to optimize network performance by using indirect reciprocity, evolutionary games, and sequential decision making. Understand the latest theory without the need to go through the details of traditional game theory. With practical management tools to regulate user behaviour, and simulations and experiments with real data sets, this is an ideal tool for graduate students and researchers working in networking, communications, and signal processing.
- Contents:
- Cover
- Half-title
- Title page
- Copyright information
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Basic Game Theory
- 1.1 Strategic-Form Games and Nash Equilibrium
- 1.2 Extensive-Form Games and Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
- 1.3 Incomplete Information: Signal and Bayesian Equilibrium
- 1.4 Repeated Games and Stochastic Games
- Part I Indirect Reciprocity
- 2 Indirect Reciprocity Game in Cognitive Networks
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 The System Model
- 2.2.1 Social Norms
- 2.2.2 Action Rules
- 2.3 Optimal Action Rule
- 2.3.1 Reputation Updating Policy
- 2.3.2 Stationary Reputation Distribution
- 2.3.3 Payoff Function
- 2.3.4 Optimal Action Using an Alternative Algorithm
- 2.4 Action Spreading Due to Natural Selection
- 2.4.1 Action Spreading Algorithm Using the Wright-Fisher Model
- 2.4.2 Action Spreading Algorithm Using the Replicator Dynamic Equation
- 2.5 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy and Simulations
- 2.5.1 Binary Reputation Scenario
- 2.5.2 Multilevel Reputation Scenario
- 2.6 Conclusion
- References
- 3 Indirect Reciprocity Game for Dynamic Channel Access
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 System Model
- 3.2.1 Action
- 3.2.2 Social Norm: How to Assign Reputation
- 3.2.3 Power Level and Relay Power
- 3.2.4 Channel Quality Distribution
- 3.3 Theoretical Analysis
- 3.3.1 Reputation Updating Policy
- 3.3.2 Power Detection and Power Detection Transition Matrix
- 3.3.3 Stationary Reputation Distribution
- 3.3.4 Payoff Function and Equilibrium of the Indirect Reciprocity Game
- 3.3.5 Stability of the Optimal Action Rule
- 3.4 Simulation
- 3.4.1 Evolutionary Stability of Optimal Action a[sub(2) sup(*)]
- 3.4.2 System Performance
- 3.4.3 Different Social Norms
- 3.5 Conclusion
- 4 Multiuser Indirect Reciprocity Game for Cooperative Communications
- 4.1 Introduction
- 4.2 System Model.
- 4.2.1 Physical Layer Model with Relay Selection
- 4.2.2 Incentive Schemes Based on the Indirect Reciprocity Game
- 4.2.3 Overheads of the Scheme
- 4.2.4 Payoff Functions
- 4.3 Steady-State Analysis Using Markov Decision Processes
- 4.3.1 Stationary Reputation Distribution
- 4.3.2 Long-Term Expected Payoffs at Steady States
- 4.3.3 Equilibrium Steady State
- 4.4 Evolutionary Modeling of the Indirect Reciprocity Game
- 4.4.1 Evolutionary Dynamics of the Indirect Reciprocity Game
- 4.4.2 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
- 4.5 Energy Detection
- 4.6 Simulation Results
- 4.7 Discussion and Conclusion
- 5 Indirect Reciprocity Data Fusion Game and Application to Cooperative Spectrum Sensing
- 5.1 Introduction
- 5.2 Indirect Reciprocity Data Fusion Game
- 5.2.1 System Model
- 5.2.2 Action and Action Rule
- 5.2.3 Social Norm: How to Assign Reputation
- 5.2.4 Decision Consistency Matrix
- 5.2.5 Reputation Updating Policy
- 5.2.6 Payoff Function
- 5.2.7 Equilibrium of the Indirect Reciprocity Data Fusion Game
- 5.3 Application to Cooperative Spectrum Sensing
- 5.3.1 System Model
- 5.3.2 Fusion Game for the Single-Channel (K=1) and Hard Fusion Case
- 5.3.3 Fusion Game for the Single-Channel (K=1) and Soft Fusion Case
- 5.3.4 Fusion Game for the Multichannel (K>
- 1) Case
- 5.4 Simulation
- 5.4.1 The Optimal Action Rule and Its Evolutionary Stability
- 5.4.2 System Performance
- 5.4.3 Anticheating
- 5.5 Conclusion
- Part II Evolutionary Games
- 6 Evolutionary Game for Cooperative Peer-to-Peer Streaming
- 6.1 Introduction
- 6.2 The System Model and Utility Functions
- 6.2.1 System Model
- 6.2.2 Utility Functions
- 6.3 Agent Selection within a Homogeneous Group
- 6.3.1 Centralized Agent Selection
- 6.3.2 Distributed Agent Selection
- 6.3.3 Evolutionary Cooperative Streaming Game.
- 6.3.4 Analysis of the Cooperative Streaming Game
- 6.4 Agent Selection within a Heterogeneous Group
- 6.4.1 Two-Player Game
- 6.4.2 Multiplayer Game
- 6.5 A Distributed Learning Algorithm for an ESS
- 6.6 Simulation Results
- 6.7 Conclusion
- 7 Evolutionary Game for Spectrum Sensing and Access in Cognitive Networks
- 7.1 Introduction
- 7.2 System Model
- 7.2.1 Network Entity
- 7.2.2 Spectrum Sensing Model
- 7.2.3 Synchronous and Asynchronous Scenarios
- 7.3 Evolutionary Game Formulation for the Synchronous Scenario
- 7.3.1 Evolutionary Game
- 7.3.2 Replicator Dynamics of Spectrum Sensing
- 7.3.3 Replicator Dynamics of Spectrum Access
- 7.3.4 Analysis of the ESS
- 7.4 Evolutionary Game Formulation for the Asynchronous Scenario
- 7.4.1 ON-OFF Primary Channel Model
- 7.4.2 Analysis of SUs' Access Time T[sub(a)]
- 7.4.3 Analysis of the ESS
- 7.5 A Distributed Learning Algorithm for the ESSs
- 7.6 Simulation Results
- 7.6.1 ESSs of the Synchronous and Asynchronous Scenarios
- 7.6.2 Stability of the ESSs
- 7.6.3 Performance Evaluation
- 7.7 Conclusion
- 8 Graphical Evolutionary Game for Distributed Adaptive Networks
- 8.1 Introduction
- 8.2 Related Works
- 8.3 Graphical Evolutionary Game Formulation
- 8.3.1 Introduction to the Graphical Evolutionary Game
- 8.3.2 Graphical Evolutionary Game Formulation
- 8.3.3 Relationship to Existing Distributed Adaptive Filtering Algorithms
- 8.3.4 Error-Aware Distributed Adaptive Filtering Algorithm
- 8.4 Diffusion Analysis
- 8.4.1 Strategies and Utility Matrix
- 8.4.2 Dynamics of p[sub(m)] and q[sub(m|m)]
- 8.4.3 Diffusion Probability Analysis
- 8.5 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
- 8.5.1 ESS in Complete Graphs
- 8.5.2 ESS in Incomplete Graphs
- 8.6 Simulation Results
- 8.6.1 Mean-Square Performance
- 8.6.2 Diffusion Probability.
- 8.6.3 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
- 8.7 Conclusion
- 9 Graphical Evolutionary Game for Information Diffusion in Social Networks
- 9.1 Introduction
- 9.2 Diffusion Dynamics over Complete Networks
- 9.2.1 Basic Concepts of Evolutionary Game Theory
- 9.2.2 Evolutionary Game Formulation
- 9.2.3 Information Diffusion Dynamics over a Complete Network
- 9.3 Diffusion Dynamics over Uniform-Degree Networks
- 9.3.1 Basic Concepts of Graphical EGT
- 9.3.2 Graphical Evolutionary Game Formulation
- 9.3.3 Diffusion Dynamics over Uniform-Degree Networks
- 9.4 Diffusion Dynamics over Nonuniform-Degree Networks
- 9.4.1 General Case
- 9.4.2 Two Special Cases
- 9.5 Experiments
- 9.5.1 Synthetic Networks and a Real-World Network
- 9.5.2 Twitter Hashtag Data Set Evaluation
- 9.6 Conclusion
- 10 Graphical Evolutionary Game for Information Diffusion in Heterogeneous Social Networks
- 10.1 Introduction
- 10.2 Heterogeneous System Model
- 10.2.1 Basics of Evolutionary Game Theory
- 10.2.2 Unknown User-Type Model
- 10.2.3 Known User-Type Model
- 10.3 Theoretical Analysis for the Unknown User-Type Model
- 10.4 Theoretical Analysis for the Known User-Type Model
- 10.5 Experiments
- 10.5.1 Synthetic Data Experiments
- 10.5.2 Real Data Experiments
- 10.6 Discussion and Conclusion
- Part III Sequential Decision-Making
- 11 Introduction to Sequential Decision-Making
- 11.1 Decision-Making in Networks
- 11.2 Social Learning
- 11.3 Multiarmed Bandit
- 11.4 Reinforcement Learning
- 12 Chinese Restaurant Game: Sequential Decision-Making in Static Systems
- 12.1 Introduction
- 12.2 System Model
- 12.3 Equilibrium Grouping and Advantage in Decision Order
- 12.3.1 Equilibrium Grouping
- 12.3.2 Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
- 12.4 Signals: Learning Unknown States
- 12.4.1 Best Response of Customers.
- 12.4.2 Recursive Form of the Best Response
- 12.5 Simulation Results and Analysis
- 12.5.1 Advantage of Playing Positions vs. Signal Quality
- 12.5.2 Price of Anarchy
- 12.5.3 Case Study: Resource Pool and Availability Scenarios
- 12.6 Application: Cooperative Spectrum Access in Cognitive Radio Networks
- 12.6.1 System Model
- 12.6.2 Simulation Results
- 12.7 Conclusion
- 13 Dynamic Chinese Restaurant Game: Sequential Decision-Making in Dynamic Systems
- 13.1 Introduction
- 13.2 System Model
- 13.2.1 Bayesian Learning for the Restaurant State
- 13.3 Multidimensional MDP-based Table Selection
- 13.4 Application to Cognitive Radio Networks
- 13.4.1 System Model
- 13.4.2 Bayesian Channel Sensing
- 13.4.3 Belief State Transition Probability
- 13.4.4 Channel Access: Two Primary Channels Case
- 13.4.5 Channel Access: Multiple Primary Channels Case
- 13.4.6 Analysis of Interference to the PU
- 13.5 Simulation Results
- 13.5.1 Bayesian Channel Sensing
- 13.5.2 Channel Access in the Two Primary Channels Case
- 13.5.3 Fast Algorithm for Multichannel Access
- 13.5.4 Interference Performance
- 13.6 Conclusion
- 14 Indian Buffet Game for Multiple Choices
- 14.1 Introduction
- 14.2 System Model
- 14.2.1 Indian Buffet Game Formulation
- 14.2.2 Time Slot Structure of the Indian Buffet Game
- 14.3 Indian Buffet Game without Budget Constraints
- 14.3.1 Recursive Best Response Algorithm
- 14.3.2 Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
- 14.3.3 Homogeneous Case
- 14.4 Indian Buffet Game with Budget Constraints
- 14.4.1 Recursive Best Response Algorithm
- 14.4.2 Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
- 14.4.3 Homogeneous Case
- 14.5 Non-Bayesian Social Learning
- 14.6 Simulation Results
- 14.6.1 Indian Buffet Game without Budget Constraints
- 14.6.2 Indian Buffet Game with Budget Constraints.
- 14.6.3 Non-Bayesian Social Learning Performance.
- Notes:
- Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 09 Jul 2021).
- ISBN:
- 1-108-84903-2
- 1-108-85978-X
- OCLC:
- 1249715358
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